Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ

Titel: The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ

Stichwort: Person (Elemente d. Definition); Seiendes, Sein: Schlussfolgerungen; Licht des Verstandes (intentio intendens): geschaffene Ähnlichkeit mit dem ungeschaffenen Licht

Kurzinhalt: Fifth, the intending intention of being is the very light of our intellect... Sixth, the light of our intellect is a participated likeness of uncreated light.

Textausschnitt: 6 Conclusions (eü)

6 Granted the foregoing, these conclusions readily follow. (17; Fs)

17/1 First, far from being abstract, being is precisely that by which we can intend and signify the concrete. When you speak of something concrete, you are speaking of a thing in its total reality. But no human being knows anything in its total reality. Accordingly, we denote and signify the concrete not by knowing it but by intending it through the intending intention of being. (17; Fs)

Second, being is the greatest not only in extension but also in intention. The followers of Scotus and Hegel maintain that being is minimal in intention. But what leads them astray is the fact that by the intending intention of being alone, although potentially we know everything, we actually know nothing. (17; Fs)

Third, since being includes everything it must not be considered the sole preserve of philosophers to the exclusion of all other branches of knowledge. For just as philosophy alone is not the science of all reality, so too philosophy alone is not the science of being. (17; Fs)

Fourth, theology deals with being insofar as it deals with God and everything that is related to God. For God is being by essence, and if you eliminate God, you eliminate the intrinsic intelligibility of being. And the absolutely supernatural beatific vision of God is the only knowledge possible to a creature whereby being can be known quidditatively. Finally, to deal with everything as it is related to God means in some way to deal with everything and therefore with being. (17; Fs)

Fifth, the intending intention of being is the very light of our intellect. For by this intention and light (1) we wonder intellectually about sensible things; (2) we are turned away from sensible things as sensible; and (3) we are turned to questions about the entire range of intelligible truth. (17; Fs) (notabene)

Sixth, the light of our intellect is a participated likeness of uncreated light.1 (19; Fs)

Seventh, the divine Word is being by essence intellectually begotten, and the incarnate Word is being by essence intellectually begotten and incarnate. Hence we read, 'He was the true light that enlightens everyone coming into the world' (John 1.9),2 and 'For this was I born and for this have I come into the world, to bear witness to the truth. Everyone who is of the truth hears my voice' (John 18.37).3 See also other Johannine passages that speak of light and darkness. (19; Fs)

Eighth, since the intended intention of being has been understood by various people in various ways, a historian must distinguish between the different philosophical and theological schools. (19; Fs)

18/1 On the other hand, because the intending intention of being is specifically one and the same in all, one can imagine nothing more absurd than what is heard all too often, namely, that divine revelation lacked any intention of being, that the intention of being was imported into Christian thought from Hellenism, Gnosticism, Platonism, Aristotelianism. (19; Fs)

19/1 Again, because the intending intention of being is part of human nature and common to all, the theologian must pay particular attention to it for the reason that, in keeping with the meaning of the sources of revelation themselves, this intention cannot be absent from those sources. And for the same reason this holds also for the notions of potency, form, and act as they will be defined later. (19; Fs)