Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Topics in Education

Titel: Topics in Education

Stichwort: Erkenntnis bei Thomas: intellectus agens, i. possibilis, species intelligibilis, inneres Wort - Scotus

Kurzinhalt: The ontological structure of intellect in the writings of St Thomas may be represented schematically as follows; Scotus: kein intelligere (durchdringen des phantasmas); kein 2. inneres Wort

Textausschnitt: 1.1 Scholastic Theories

3/5 The ontological structure of intellect in the writings of St Thomas may be represented schematically as follows.1 There is an intellectus agens, on the one hand, and there are senses, imagination, phantasms, re-presentations of the data of sense, and an intellectus possibilis, on the other hand. The agent intellect illuminates the phantasm and uses it as an instrument to impress upon the possible intellect an intelligible species. The possible intellect, determined by the species, has an act, intelligere, understanding,2 and from that act there proceeds an inner word. It is a simple inner word, not a judgment, since in itself it is neither true nor false. The standard illustration of such an inner word is the definition. This simple inner word is followed by a reflective process, an activity named reductio ad principia, a reduction of the definition to its principles in intellectual light (intellectus agens) and in sense whence the phantasms were withdrawn. From that reflective process there proceeds a second inner word, the composition or division by affirmation or negation. (108; Fs) (notabene)

4/5 Such is the Thomist structure of intelligence. It can be established beyond any doubt or question from the writings of St Thomas that this is what he meant when he spoke of intellect. He gives, however, a strictly metaphysical account of the psychological process, that apparently does not appeal to data of consciousness.3 (108; Fs)

5/5 In the thought of Duns Scotus, of course, there is presented a different setup, first from the ontological point of view. Scotus speaks of the intellective power, and he does not wish to determine whether or not it is to be divided into agent and possible intellect. He also recognizes the existence of the phantasm and the use of the phantasm by the intellective power to impress upon intellect - whether agent intellect is really distinct from possible intellect or not is not settled - an intelligible species. But that intelligible species corresponds, not to the Thomist intelligible species, but to the Thomist simple inner word. Intellect takes a look at that species, and when it does so it is knowing a concept. It can form several species, take a look at two at a time, compare them, see whether they are compossible, compatible or incompatible, or necessarily connected. (108f; Fs)
(notabene)
eg: Also, Scotus' species intelligibilis entspricht dem ersten inneren Wort bei Thomas (folglich lässt er den Prozess des intelligere aus und hat die Auffassung eines Erkennens durch "Sehen"), dann verquickt er dieses innere Worte, indem er es zugleich als Begriff auffasset, mit dem, was bei Thomas das zweite innere Wort ist.

6/5 Clearly we have here two quite different ontological accounts of the structure of intellect. But there is also a difference in the psychological content. There is abundant evidence in the writings of St Thomas that the act of understanding, intelligere, regards not only the inner word but also the phantasm. Scotus denies the possibility of that. What understanding would see in the phantasm either is universal or it is particular. If it is particular, then we have not understanding, but sense, for sense knows the particular. If it is universal, then understanding is suffering from an illusion, because there is no universal in the phantasm. The traditional or regular Thomist answer to that, of course, is the distinction between the potential and the actual. The phantasm is potentially intelligible, but the intelligible in act is identical with the intellect in act. (109; Fs) (notabene)

7/5 Another difference is that the Scotist analysis leads to a conceptualized universe. Scotus saw the need for a further intellectual intuition of the existing and present as existing and present, if one is to know whether or not this conceptualized network exists. That is not the case with St Thomas. For St Thomas judgment proceeds from the reductio ad principia of reflection. (109; Fs)

8/5 We have two presentations, then, and the difference between them raises a question of fact. Does understanding regard phantasms or does it not? In general, I believe there is no possibility of doubt that understanding does occur with respect to phantasms. However, it is very difficult to get some people to admit that this is the case because, if they do, they have to face epistemological questions that otherwise they could dodge. It is the existence and the dodging of those epistemological questions that, to my mind, accounts for the fact that what Aristotle and Thomas were talking about when they spoke about the intelligible in the sensible has been totally disregarded for a number of centuries by people proclaiming themselves to be Aristotelians and Thomists.4 (109f; Fs)