Autor: Manent, Pierre

Buch: An Intellectual History of Liberalism

Titel: An Intellectual History of Liberalism

Stichwort: Locke 5; L.: Naturzustand -> Recht auf Eigentum (auch gegen abs. Souverän) -> Legislative -> Exekutive

Kurzinhalt: To leave the state of nature, or enter into "civil society," is essentially to constitute a legislative assembly... the laws must be continuously applied. Hence the necessity of another power, subordinate to the first, the executive power.

Textausschnitt: 47a We have already observed that the Lockean state of nature is not a state of war. Locke had to distinguish between them if he wanted to avoid the despotic or absolutist consequences of Hobbes's doctrine, if he wanted to attach rights to a truly solitary individual. But here a difficulty immediately arises. If the state of nature is not a state of war, if in it men can become proprietors, developing production and trade, why would they ever leave it? To what need would the political institution respond? Here, moreover, we find the principal difficulty of the notion of the state of nature. The more "satisfying" it is, the "happier" it is, then the more likely it is to provide the image of natural rights that the political institution should guarantee and protect; but simultaneously, it becomes less clear why men left this state to enter into a body politic. The better it fills the political function for which one imagined it, the more it makes the political institution superfluous. (Fs) (notabene)

48a Locke gets out of the difficulty by asserting that although the state of nature is not essentially a state of war, it tends naturally to become so. In the state of nature, men have no recognized judges to arbitrate their differences: each one is judge of his own cause. Consequently, everyone's rights are in perpetual danger. The state of nature always ends up becoming a state of war. This is the "Hobbesian moment" of the Lockean doctrine. And any doctrine of the state of nature and the social contract (even Rousseau's) necessarily has a Hobbesian moment, since only an unbearable state of war, an intolerable evil can explain why men agreed to leave a state where in principle their rights were flourishing. But this Hobbesian moment is not satisfactorily solved in Hobbes's own system. In contrast, the Lockean solution can be seen as having been aimed directly against Hobbes's.1 Locke's objection is well known: transmitting all of one's rights to an absolute sovereign does not mean leaving the state of war, it only makes it worse. Under the guise of fabricating a protector, one arms an enemy. To protect oneself from foxes (one's neighbors), one puts oneself in the clutches of a lion. Some other solution must be sought. (Fs)

48b In the state of nature, each person is the sole judge of transgressions of the law of nature. To leave this state, a common definition of these transgressions must be agreed on, just as there must be agreement on the laws defining them, laws that state clearly what is yours and what is mine. If the laws are to be effective, they must apply equally to everyone, nobody must be exempt (and especially not the "sovereign"). If they are not to be oppressive, each person must be able to contribute to their conception and promulgation, singly or through representatives. To leave the state of nature, or enter into "civil society," is essentially to constitute a legislative assembly.2 (Fs)

48c The purpose of the political institution is to preserve property endangered by the inevitable disorders of the state of nature. To leave this state, it is necessary to institute a "supreme power" that has the right to demand obedience; simultaneously, so that this power cannot willfully divest members of their property and liberty, it must itself be subjected to the laws it enacts. Only a representative and sovereign legislative body fulfills this double condition, and only as long as certain precautions are taken. For example, it must not remain continuously assembled, since then its own interests would risk becoming distinct from the common interest. But even though the legislative body should not be continuously convened, the laws must be continuously applied. Hence the necessity of another power, subordinate to the first, the executive power. Since all the circumstances of governmental action cannot be foreseen or encompassed by laws, this latter power must be left sufficient latitude for confronting imponderables, and for adapting the laws themselves to what the public good requires. The executive must be granted a prerogative. Executive power, in its principal definition, enforces the laws; its sphere of action is within the body politic. A third power is therefore needed, which itself can hardly be regulated by laws. This power responsible for foreign relations, for peace and war, Locke calls the federative power, adding that for reasons of convenience it is most often in the hands of the executive.3 (Fs)