Autor: Liddy, Richard M.

Buch: Transforming Light

Titel: Transforming Light

Stichwort: Erkenntnislehre, Konverison, Definition, Grundirrtum

Kurzinhalt: Epistemologie, persönliche Angelegenheit, Brief v. 1935, nexus, Scotus, intellektuelle Konversion, agens

Textausschnitt: () 'An exact account of knowledge raises the epistemological problems in a real fashion, not merely in the sense of refuting adversaries, but also in the sense of solving personal problems-and not how I am going to help other people that are in difficulties, but how I'm going to help myself!
()
... process of self-appropriation taking place, not publicly, but privately. The process takes place in the hiddenness of one's presence to oneself and one's growing knowledge of oneself. Nevertheless, as Lonergan goes on to say in the same introduction, though the act is private, both its antecedents and its consequents have their public manifestation.
()
The issue is joined. The Scotist and Suarezian presupposition of intellectual knowledge as 'seeing the nexus' between the concepts of a universal judgment is the basic misunderstanding in most philosophical thought.
()
In Lonergan's future writings he will maintain that this basic misinterpretation of intellectual knowledge as a type of 'seeing' is the fundamental error in cognitional theory. It is at the root of the basic counter-positions in philosophy, whether in their naive realist, empiricist, or idealist forms. Let us call to mind his definition of intellectual conversion from thirty-seven years later. 'Intellectual conversion is a radical clarification and, consequently, the elimination of an exceedingly stubborn and misleading myth concerning reality, objectivity, and knowledge. The myth is that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is out there now to be looked at.'
()
I can work out a luminous and unmistakable meaning to intellectus agens et possibilis, abstractio, conversio to phantasm, etc., etc. The Thomists cannot even give a meaning to most of this.'
()
I am certain (and I am not one who becomes certain easily) that I can put together a Thomistic metaphysic of history that will throw Hegel and Marx, despite the enormity of their influence on this very account, into the shade.