Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas

Titel: Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas

Stichwort: Form, species: in der 2-fachen Bedeutung in Übereinstimmung mit Lehre und Einsicht

Kurzinhalt: Beispiel: Wille aktuiert als Habitus setzt noch nicht den Willensakt zum Ziel; operatio mehr als Form; processio operationis u. p. operati; so wie die Form nicht Wirkursache des Seins ist, so die species WU des intelligere

Textausschnitt: 220 It may not be out of place to note how exactly this fits in both with general doctrine and with intellectual theory. It is in accord with the general doctrine that the efficient cause not merely produces the form but also produces the movement consequent to the form1 that what produces the species should also produce the consequent intelligere. It is in accord with the general doctrine that form is less perfect than operation2 and so not its proportionate cause, that the species should not move intellect to the act intelligere. It is in accord with the general doctrine 'quidquid movetur ab alio movetur'3 that intellect actuated by species should not produce its acts of understanding, just as the will actuated by a habit does not produce its act of willing the end; on the other hand, just as will actually willing the end moves itself to willing the means4 so intellect actually understanding is able to utter, constitute, produce its inner word of definition or judgment. (137; Fs)

221 Further, the passage before us accords with specific intellectual doctrines. It makes it quite clear why the procession of the act of understanding is only a 'processio operationis,' while the procession of the act of defining or of judging is a 'processio operati.'5 It is quite in harmony with the statement, 'sicut enim esse consequitur formam, ita intelligere sequitur speciem intelligibilem,'6 for no form is efficient cause of its esse and similarly species is not the efficient cause of intelligere. Again, it harmonizes with the parallel statement that '[...] intelligere, quod ita se habet ad intellectum in actu, sicut esse ad ens in actu';7 for the ens in actu is not the efficient cause of its esse. Finally, of course, there is no opposition between this scheme of analysis and the preceding; when (intellect actuated by) species is said to be the principle of action or the principle of operation, it is not said to be the principle of an effect; as we have seen, these two are repeatedly distinguished by St Thomas. (137f; Fs) (notabene)