Autor: Tekippe, Terry J.

Buch: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Titel: What Is Lonergan Up to in Insight?

Stichwort: Erkenntnistheorie, Maßstab, Thomas

Kurzinhalt: Urteil: Kriterium der Wahrheit, Definition v. Wahrheit, Sth, F1_016 q2, Erkenntnistheorie als Maßstab für Philosophiegeschichte, Realismus, Empirismus, Idealismus

Textausschnitt: () Thomas's argument begins with the definition of truth: it is the conformity of mind with reality. So to know truth is to know that conformity. It is not enough to be in conformity with reality, then; one must also know the conformity. But the senses, though they may be in conformity with reality, do not know the conformity: hence truth is not to be sought there. Again, an insight or a concept may be in conformity with reality; but it does not know that conformity, for the question has not yet arisen. Is that true? The conformity of mind and reality is only known, then, in judgment.
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Accordingly truth is defined as conformity between intellect and thing. Hence to know that conformity is to know truth. Sense however does not know that conformity in any way; for although sight possesses the likeness of the visible thing, it does not know the correspondence between the thing and what it apprehends about it. Intellect can know its own conformity to the thing known; yet it does not grasp that conformity in the mere act of knowing the essence of a thing. But when the intellect judges that the thing corresponds to the form of the thing which it apprehends then for the first time it knows and affirms truth. [...] Therefore properly speaking truth is in the intellect in its function of affirming and denying one reality of another; and not in sense, nor in intellect knowing the meaning
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Here is the way that Thomas himself explains it: ... eg. Das erkannte Ding ist Form des Intellekts ...
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But perhaps enough has been said to suggest how one might construct a whole history of philosophy from the critical standpoint of the structure of consciousness.