Autor: Manent, Pierre

Buch: An Intellectual History of Liberalism

Titel: An Intellectual History of Liberalism

Stichwort: Hobbes 2; Bürgerkrieg als "Normalzustand"; Natur: keine Erbsünde, sondern übel aus Notwendigkeit; Vernunft als Einsicht in Naturzustand -> Leviathan (sterblicher Gott ) Grant d. Friedens

Kurzinhalt: The Hobbesian description of the state of nature made it possible to reject simultaneously the claims of the classical view of nature and the Christian view of grace ... In this way the sovereign, the Leviathan, is constituted. He is that "artificial ..."

Textausschnitt: 23a This reminds us of Machiavelli and the episode in Cesena. The Florentine and the Englishman both count on fear for constructing the new city-state. But Machiavelli leads us to believe that fear, insofar as it is politically effective and beneficial, is created by the prince endowed with virtù: this efficacious fear is an effect of art. In Italy the human association had not been fully destroyed, it was only passive or condemned to a helpless feverishness. A sort of shameful compromise between the city-states and the Church, between nature and grace, preserved a certain consistency in it. It was thus advisable to reactivate it by a judicious use of fear. In Hobbes's England, on the contrary, the power of disassociation of opinion had ruined human association as such. The conflict of opinions over the good had produced the war of all against all, which prevented all social, intellectual, and economic life. Everyone was racked by the fear of death. The incompatibility of opinions regarding the good had produced absolute evil. It was from this point that one had to rise up, to reconstruct a new political organization invulnerable to the conflict of opinions. The plague of fear had to be made into the cause of the salutary art. The principle of this new order would not be the good one was seeking, but the evil one was fleeing. (Fs) (notabene)

23b It will be said, however, that civil war is an exceptional circumstance: it is impossible to conceive of the ordinary ends and means of political life by starting from it. Hobbes replies that civil war, the war of all against all, is "the natural condition of mankind." In his eyes, the political and religious strife of his country is only a particularly cruel manifestation of behavior natural to men when they live without recognized and undisputed masters. Even in times of civil peace, that is, in "normal" circumstances, Hobbes observes the permanent presence of fear, distrust, aggressiveness. Do not men lock their doors at night and even, within their houses, lock their chests, thus proving that they are permanently afraid, not only of their fellow citizens but also of their servants and even of their children?1 Careful observation also reveals that man's life in society is dominated by pride, conceit, and vainglory, the desire to get the upper hand over one's neighbor, to have one's superiority recognized. In a period of civil peace, when the legitimate sovereign is recognized and obeyed, man's pride inflicts and receives only wounds of pride. But let the sovereign be uncertain or contested, let civil war take over, and exacerbated pride will become destructive and murderous, laying into the property and even the lives of rivals. The rivalry of all with all thus becomes what it was implicitly: the war of all against all. Such is the natural condition of mankind. The Greek idea of a benevolent nature, constituted by a group of hierarchical goods of which the city-state would make men participants, is completely ruined. (Fs) (notabene)

24a But, some will say, this criticism of human nature is simply the Christian criticism of humanity in the grip of original sin. It is true that this picture of the human condition allies Hobbes with the gloomiest of Christian moralists. It was at this time that Pascal wrote: "All men naturally hate each other," and also, "Each self is the enemy and would like to tyrannize all the others." But it is precisely when he appears closest to an essential aspect of the Christian vision that Hobbes turns it upside down. In this imminent war of all against all, "the natural condition of mankind," the worst actions cannot be considered faults or sins. In a situation where the life of each person is perpetually in danger, all acts are covered by legitimate defense; even the seemingly least provoked attack can always be considered as preventive. Like Machiavelli's prince in the uncertainty and violence of political existence, each person in the state of nature is sole judge of the conduct necessary for preserving his life. If such is the natural condition of mankind, it is all too clear that men's desires and passions cannot be sins, either in themselves or by nature. If the most atrocious murders can be justified, it is obvious that notions such as morality, right and wrong, and sin have no meaning in the state of nature. Good and evil do not exist by nature. They have meaning only once the state of nature has been surmounted, once public authorities have promulgated laws that define these notions. (Fs) (notabene)
24b The Hobbesian description of the state of nature made it possible to reject simultaneously the claims of the classical view of nature and the Christian view of grace: the former by showing that nature is not good, or that life according to nature is the recapitulation of all evils; the latter by showing that these evils do not have their source in sin, but in necessity, and therefore require healing by art rather than by grace. Thanks to a new art, a new definition of the political good is born from this absolute evil. (Fs) (notabene)

24c The necessity that forces men in the state of nature to do what the ordinary opinion calls evil, also binds them, although less directly, to what this same opinion calls good. The state of nature is unbearable for man: in the war of all against all, each person's life is "solitary, poore, nasty, brutish and short"—especially, short.2 The threat of violent death hangs over everything, whereas man wants nothing so much as to shield himself from death. And this war's most abundant source is precisely each person's desire to preserve his life. The fear of death pushes men to this murderous conduct which places them in mortal danger. This situation is absurd, or at best a logical contradiction. To solve a logical contradiction, it is not necessary to be good, or generous or courageous, or pious; a little ingenuity will do. It suffices to have that quality that modern men are going to prize above all else: intelligence, the faculty to solve problems. And how could men fail to be intelligent, when they are forced to it by the most imperious passion of all, the fear of death? Human reason, observing the absurdity of this war, is going to seek a means of peace. More precisely, what one calls reason is born from this necessity, which is experienced and recognized through passion: it is the faculty of inventing means or producing effects. The new political art will be the good use of this faculty. What Hobbes clarified is the fact that men, if they want to be satisfied, are constrained to be intelligent. (Fs)

25a To reason born from and educated by fear of death, the very terms of this political problem point the way toward its solution. To say that in the state of nature each person can do anything that he deems useful for defending himself, means that each person has a right over everything (a jus in omnia), including the bodies of others.3 This unlimited right of each person ensues necessarily from the war of all against all; it is also the source of war. Only by renouncing this right can each person dry up war's source. This renunciation would be absurd if he did not have a reasonable assurance that each of his neighbors and rivals would do the same. Each person must therefore engage in a mutual covenant to renounce this unlimited right. But "covenants without the Sword, are but words," says Hobbes.4 The only possible guarantee of the covenant is in the threat of punishment that will constitute a sanction against all violation. Who will inflict this punishment? The one (or ones) whom the parties to the covenant have chosen. Everyone will renounce his right over everything and will transfer it to the one to whom he entrusts sovereignty, on the condition that this sovereign will promulgate the laws necessary for civil peace, and guarantee (by force if necessary) that they are obeyed. (Fs) (notabene)

25b The right of the sovereign, individual or collective, is necessarily unlimited. His sovereignty is absolute because the right transmitted to him by everyone is unlimited. The sovereign inherits the jus in omnia that belonged to each individual in the state of nature; or it might be said that he alone keeps this right, held by all in the state of nature and abandoned by all except him. In this way the sovereign, the Leviathan, is constituted. He is that "artificial man" or "mortal God" who will ensure civil peace. (Fs)