Autor: Schindler, David C., Jun

Buch: The Catholicity of Reason

Titel: The Catholicity of Reason

Stichwort: Kausalität 6e; Verflochtenheit der Ursachen; Wirkursache Kommunikation von Sein) -> Formursache; Materialursache <-> Formursache (Potenz zu Form); Finalursache (Austauschbarkeit d. Dinge ohne inneres Ziel); entelecheia

Kurzinhalt: The general principle in classical thought, omne agens agit sibi simili, holds by virtue of this unity in form, so that there would be no unity were there no form. This means ... cannot be what it is, namely, the communication of being sibi simili ...

Textausschnitt: The Interweave of the Causes

145a Let us briefly consider each of the causes in turn with a view to at least some aspect of their interdependence.1 As we saw above, classically understood, the efficient cause is not a force that sets a mechanistic event in motion, but in the first place is a communication of being: the paradigm of such causality for Aristotle would be the generation of progeny; for Aquinas — as we will explore further in a moment — the only "instance" of efficient causality in the strictest sense, which establishes the meaning for every other analogical instance, is God's act of creation. This act is a communication of being simpliciter. It is worth pointing out that, in contrast to the modern notion of cause which is necessarily a temporal event, this act designates in the first place an ontological relationship; it is not a change that occurs within the world. Now, setting aside the act of creation for a moment, and considering efficient causality in a general sense, the word "communication" implies that something is shared, which as we suggested above means that there is some unity between the cause and the effect. This unity lies in the form: a father and mother "cause" a child by passing on to him the human form, and they have a unity with him because this form is in some respect identically the same. The general principle in classical thought, omne agens agit sibi simili, holds by virtue of this unity in form, so that there would be no unity were there no form. This means, then, that the efficient cause cannot be what it is, namely, the communication of being sibi simili, without reference to form: the formal cause, in other words, belongs to the efficient cause properly understood. As we argued in the previous chapter, if it is separated from the formal cause, the efficient cause cannot communicate anything, but can only transfer energy, which, precisely because it is necessarily extrinsic in this case, takes the form of force. (Fs; tblStw: Kausalität) (notabene)

146a While matter in the modern conception means mere extension in space, and so designates "physicality," we might say, bereft of any inherent qualities apart from measurability, matter in the classical understanding was an essentially relational term. Specifically, as a potency, it always referred in some sense to form or actuality, in two respects. On the one hand, matter is, in itself, aptitude for form, so that, as we explained above, its intelligibility derives in part from the form that actualizes it and thus determines it in a certain way. Matter is openness upwards, we might say. On the other hand, what is potentiality in one respect will always be actuality in another: the body that represents the material cause of a living organism with respect to its animating principle, namely, the form or soul, is itself the form with respect to its own material principles, namely, the flesh, blood, and bones, and so on down the line. In this sense, matter — understood as formed body — will always have a qualitatively determined nature, in one respect, even while it will remain in another respect open to higher determinations. Although this inference was rarely drawn in classical accounts, it follows in fact that the more relatively determinate matter is, the more receptive it is capable of being for a higher form. But this means that, if matter is defined as a potency for form, the higher, more organized instances of matter, which by virtue of their complexity are more capable of receiving higher-order actualities, represent more fully what matter is than the lower instances. Thus, for example, a human body is a better representative of the nature of matter than, say, a stone, which has little intrinsic potency to receive form.2 Thus, in short, we do not speak of matter, simply, as a thing in itself, but always of the material principle of a particular being. The natural being as a whole is in each case the subject, the fundamental reference point, in relation to which we are able to judge what in fact the material cause is. The material cause alone, without any reference to form or nature, would be simply unintelligible. (Fs; tblStw: Kausalität)

147a Next, we may consider the dependence of form on matter. The key to this dependence is that, if form is not the actualization of some potency, as we noted above, it cannot be the intrinsic principle that it in fact is. Instead, it becomes an abstract formality, so to speak, which must remain by definition superficial, since it does not bear any internal relationship to the thing of which it is the form. In other words, it necessarily turns into a purely extrinsic structure, pattern, or law.3 We thus no longer speak of things as formed, in the sense of being "in-formed," but rather we speak of form as the external patterns to which things are con-formed. To speak of form as an internal principle requires, once again, a reference to a real being — or as Aristotle puts it, a "natural body" — of which it is the form, and a real being is such only by virtue of the relation between form and matter: "nature is twofold, and is both form and matter."4 We can explain this essential relation by saying that, in order for form to be internal to a being, it must be received into it, and it can only be thus received if there is an intrinsic potency for that actuality, i.e., if there is a material principle understood as we have just described it. There is thus a relationship of reciprocal dependence between form and matter: matter, as a "potency for," implies the priority of form, and form cannot exist as such except as received by matter. This means that there cannot be a temporal priority of one or the other, so that they are then added together in a subsequent "moment." Instead, they must always already be involved with one another, so to speak. This is why Aristotle presents organic form, which is always already intrinsically related to its matter, as the paradigm, and treats the form of an artifact, which is to some degree simply imposed on matter that is in a certain respect independent of it, as an analogous sense of the term.5 An intrinsic relation to matter is part of the meaning of form in its strict sense. (Fs) (notabene)

148a As for final causality, it represents an explanation of the meaning of things, and not simply an arbitrary imposition, only insofar as teleology is taken to be most fundamentally intrinsic. If there is no intrinsic relationship between a being and the purpose it serves, if, in other words, the purpose is simply extrinsic to a being, then it becomes wholly accidental that it happens to be this particular being that serves the purpose, and not some other. Things become interchangeable with respect to their purpose, and represent nothing more than instruments in its service. The purpose, in this case, does not illuminate the meaning of the being, which is to say it has no strictly theoretical role, but as we saw above dissolves into a kind of positivistic pragmatism that is never truly self-explicating but only ever endlessly self-justifying, and indeed, always in terms other than itself. For teleology to have an essentially theoretical dimension, the end must be internal, which is another way of saying that natural things must be their own end. Aristotle coined the term "entelecheia" to refer to organisms: they possess (echein) their end (telos) in (en) themselves; they are, so to speak, "enpurposed." But this simply means that the first aim of an organism is to be itself, to actualize as fully as possible what it is. It follows, then, that final causality, if it is to be something other than external manipulation, requires a reference to formal causality, the essential "whatness" of a thing or its most basic determinate act, and more specifically to an internal notion of form, which as we saw above, is such only with reference to an internal potency. In the paradigmatic case of the organism, once again, the "reference" is so intrinsic as to be materially identical, to represent one and the same thing under a different aspect.6 Finality as a cause is inconceivable without formal causality. (Fs; tblStw: Kausalität)