Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas

Titel: Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas

Stichwort: 3 Arten von intellekturellen Habitus, duale Weisheit; Weisheit als Grund von Intellekt u. Wissenschaft

Kurzinhalt: science, intellect, wisdom; habit of intellect: the first principles of demonstrations; habit of wisdom: the first principles of reality; Intellekt u. Weisheit in Bezug auf Erfassung d Prinzipien; virtus quaedam omnium scientiarum

Textausschnitt: There are, then, three habits of speculative intellect. Most easily recognized of the three is the habit of science, which has to do with the demonstration of conclusions. However, demonstration does not admit indefinite regress, and so there must be some prior habit that regards first principles. In fact, two such prior habits are affirmed, intellect and wisdom ... For the habit of intellect regards the first principles of demonstrations, while the habit of wisdom regards the first principles of reality. The habit of intellect is comparatively simple: grasp of first principles of demonstrations results from knowledge of their component terms; if one knows what a whole is and what a part is, one cannot but see that the whole must be greater than its part; the habit of such seeing is the habit of intellect.
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On the other hand, the habit of wisdom has a dual role. Principally, it regards the objective order of reality; but in some fashion it also has to do with the transition from the order of thought to the order of reality. ... While art orders human products, and prudence orders human conduct, science discovers the order which art prudently exploits; but there is a highest, architectonic science, a science of sciences - and that is wisdom.
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The habit of intellect is the habit of knowing the first principles of demonstrations; but knowledge of first principles is just a function of knowledge of their component terms. If the simple apprehension of these terms is a matter of direct understanding, still it is wisdom that passes judgment on the validity of such apprehensions and so by validating the component terms validates even first principles themselves.
... Hence both intellect and science depend upon the judgment of wisdom. Intellect depends upon wisdom for the validity of the component terms of principles; science depends upon wisdom for the validity of its consequence from intellect; so that wisdom, besides being in its own right the science of the real as real, also is 'virtus quaedam omnium scientiarum.'