Autor: Thomas Aquinas

Buch: Aquinas on Being and Essence

Titel: Aquinas on Being and Essence

Stichwort: Seiendes - Substanz

Kurzinhalt: Further Remarks on Being as First Conceived by the Intellect ... what is there actually is first predicated of substances. It is clear that the word "substance" does not mean the same as the word "being"; the word "substance" includes, but ...

Textausschnitt: Further Remarks on Being as First Conceived by the Intellect

43a In terms of a reference to the uses of being as real, of reason, true, actual, and potential, one can express the content of being as first conceived in this way: what is actually there. Recall that our first intellectual knowledge is a knowledge whose explicit content is rooted in a sense experience and whose implicit content is being (see page 4). This implicitly grasped content, that to which we referred before as something-there, can now be expressed as real actual being, i.e., what is there actually. It is not to be expressed as what can be there (potential being), for what can be there is conceivable only by reference to what is there actually. Nor is it to be expressed as what is there as an absence (being of reason), for this too is conceivable only by reference to what is there actually. Nor, lastly, is it to be expressed as what is in the sense of what is true, for to make a true statement about what is there obviously presupposes a grasp of what is there, since conception is analytically prior to judgment. (Fs)

43b In terms of a reference to substance and accident, one can express that of which we first predicate the content of being as first conceived: what is there actually is first predicated of substances. It is clear that the word "substance" does not mean the same as the word "being"; the word "substance" includes, but adds to, the meaning of the word "being." But it is also clear that the meaning of the word "being" is first predicated of that of which we also predicate the word "substance." A sign of this is the easily observable fact that when we say of something that it is a being, we say this without hesitation only of that which is a substance. Only that which is a substance is a being without qualification, or simply; i.e., without the qualification of being in another, as is an accident. If it is not a substance, we hesitate to call it a being. We do not hesitate to call Jack a being, but we do hesitate, at first at least, to call Jack's height a being. Further, if we consider the word "being" used as subject of a sentence, we can easily observe that when we say something about a being, we say it about those things which are substances; for example, when we say all beings are God's effects, all beings refers to all substances. (Fs)