Autor: Manent, Pierre

Buch: An Intellectual History of Liberalism

Titel: An Intellectual History of Liberalism

Stichwort: Locke 6; Legislative (Erweiterung d. natürl. Strebens n. Selbsterhalt), Problem d. Exekutive (Macht b. Staat - Bruch mit n. Recht auf Selbstverteidigung -> Kluft: Naturzustand - Zivilgesellschaft); moderne E.: ohne exekutive Gewalt (Ggs: Rom, Athen)

Kurzinhalt: I wished to suggest that politics is irreducible to representation, and that the modern emancipation of the executive, contrary to Locke's wishes yet authorized by his doctrine, bears witness to this irreducibility.

Textausschnitt: 49a Despite the impression of clarity that this summary undoubtedly gives, Locke's theory of powers is not easy to understand. One must make the effort, however, because the functioning of modern democracies is in the end determined by the relations between legislative and executive power, and by its apparent clarity. One is tempted to understand this distinction in the light of the later doctrine of "separation of powers." In reality, it is difficult to place Locke's theory under this latter rubric. Although he contributed greatly to elaborating this latter doctrine, it should be said that Locke makes its difficulties highly perceptible to us. According to him, in any body politic fulfilling its mission of protecting property, there is one "supreme" power which no political will, no constituted power has the right to oppose. That is the legislative power. As such, this power is as "absolute" as Hobbes's Leviathan. Executive power is derived from and essentially subordinated to it: it is its instrument. Between the two, there is a considerable difference of political dignity, of moral consistency. It is true that the executive has its "prerogative," but its existence is due less to the intrinsic dignity of the executive than to the necessities of social and political life. Locke recognizes in the executive only a de facto weight and importance, but not a de jure dignity. This inequality between the principle and the fact sums up the Lockean executive problem, which is also the problem of the modern executive. Its meaning and legitimacy are uncertain, because modern political legitimacy is based on representation, and because the natural place for national representation is the legislative body. What then is the modern executive? (Fs)

49b We must first observe that unlike the legislative power, it is a radically new notion in the history of political thought.1 Let us consider, for example, book 4 of Aristotle's Politics, in which it was thought that an outline of "separation" or "distribution" of powers could be found. Aristotle distinguishes the body that deliberates, the magistrates, and the judiciary power: that is, he distinguishes something resembling the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. But it is striking that Aristotle's "executive," so to speak, is a plural power, while the modern executive is essentially an indivisible power. We are governed by one government, whereas the Greeks or Romans were ruled by several magistrates. The mystery of the modern executive is the mystery of its unity. (Fs)

50a If this mystery most often goes unnoticed, the reason is simple: it is historical. The modern executive is thought to have taken over from the monarchical power. Locke's and Montesquieu's classical interpretations of the relationship between the executive and legislative appear to be born from the observation of the conflict between the king of England and the House of Commons. But why have all modern democratic republics kept or even created a "monarchical" type of executive? Why in particular did the American republic, which did not replace a native monarchy, endow itself deliberately with what the framers of the Constitution called an "energetic" executive, which was perceived by opponents of the Constitution as dangerously "monarchical"?2 (Fs)

50b Consider how Locke defined the origin and function of the two powers. They both have their source in the state of nature; they are two powers held by every individual living in this state. The legislative is the power of each person to do what he deems best for his preservation and that of others, a power that he is going to abandon partially when he enters into "civil society" so as to be ruled by laws. The executive is the power that each person has, in the state of nature, to punish infractions against the law of nature. When he enters civil society, the individual turns over this power wholly to society. The natural force that the individual in the state of nature could use as he wished to punish transgressors can no longer be used except according to the instructions of the legislative power.3 The executive force of society is made by combining the executive forces of individuals. (Fs)

50c Thus the "political" legislative power is the direct extension of the "natural" legislative power. It is the same power, now limited according to law. The individual, instead of simply doing what seems best for preserving his life, now does what seems best within the limits fixed by the law which, through his representatives, he has contributed to formulating and promulgating. Legislative power is the direct extension of the individual's desire for self-preservation. And it is sovereign or "supreme" because it directly expresses the desire for preserving property, the origin of the political institution. (Fs)

50d Executive power is a different matter. Like the legislative, it is present in the state of nature; but unlike it, it is in principle totally abandoned by the individual to the political institution. It can be completely relinquished without harming the individual's rights because, unlike the legislative, it does not express directly the desire for the individual's preservation. Its dignity is entirely subordinated to the legislative body. But this total abandonment proves in fact to be impossible: the individual retains the natural executive power insofar as the law can never be completely effective.4 Thus, while the civil legislative power extends the natural legislative by making it representative, the natural executive power, which is not representable, can only be abandoned in principle or retained as it is. The civil executive reveals that nature is irreducible to the representative convention. In this sense, it suggests a certain identity between the state of nature and the civil state in Locke's doctrine. But simultaneously, it testifies that the preservation of the body politic is irreducible to the preservation of its members such as the legislative body represents it and inscribes it in laws. Locke's intention was to found the supremacy of the legislative. But his theory of executive power reveals the difference between man's natural and political conditions. The law expresses or represents natural man's desire for preserving his life, but the civil executive, by showing the inadequacy of law, indicates the rupture between the state of nature and the civil state. More than the legislative power, the executive embodies the essence of man's political condition. (Fs)

51a Locke thus testifies involuntarily to the ambiguity characterizing the relationship between the two powers in modern times. The legislative, as the more direct expression of individuals in civil society, is the supreme power. Our political institutions founded on the idea of representation naturally attribute supreme power to the legislative power. Simultaneously, executive power embodying the difference between the state and civil society, or between man's political and natural conditions, finds in its de jure inferiority a de facto principle of action. Insofar as it does not represent individuals in their "natural" condition, it will be able to claim to "represent" them in their political condition. The executive will be able to say, for example, that whereas the legislative body represents the "interests of society," it represents the "greatness of the nation." (Fs)

51b Thus one can see why the energetic executive is not essentially a monarchical inheritance, but is born naturally from the dialectic between the idea of representation and man's political condition. It embodies the "transcendence" of political power in relation to society—hence the imperious necessity for its unity. The legislative body, owing to its representative character, and in spite of the convention considering the majority's will the will of the body, cannot suffice to incarnate the members' political unity. After all, it is meant to reflect faithfully the diversity of interests and opinions. Certainly one can object that although society's diversities are expressed in the legislative debates, they are also crystallized into a few broad tendencies reflecting the common interest. The majority decision can thus truly be the decision of all, and not just by convention. It is quite true that the legislative body has often been the eminent place of deliberation, that as such it can embody the political unity of society. However, care must be taken to ensure that the representative character of the modern legislative body does not seriously limit the scope of its own deliberations: unlike those of the Athenian Assembly or the Roman Senate, its deliberations can lead only to laws and not to actions. Voting a law always falls decisively short of deciding on an action. Because the modern representative body confines itself to the law and leaves action to the executive, its deliberation is always radically incomplete. The immediate link between deliberation and action is a necessary condition for political action, and more generally for all human action. And since the unity of deliberation and action cannot reside in the legislative body, it will come forth in the executive power. One can truly deliberate only on what must be decided by oneself; one can decide wisely only on what one has oneself deliberated. (Fs)

52a These few remarks on the question of the executive have not been aimed against Locke. I simply wished to show how much the idea of political representation, first formulated by Locke in terms that have remained our own, was uncertain and even confused, in spite of its apparent lucidity. I wished to suggest that politics is irreducible to representation, and that the modern emancipation of the executive, contrary to Locke's wishes yet authorized by his doctrine, bears witness to this irreducibility. And since political liberalism rests historically on the idea of representation, this tension between politics and representation will necessarily emerge in any attempt to define a liberal politics. (Fs)