Autor: Vertin, Michael -- Mehrere Autoren: Lonergan Workshop, Volume 8

Buch: Lonergan's "Three Basic Questions" and a Philosophy of Philosophies

Titel: Michael Vertin, Lonergan's "Three Basic Questions" and a Philosophy of Philosophies

Stichwort: Philosophie der Philosophien intuitive operational prä-empirische Grundlegung (intuitive operational pre-empirical foundationalism); Owens, Hepburn

Kurzinhalt: (i) Apparent knowing does indeed occur in me, and it distinctively consists of INTUITIVE operations;
(ii) that assertion is based upon PRE-EMPIRICAL OPERATIONAL EVIDENCE and thus is OPERATIONALLY INCONTROVERTIBLE; and

Textausschnitt: iii. intuitive operational pre-empirical foundationalism

241b Their stand on the basic phenomenological issue is what distinguishes philosophers in our third major group from those in the fourth. As before, so also here the members of the group have at least three joint views. The first is that apparent cognitional operations essentially are functionally immediate or intuitive in kind, though there is disagreement about the precise character of that intuitivity. Some see it as uniquely intentional, involving the bipolar functional immediacy of cognitional act and distinct cognitional content. Others see it as uniquely nonintentional, with the monopolar functional immediacy of cognitional act that is its own cognitional content. For still others, the intuitivity is intentional in one dimension of the operations and nonintentional in another. The second joint view is that the evidence to which one properly appeals in asserting the first joint view is the pre-empirical evidence intrinsic to the concrete performance of seriously asserting any view at all. Apparent cognitional operations are essentially intuitive; in any denial of that intuitivity the act of denial would be intuitive and thus would operationally contradict the content of the denial; hence to maintain the denial consistently is concretely impossible. The third joint view is that the first two joint views together manifest the overall pattern of what is methodologically the most fundamental of all philosophical stands. Let us call this threefold view "intuitive operational pre-empirical foundationalism" and sum it up in this way:

A. 1 (Intuitive Operational Pre-Empirical Foundationalism):
(i) Apparent knowing does indeed occur in me, and it distinctively consists of INTUITIVE operations;
(ii) that assertion is based upon PRE-EMPIRICAL OPERATIONAL EVIDENCE and thus is OPERATIONALLY INCONTROVERTIBLE; and
(iii) the first two assertions constitute the general form of the fundamental determinative member of the integral set of basic philosophical stances. (Fs)

242a Two examples: "intentional intuitionism" as just characterized may also be called "(phenomenological) naive realism"; and I would propose Joseph Owens as a philosopher holding a version of this view (Owens, 1968: 14-43). Again, "nonintentional intuitionism" as just characterized may also be called "(phenomenological) naive idealism"; and I am inclined to think that the claims of certain so-called "introvertive" mystics illustrate this view (Hepburn, 1967: 429-34). Finally, for each version of the intuitive operational pre-empirical foundationalist stand on the basic phenomenological issue there are correlatively specified stands on the basic phenomenological-epistemological and epistemological-metaphysical issues, and, in consequence, on the basic epistemological and metaphysical issues. (Fs)