Autor: Manent, Pierre

Buch: An Intellectual History of Liberalism

Titel: An Intellectual History of Liberalism

Stichwort: Benjamin Constant 1; von der Gleichheit im Naturzustand (führt zum absoluten Souverän) zu jener in Geschichte; G. als Autorität

Kurzinhalt: If history is the authority, if the "natural" arena of history's action is civil society, then political authority finds itself in an essentially subordinate position... But, one might say, cannot history's authority also serve to justify despotism?

Textausschnitt: CHAPTER VIII
Benjamin Constant and the Liberalism of Opposition

84a It was undoubtedly with Benjamin Constant that the liberal ambivalence toward the revolutionary event was most perceptible. On the one hand, he was unreservedly for the Revolution and against the ancien regime; he approved of not only its principles, but even certain of its less liberal measures. On the other hand, he was an extremely penetrating and severe critic of the "spirit" or "style" or "mores" of revolutionary, and later imperial, politics. This is how he conceived of the Revolution's meaning: "Regardless of the various banners under which people have embarked on and supported that struggle we have witnessed, and of which we have often been victims, it has always been fundamentally the struggle of the elective against the hereditary system. It is the principal question of the French Revolution, and so to speak, the question of the century."1 Constant was also on the side of the elective system since it is founded on equality, which is the ultimate goal of human history: "The perfectibility of the human species is nothing other than the tendency toward equality.... Equality alone conforms to the truth, that is to the respective relationships of things and men to each other."2 (Fs)

84b Equality no longer has its place in the hypothetical state of nature imagined by the prerevolutionary liberals, a hypothesis Constant ridiculed. Its place is history, more precisely the completion of history, conceived of as the necessary progress of equality. One could also say that history appears as an incorporating notion, as the newly perceived element in which humanity transforms itself, because the different political, social, and religious forms can be considered together, described, and classified in terms of a growing equality. At the same time, however, Constant follows the works of the state of nature theorists even though he disdains them. If he considers that "equality alone conforms to truth," it is not because these theorists demonstrated that political legitimacy could be conceived of and produced only by starting from the hypothesis of equal individuals. Why then consider that the elective or representative regime is founded on the authority of history, an arena of human perfectibility, rather than on that of nature? (Fs; tblStw: Politik) (notabene)

85a I suggested earlier a few of the reasons why liberal authors, and more generally postrevolutionary authors, had accepted this substitution of authority. In Constant's case, there was also a very specific political reason. The hypothesis of the state of nature leads necessarily, as we have seen, to founding the body politic on the idea of an absolute or supreme sovereignty. For Constant, the Revolution had just proved that there is no more dangerous idea for political liberties and even for simple social propriety. On the other hand, what is to be represented is no longer the individual's absolute right to self-preservation, but a complex group of previously constituted and incessantly changing interests, properties, and relationships. And if what is to be represented is what is brought about by the spontaneous movement of history in society, then the representative can no longer claim absolute sovereignty: he has to place himself in the service of social movement. Here the goal, or at least the result, of Constant's "historicism" is to limit decisively the legitimate field of political action. If history is the authority, if the "natural" arena of history's action is civil society, then political authority finds itself in an essentially subordinate position. (Fs)

85b But, one might say, cannot history's authority also serve to justify despotism? What answer can be given to a government that declares that the historical stage reached by society requires X? What answer can be given to Danton when he declares, "These priests, this nobility are not guilty, but they have to die, because they are out of place, they hinder the movement of things and get in the way of the future"?3 At that point, Constant rediscovers the criterion of nature: these are things that power has no right to do, regardless of the situation. Thus Constant's liberalism, like post-revolutionary liberalism generally, moves between two unequal authorities: first that of history, and then that of nature. But it is always in order to limit the jurisdiction of political power that one or the other authority is invoked. The fact remains that this uncertainty in the criterion of judgment introduces instability into Constant's analysis of the Revolution and the Empire. We must consider that analysis. (Fs) (notabene)

85c I have just said that the delicate question concerns the idea of sovereignty, in particular the sovereignty of the people such as the Revolution claimed to implement it, drawing inspiration from Rousseau. Constant completely accepts the principle of the sovereignty of the people, and also echoes Rousseau's language:

Our present constitution formally recognizes the principle of the sovereignty of the people, that is the supremacy of the general will over any particular will. Indeed this principle cannot be contested. In our days many have attempted to obscure it; the evils which were caused and the crimes which were committed on the pretext of enforcing the general will lend apparent strength to the reasonings of those who would like to assign a different source to the authority of governments. Nevertheless those reasonings cannot stand against the simple definition of the words which they use. The law must be either the expression of the will of all, or that of the will of some. What would be the origin of exclusive privilege if you should grant it to that small number? If it is power, then power belongs to whoever takes it. It does not constitute a right, and if you acknowledge it as legitimate, it will be equally legitimate whoever sets his hands on it, and everyone will want to conquer it in his turn. If you suppose that the power of a small number is sanctioned by the assent of all, then that power becomes the general will.4

86a Here Constant asserts the incontestable character of the sovereignty principle and recognizes the dangers of its application. He continues:

But while we recognize the rights of that will, that is the sovereignty of the people, it is necessary, indeed imperative, to understand its exact nature and to determine its precise extent. (Fs)

Without a precise and exact definition, the triumph of the theory could become a calamity in its application. The abstract recognition of the sovereignty of the people does not in the least increase the amount of liberty given to individuals. If we attribute to that sovereignty an amplitude which it must not have, liberty may be lost notwithstanding that principle, or even through it. (Fs)

When you establish that the sovereignty of the people is unlimited, you create and toss at random into human society a degree of power which is too large in itself, and which is bound to constitute an evil, in whatever hands it is placed. Entrust it to one man, to several, to all, you will still find that it is equally an evil.... There are weights too heavy for the hand of man.5

86b The principle of popular sovereignty is more negative than positive, more critical than founding. It signifies essentially that no individual or group has the right to subject the body of citizens to its particular will, or, put another way, that all legitimate power must be delegated by the body of citizens. But this does not at all mean that power thus delegated can do whatever it pleases:

There is, on the contrary, a part of human existence which by necessity remains individual and independent, and which is, by right, outside any social competence. Sovereignty has only a limited and relative existence. At the point where independence and individual existence begin, the jurisdiction of sovereignty ends. If society oversteps this line, it is as guilty as the despot who has, as his only title, his exterminating sword. Society cannot exceed its competence without usurpation, nor bypass the majority without being factious.... Were it the whole of the nation, save the citizen whom it oppresses, it would be none the more legitimate.6

86c The dangerously false idea of unlimited popular sovereignty relies on the authority of Rousseau, whose Social Contract, "so often invoked in favor of liberty [was] the most formidable support for all kinds of despotism." (Fs) (notabene)

87a However, Rousseau himself "was appalled by ... the immense social power which he had thus created, he did not know into whose hands to commit such monstrous force.... He declared that sovereignty could not be alienated, delegated or represented. This was equivalent to declaring, in other words, that it could not be exercised. It meant in practice destroying the principle he had just proclaimed."7 In Constant's eyes, Rousseau himself admitted that his principle was essentially inapplicable, hence false. (Fs)