Autor: Liddy, Richard M.

Buch: Transforming Light

Titel: Transforming Light

Stichwort: Substanz, Akzidenz, distinctio realis, Sein, Wesen; "kausale" Erklärung d. Substanz, Unterschied: Intelligibilität - Existenz

Kurzinhalt: ... there is no real distinction between substance and accidents as the scholastic theory requires ... Lonergan distinguishes the intelligibility of the object from the fact that the object exists

Textausschnitt: 13/5 Unlike Kantian theory in which the apprehension of the object is according to the formal category of substance, Lonergan's analysis is 'not formal but causal.' (80; Fs)

The substance therefore is not only what unifies the different appearances of the object and makes it ens per se, a thing by itself distinct from other things; it is also the cause of the appearances. In other words, the appearances are the substance manifested to us sensibly. Hence there is no real distinction between the substance and the appearances; that is, there is no real distinction between substance and accidents as the scholastic theory requires. For example, the white of the object is not something objectively different from the object itself; white is what the object appears to be to the eye.1 [...] Again, not only is the substance the cause of the appearances but also it is the explanation of its action and reaction [...]. We may remark that being the explanation of action includes being the explanation or cause of sensation (in so far as sensation is caused by the object perceived and not by the subject perceiving).2

14/5 The action and reaction of the substance is according to intelligible law and this follows from the intelligibility of reality. Such intelligible law is progressively discovered by developing human intelligence. (80; Fs)

15/5 It is remarkable in these notes that there is a section prefiguring Lonergan's program in Insight, that is, a program of unifying all the sciences in a 'science of sciences' based on developing understanding. 'In so far as the critical metaphysic is a view or theory of reality, it is more pronouncedly positive and inductive; it takes advantage of all human understanding or science of the objective world and is, in the theoretic order, a science of sciences [...]. Critical metaphysic takes the explanations arrived at in every field of science - physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, history, ethics, etc. - and frames a unified view of reality in its totality.'3 Lonergan distinguishes the intelligibility of the object from the fact that the object exists and thus touches on the scholastic doctrine of the real distinction of essence and existence. (80f; Fs)

The law of the object is distinct from the fact that the object exists. This distinctness is due to the nature of our knowledge. For the fact of existence is known by apprehension; the law of the object is known by understanding. Knowledge consists of a conjunction of presentation and understanding into one whole; the pure presentation of experience and the pure intellection (abstract idea) are the entia quibus of knowledge (human). This distinction the scholastic theory objectifies by a real distinction between essence and existence; it puts the composition, not in the mind, but in some very obscure way, in the object. Whether the critical metaphysician will assert such a real distinction or not, I shall discuss presently. But if he does, it will not be due to the distinction in the mind but only on the analogy of this distinction and as a theory to explain definite facts.4

16/5 These written fragments by Lonergan contain no further comments on the 'real distinction,' but since he had already denied the scholastic theory of the real distinction between substance and accident, and since he is at the very least ambiguous in his attitude toward it in the above quote, it is safe to say that at this time it is not a doctrine on which he has convictions. (81; Fs)