Autor: Manent, Pierre

Buch: An Intellectual History of Liberalism

Titel: An Intellectual History of Liberalism

Stichwort: Montesquieu 2; M. vs. Locke, Hobbes: Macht als "Ding" (abgetrennt von Ursprung und Ziel), Machtstreben nicht von Natur aus -> institutionelle Vermeidung von Machtmissbrauch (Legislative, Exekutive)

Kurzinhalt: In other words, the desire for power is not essentially inscribed in man's nature. It is not born from itself ... Consequently a judicious institutional arrangement will make it possible to avoid the abuses of power.

Textausschnitt: 55a By seeing the heart of the political problem in the conflict between power and liberty, Montesquieu determines the definitive language of liberalism. In so doing, he reverses Locke's point of view, so as to carry out the latter's intention more effectively. Instead of starting with the right that founds liberty, he starts with power that threatens it; instead of pondering the origin of power, he ponders its effects. He is doubtless the first author to speak of power as a thing, separable in right and fact from its origin as well as its end, man himself. He takes us then to the end of the process that led the modern mind to conceive the ways in which men influence each other under the single concept of "power." The Romans, by contrast, had distinguished at least three forms of political power: auctoritas, potestas, imperium. Later Hobbes simplified matters when he reduced all human passions and motives to the desire for power. "The passions that most of all cause the differences of Wit, are principally, the more or lesse Desire of Power, of Riches, of Knowledge, and of Honor. All of which may be reduced to the first, that is Desire for Power. For Riches, Knowledge and Honor are but severall sorts of Power."1 And again: "So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restlesse desire of Power, that ceaseth only in death."2 (Fs) (notabene)

55b The modification to which Montesquieu subjects Hobbes's teaching is contained in the following phrases: "The natural impulse or desire which Hobbes attributes to mankind of subduing one another is far from being well founded. The idea of empire and dominion is so complex, and depends on so many other notions, that it could never be the first which occurred to the human understanding."3 And then: "Constant experience shows us that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it."4 In other words, the desire for power is not essentially inscribed in man's nature. It is not born from itself, so to speak, or at least it is born in its excessive and dangerous form only if the individual is in a social or political institution already endowing him with a certain power. It is born thanks to institutions. Consequently a judicious institutional arrangement will make it possible to avoid the abuses of power. (Fs)

56a What must be grasped is that Montesquieu is really considering two powers, the legislative and the executive. Of course he makes a general distinction among three powers: these two and the judiciary power. But judiciary power has real political importance only in regimes where the first two powers are confused: "Most kingdoms in Europe enjoy a moderate government because the prince who is invested with the two first powers leaves the third to his subjects. In Turkey, where these three powers are united in the Sultan's person, the subjects groan under the most dreadful oppression." In the English regime, as interpreted by Montesquieu, judiciary power does not exist as such: there it is "exercised by persons taken from the body of the people."1 He comments: "By this method the judicial power, so terrible to mankind, not being annexed to any particular state or profession, becomes, as it were, invisible. People have not then the judges continually present to their view; they fear the office, but not the magistrate." Montesquieu considers this point so important that he (who never repeats himself) repeats it two pages later: "Of the three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is in some measure next to nothing: there remain, therefore, only two." (Fs)
55c How? Montesquieu's answer is well known: "To prevent this abuse, it is necessary from the very nature of things that power should be a check to power."5 Human nature is sufficiently flexible, sufficiently plastic, for its behavior to be largely determined by the institution in which it lives. No need then of an absolute power to subdue an essentially ambitious and rebellious human will by the death threat, as Hobbes believed; this neutralizing power can itself be neutralized by being judiciously divided in such a way that one power will be opposed to another. Hobbes was not yet liberal because he saw in man something that rebelled against association and cooperation; Rousseau, despite his hatred of absolutism, was not any more liberal because he saw a basic incompatibility between man's nature and social life, even in a liberal regime. Although he often seems to recall Hobbes and to announce Rousseau, Montesquieu is convinced by the English example that it is possible to bring into harmony man's desires and political necessities by a judicious adjustment of power and liberty: by the "distribution of powers." The account of the distribution of powers is found in the chapter of The Spirit of the Laws, (n.6) entitled "Of the Constitution of England." I am going to consider it briefly. (Fs)