Autor: Thomas Aquinas

Buch: Aquinas on Being and Essence

Titel: Aquinas on Being and Essence

Stichwort: Seiendes, logische (zweite) Intentionen; Philosophie (Dinge, nicht bloß Begriffe), Logik (nicht zweite Intentionen, sondern um ihre Relationen)

Kurzinhalt: ... intentions can be described as certain sorts of relations among anything and everything involved in the human way of knowing, so long as at least one of the relata is a concept... logic investigates secunda intellecta ... and not secundas intentiones.

Textausschnitt: Further Remarks on Second Intentions

54a Having considered the character of the analogical word, by way of contrast with the univocal and the equivocal word, one can very conveniently expand, and thereby make clearer, the notion of a second intention. (Fs)

54b The description of second intention given above (see pages 16-20) is but a first description, i.e., a description in terms of a reference to the first context in which one notices second intentions. This is the context of first intentions, of concepts about things in the real world. (Fs)

55a As one pursues an investigation of second intentions in the study of logic, relations among second intentions themselves are very quickly noticed. For example, it is easy to notice the relation of genus between the second intention supposition, on the one hand, and its ordinarily distinguished types—namely, proper and improper supposition (metaphor)—on the other hand. The relation of genus is also noticed within proper supposition, between proper, on the one hand, and its types—namely, real, logical, and material—on the other hand. Such relations are clearly second intentions arising out of the plurality of our concepts, in this case a plurality of second intentions based immediately on a plurality of first intentions. At this point, one can give a second description of second intention, a description in terms of a reference to a second and broader context. Second intentions are certain sorts of relations among any sorts of concepts, whether first intentions or not. (Fs)

55b There is a third context in which one can describe second intentions, a context conveniently exemplified by the analogical word. For a proper understanding of this context one must notice carefully that the human way of knowing (the human way of knowing is what gives rise to second intentions) involves not only (1) a plurality of concepts (we cannot know reality by but one concept) but also (2) the formation of this plurality with dependence on referents in the real world (our knowledge in this respect is quite unlike that of God) and (3) the use of words. In this context second intentions can be described as certain sorts of relations among anything and everything involved in the human way of knowing, so long as at least one of the relata is a concept. Thus the analogical word (so too the univocal word and the equivocal word) involves a triadic relation, a relation among three terms, only one of which is a concept; the other two are a word and the referents. In the case of the analogical word (as the word "healthy" previously discussed) the relation goes by the name of analogy, and is described as the relation which obtains among a word, concept, and referent when the same word is said of different referents with a concept or meaning which is partly the same and partly different (see page 53 for the exact sense of this partial sameness and partial difference). (Fs)

Kommentar (22/07/11): also im Beispiel "gesund" oben: Wort: gesund; Concept (Bedeutung): Inhalt von gesund; Referenten: Gesichtsfarbe, Medizin usw.

56a It is clear that the three contexts and the three corresponding descriptions of second intention are so related that the second includes the first, and the third the second; hence the third also the first. Thus the third description of second intention is to be taken as the most inclusive one. (Fs)

56b Apart from expanding, and thereby making clearer, the notion of a second intention, it is important to notice that it is in a sense misleading to say that logic is about second intentions as about a subject. For second intentions are concepts about certain sorts of relations among anything and everything involved in the human way of knowing. It is rather the noticed relations themselves which are the subject of logic. Here, as in any case in which the intellect is concerned to investigate something or other, it forms concepts about those things. But the concepts are the means by which the investigation is carried on, and not the things themselves which are investigated. Just as philosophy is not about first intentions, but rather about things in the real world by means of different sorts of first intentions; so too, logic is not about second intentions, but rather about the noticed relations themselves. And second intentions become the means by which the investigation is carried on. Most properly put, logic investigates secunda intellecta (see text on page 17), and not secundas intentiones. (Fs)

Kommentar (22/07/11): cf. secunda prima, secunda: 16c; zum Absatz oben mit anderen Worten; der Philosophie geht es um Wirklichkeit, nicht um Worte, die diese Wirklichkeit beschreiben, der Logik geht es um das in der Reflexion erfasste, die Beziehungen des so Erfassten und nicht bloß um die Bestimmung von Gattung, Art usw.