Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ

Titel: The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ

Stichwort: Person (Elemente d. Definition); das Subsistente, Subsistenz (Notion); Seiendes im engen Sinn: subsistieren; S. im weiten Sinn nicht s.: innere Prinzipien, Akzidenzien usw.; Christus als Gott und Mensch ist s.

Kurzinhalt: Ordinarily the subsistent is described as that which exists per se and in itself, a complete being, a whole in itself, simply divided from and existing separately and apart from everything else... (3) that the separated human soul falls somewhat ...

Textausschnitt: 14 Notion of the Subsistent (eü)

49/1 14. With these observations in mind, we come now to the systematic notion of the subsistent. Ordinarily the subsistent is described as that which exists per se and in itself, a complete being, a whole in itself, simply divided from and existing separately and apart from everything else. Hence, in refutation of the Platonic view, the usual question asked is whether universals subsist, that is to say, whether they are beings that exist outside the mind, separate entities (khôrista), substances (ousiai). Now everything that is predicated of a subsistent comes down to the fact that a subsistent is a being in the strict sense. For if it is a being, somehow or other it exists and somehow or other it is undivided in itself and divided from everything else. And if it is a being in the strict sense, it is that which is, substantial, being per se (otherwise it would be something accidental or something less), undivided in itself and this by its very nature, and simply divided from all else and so existing separately and apart. (35; Fs)

50/1 From all this it is evident (1) that beings in the strict sense (things which are) subsist, and therefore minerals, plants, animals, human beings, and angels are said to subsist; (2) that beings in the broader sense (things to which existence belongs only in a certain way) do not subsist, and therefore accidents, the intrinsic principles of being, possible beings, and beings of reason are not said to subsist; (3) that the separated human soul falls somewhat short of being a subsistent in the true sense, since a human being who has been separated into body and soul is not 'undivided in itself';1 (4) that the Eucharistic accidents, which by divine power are sustained without a subject, come somewhat closer to being truly subsistent, since they are more completely divided from everything else than is the case with accidents; and (5) that Christ, God and man, one being in the strict sense (a one, that is, which is divine and human), is also one subsistent. (35; Fs)