Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas

Titel: Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas

Stichwort: Erleiden, pati; pati proprie - pati communiter; "actus perfectus" als "pati"; operatio und actio im Sinne von Seinsakt; pathesis, pathos - poiesis , poiema

Kurzinhalt: ... the influence of Aristotle did lead Aquinas to use operatio and actio in the sense of act or of being in act; and in that sense there is no absurdity - on the contrary, there is a necessity - in saying that such act in a creature is a patii communiter

Textausschnitt: 3. Pati

16/3 There is no difficulty in thinking of movement in the strict sense of actus imperfecti as a pati. But there appears to be enormous difficulty in thinking of movement in the broad sense, which includes the actus perfecti, as a pati. Since that difficulty necessarily tends to the substitution of what someone else thinks for what Aquinas said, we must endeavor to surmount it at once. We begin from the variety of meanings of the term pati in Aquinas's source. (116; Fs)

17/3 In the Ethics Aristotle recognizes in the soul three things: potencies, habits, and pathê. The last are illustrated by desire, anger, fear, boldness, envy, joy, friendliness, hate, longing, rivalry, pity, and in general the feelings accompanied by pleasure or pain.1 Secondly, in a logical context Aristode will speak of idia pathê, which are attributes or properties, even of ideal numbers.2 Thirdly, and this is the fundamental usage, pathos is connected with the species of movement called alteration. In general, alteration is defined as change of quality,3 but the quality subject to such change is restricted to the sensibilia per se et propria such as the white and black, the heavy and light, the hot and cold, the hard and soft, and so forth.4 Pathê are such qualities as such; they are also the process of change of such qualities; especially, they are such change when it is for the worse.5 Fourthly, in close connection with the foregoing there is the account of the affective qualities in the Categories?6 though the feelings of the Ethics are also relevant here.7 Fifthly, with reference to any movement in the strict sense Aristotle distinguishes the passive process (pathêsis) and the received term (pathos) of the incomplete act, and these he maintains to be really identical with the production (poiêsis) and the effected term (poiêma) respectively of the same incomplete act.8 Sixthly, in an extended sense already noted, paschein is employed to denote sensation which is an act of the completed;9 it is to be observed that the theorem of the identity of action and passion is extended to this usage on the ground that without such an identity it would be necessary for every mover to be moved.10 (116f; Fs)


183 The complexity of Aristotelian usage pours into the writings of Aquinas. In the Sentences some nine meanings of pati are distinguished; the basic meaning is considered to be 'alteration for the worse,' and other meanings are allowed greater or less propriety according to their approximation to what is considered basic.1 In later works this jungle growth is cut through with a distinction between pati proprie and pati communiter?"2 To pati proprie is assigned the province of Aristotelian physics and, as well, the linguistic associations of pati with suffering and of passio with human passions. On the other hand, pati communiter is a purely metaphysical idea; it is somewhat less general than 'being an effect,' for it presupposes a subject; it is described as recipere, as something found in every creature, as something following necessarily from the potentiality involved in every creature However, there seems to be a concentration on the moment of reception,3 and it is pointed out that, since this pati involves no diminution of the recipient, it might be better named a perfici.4 (117f; Fs)

184 The question before us is whether operation or action as actus perfecti can be called a pati in the sense of a received perfection. The difficulty here, insofar as I have been able to grasp it, lies in distinguishing between the grammatical subject of a transitive verb in the active voice and, on the other hand, the ontological subject of the exercise of efficient causality.a When it is true that 'I see,' it is also true that "I" is the grammatical subject of a transitive verb in the active voice. But it is mere confusion to conclude immediately that "I" also denotes the ontological subject of the exercise of efficient causality. Further, it may or may not be true that one must conclude mediately from the transitive verb to the efficient cause; with such abstract questions I am not concerned. But it is false to suppose that either Aristotle or Aquinas acknowledged or drew such a conclusion. I quote: (118; Fs)

Videbatur enim repugnare, quod sentire dicitur in actu, ei quod dictum est, quod sentire est quoddam pati et moveri. Esse enim in actu videtur magis pertinere ad agere. Et ideo ad hoc exponendum dicit [Aristoteles], quod ita dicimus sentire in actu, ac si dicamus, quod pati et moveri sint quoddam agere, idest quoddam esse in actu. Nam motus est quidam actus, sed imperfectus, ut dictum est in tertio Physicorum. Est enim actus existentis in potentia, scilicet mobilis. Sicut igitur motus est actus, ita moveri et sentire est quoddam agere, vel esse secundum actum.5

185 The question is, How can one speak of sensing in act, when one has maintained that sensing is a matter of undergoing change and being moved? For sensing in act seems to be just the opposite of being changed and being moved, namely, acting. The answer is that there is an acting which is simply being in act, and simply being in act is not opposed to being changed and being moved. On the contrary, movement itself is defined as an act. If there is no difficulty about defining movement as an act, though it is an imperfect one, there is no difficulty in saying that the pati of sensation is an act and in that sense an acting. (119; Fs) (notabene)

186 Next, one may ask whether this Aristotelian viewpoint is to be found in Aquinas's independent writings. Let us begin by noting two senses of the term 'operatic.' In many contexts it denotes the exercise of efficient causality, for example, 'Deus operatur in omni operante.' But such usage certainly is not exclusive, and, I believe, it is not the most fundamental. For operatio also means simply 'being in act,' as does the etymologically parallel energeia; and in this sense it is a perfection which, in a creature, is received and so is a pati or a passio of the operating subject. Thus, Aquinas spoke of an 'operatio non activa sed receptiva.'6 He urged that the fact that sense had an operation did not make sense an active potency; for all powers of the soul have operations but most of them are passive potencies.7 He pointed out that nature provides suitable principles for operations; when the operation is an action, the principle is an active potency; and when the operation consists in a passion, the principle is a passive potency.8 He distinguished the operation of a mover, such as heating or cutting, the operation of what is moved, such as being heated or being cut, and the operation of what exists in act without tending to effect change.9 He defined potency as just the principle of operation, whether that be action or passion.10 (119; Fs)

187 Finally, so familiar to Aquinas was the notion of operation as passive, as something to be predicated not of the mover but of the moved, that in speaking of operative grace he found it necessary to explain that in this instance operation was to be attributed to the mover because it was the operation of an effect: 'operatio enim alicuius effectus non attribuitur mobili, sed moventi.'11 That explanation would seem to be rather superfluous today when people think it a contradiction in terms to speak of the operating subject as being moved. (119f; Fs)

188 What is true of operatic also is true of actio. In an early period these terms are contrasted,12 but later they are juxtaposed in opposition to factio,13 and such equivalence subsequently seems to be maintained. Frequently enough, then, actio means the exercise of efficient causality. But this meaning is not the only meaning. It also means simply actus. It is actio in the sense of actus that is the actuality of virtue, as being is the actuality of substance.14 It is actio in the sense of actus that is the complement of potency and stands to potency as second act to first.15 It is actio in the sense of actus that pertains to an active potency or to a passive potency.16 It is actio in the sense of actus that makes it possible to define passion as the actio of alterable quality,17 and as the actio of the patient.18 Finally, the action that goes forth into external matter would seem to have a prescriptive claim to denoting the exercise of efficient causality; but in an earlier work one may read that transient action is the act and perfection of the patient;19 and in later works one may read that transient action is the action and perfection of the patient,20 and the action and perfection of the transformed matter.21 Presumably, passive potencies and patients and transformed matter have an actio not in the sense that they are exercising efficient causality but in the sense that they are in act. (120; Fs)

189 To conclude, the influence of Aristotle did lead Aquinas to use operatio and actio in the sense of act or of being in act; and in that sense there is no absurdity - on the contrary, there is a necessity - in saying that such act in a creature is a pati communiter. However, before making any applications to the act, the action, the operation of understanding, it will be necessary to consider the notion of active potency. (120f; Fs)