Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas

Titel: Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas

Stichwort: Apprehensive Abstraction; Identität: forma intelligibilis, quidditas rei (species intelligibilis), object of intellect

Kurzinhalt: quidditas rei materialis, primo et per se cognitum, human intellect: potency of a form that actuates matter; the agent object of apprehensive abstraction (insight)

Textausschnitt: In the universal hierarchy of cognoscitive potencies human intellect holds an intermediate place. Sense is the first act of a material organ, and so its object is a form existing in matter as it exists in matter. Angelic intellect is the potency of a pure form, and so its object is a pure form. But human intellect is neither the act of an organ, as sense, nor the potency of a pure form, as angelic intellect; it is the potency of a form that actuates matter, and so its object must be a form, existing indeed in matter, but not as it exists in matter.
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one must first distinguish conversion to phantasm from reflection on phantasm, and secondly, settle precisely what is meant by conversion. Now conversion and reflection are quite distinct both in themselves and in their consequents. They are distinct in themselves:
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But plainly there is no difficulty in reconciling the necessity of sight converting to color with the fact that color is what sight first and directly knows; similarly, there is no difficulty in reconciling the necessity of possible intellect converting to phantasm to know the quiddity with the statement that possible intellect first and directly knows the quiddity in the phantasm.
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In the Contra Gentiles the actual intelligibility of phantasm is clarified: in the dark colors are visible in potency; in daylight they are visible in act but seen in potency; they are seen in act only inasmuch as sight is in act; similarly, prior to the illumination of agent intellect, phantasms are intelligible in potency; by that illumination they become intelligible in act but understood only in potency; they are understood in act only inasmuch as the possible intellect is in act. Moreover, there occurs a description of the intelligibility in act of phantasm: the species intelligibilis is said to shine forth in phantasm as the exemplar does in the example or image.
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As has been already explained, the object of insight into phantasm is preconceptual, so that any expression of it is as conceived and not as such, just as any expression of the object of sight is of it as conceived and not as such. It is this fact that accounts for the variety of the descriptions one finds.
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In the In Boetium De Trinitate there occurs an identification of
(1) 'forma intelligibilis,'
(2) 'quidditas rei,' and
(3) object of intellect. Since 'species' translates Aristotle's eidos, which regularly means form, it is not surprising that the object of insight should be named not only 'forma intelligibilis' but also 'species intelligibilis.' Thus, the species that shines forth in phantasm is an object of intellectual knowledge; again, the species that intellect understands, knows, apprehends in phantasm, plainly is an object; and in such statements not only the thought but also the expression is Aristotelian.
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Finally, the object of insight, besides being 'quidditas sive natura rei materialis,' 'forma intelligibilis,' and 'species intelligibilis,' also is the universal which is not posterior but prior, not with, but without the 'intentio universalitatis,' and concretely though inadequately identical with the particular material thing, just as the Aristotelian quiddity is concretely though inadequately identical with the particular.