Autor: Melchin, R. Kenneth

Buch: History, Ethics and Emegent Probability

Titel: History, Ethics and Emegent Probability

Stichwort: Geschichte als Meinung - 3 Einwände; Gegenpositionen (Unterbewusstsein, ökonomische Verhältnisse) -> Selbstaufhebung des Subjekts

Kurzinhalt: In each of these three objections what is at issue is the extent to which subjective acts of intelligence ... are decisive in constituting the over-arching course of history.

Textausschnitt: 6.4 History as Meaning

34/6 There exist at least three fundamental problems with conceiving the structure and dynamism of history in terms of acts of meaning. My procedure here will be to develop some of the foundational notions operative in Lonergan's account of the structure of history and society in the course of meeting these problems. And so an initial presentation of the problems would be in order here. (177; Fs)

35/6 First. While acts of meaning are certainly performed by human subjects, it can be argued that such acts are seldom, if ever, self-constituting or self-regulating. Rather, a myriad of 'internal' psychic, affective and physiological processes of subjects exercise an overwhelming influence upon human intelligent activity, so much so that (in an extreme view) meanings are essentially derivative of such 'internal' processes. Thus, history, conceived as decisively ordered by acts of subjects, is to be explained in terms of the patterns and regularities of subconscious life or, for example, in terms of repressed sexuality rather than in terms of subjectively constituted meaning.1 (177; Fs)

36/6 Second. While meanings are acts of human subjects, historical processes are rarely intended or foreseen by individuals. The battle plans of generals seldom explain the outcome of wars. In addition, the subtly but pervasively operative symbols and images of a society, of a culture, are rarely the result of acts of understanding of citizens of that society or culture. Thus Matthew Lamb criticizes Wilhelm Dilthey for not adequately handling 'the larger systems in history which could not be understood as expressing a given individual's presence.'2 (177; Fs)

36/6 Third. Meanings of individuals emerge in a social context in which the individual participates. But the individual's mode of participation in that context is, for the most part, determined by the economic structure of that society, its modes of production, its habitual routines, its traditional divisions among classes, its patterns of ownership and control over the institutions of society, etc., etc. It is not the meanings that determine the dynamic patterns of historical change but the operative relations of society and economy and the regular order in which such relations are transformed over the history of civilizations.3 (178; Fs)

37/6 In each of these three objections what is at issue is the extent to which subjective acts of intelligence, and more specifically one's own 'interpretation' of oneself, are decisive in constituting the over-arching course of history. Lonergan recognizes that there is a truth to be grasped in each of the objections. But he would argue that at the extreme pole of each, the significance and indeed the possibility of human knowing and human responsible acting is either precluded or rendered insignificant for the course of human life. Lonergan would note that the very act of putting forward an extreme view, in each case, would involve the subject in a contradiction. For each objection itself intends a truth about human life which is not simply to be explained away in terms of inner or outer pre-conditions surrounding its author's cognitional activity. And each intends a decisive reversal of a long-standing history of misunderstanding, and thus each claims to be a significant contribution to man's development. But it is in coming to understand the truth intended by each objection that a fuller understanding of the role of cognitional and responsible activity in human society and history is to be gained.4 (178; Fs) (notabene)