Autor: Thomas Aquinas

Buch: Aquinas on Being and Essence

Titel: Aquinas on Being and Essence

Stichwort: Seiendes: 1 real, Vernunftding, wahr in der Aussage (Proposition); 2 essentiell, akzidentell; 3 Substanz, Akzidenz; 4 aktuell, potentiell

Kurzinhalt: We have seen four divisions of the uses of the word "being" (these are divisions as well of uses of the word "is"): ... To summarize, now, and to clarifiy: (1) The main point of division I is to focus on two basic uses of the word "being" when ...

Textausschnitt: Other Uses of the Word "Being"

38b In his Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics St. Thomas discusses a number of uses of the word "being." In addition to its use apropos of real beings and the truth of propositions, there is its use (1) in an essential sense as opposed to an accidental sense, its use (2) apropos of substances and accidents, and its use (3) in a potential sense as opposed to an actual sense:

He [Aristotle] says therefore that the word "being" is sometimes used essentially, sometimes accidentally. And we must note that this division of the word "being" is not the same as its division into substance and accident ...1 Then he divides the word "being" into potency and act ...2

38c (1) Essential (secundum se or per se) as opposed to accidental (secundum accidens or per accidens). When we talk about things, we talk about them in statements or propositions; and in propositions a predicate is said of a subject. Sometimes the predicate is, or at least belongs as a part to, what the subject is; e.g., man is an animal, man is a substance; whiteness is a color, whiteness is an accident. Being an animal and being a substance belong as a part to what man is. Being a color and being an accident belong as a part to what whiteness is. The "is" in such propositions has the sense of is essentially; e.g., "man is an animal" has the sense of man is essentially an animal. Sometimes the predicate does not belong to what the subject is; e.g., man is white, man is thin; whiteness is round, whiteness is human. The "is" in such propositions does not have the sense of is essentially; rather it has the sense of is accidentally, the sense of happens to be. (Fs) (notabene)

39a This can be put in another way. Combining predicates with subjects, we get the following descriptions: (a) the animal man, (b) the substance man, (c) the color whiteness, (d) the accident whiteness; and each of the four is said to be a being in an essential sense. We also get the following descriptions: (e) the white man, (f) the thin man, (g) the round whiteness, (h) the human whiteness; and each of these is said to be a being in an accidental sense. (Fs)

39b The preceding can perhaps be made clearer if it is put in this way. Would we call any of the combinations just listed a being; e.g., would we call the animal man a being? Since each is something which is there as something positive, we would readily say that each of the eight is a being, but not in the same sense. We would immediately notice a basic difference between the first four, on the one hand, and the last four, on the other. In (a), whereas being an animal does not include in its explicit meaning being a man, being a man does include being an animal. The same thing is to be noted about the two notions expressed in (b), (c), and (d); one of each set of two includes in its explicit meaning the other; the two are essentially connected. And this is why, when each combination is called a being, it is called a being in an essential sense. In the last four neither of the two notions includes the other; the two are only accidentally connected. And this is why, when each of these combinations is called a being, it is called a being in an accidental sense. (Fs)

40a Thus, when a thing (whether it is there in the sense in which Jack is there, or in the sense in which Jack's height is there) is described in terms of one or more of those of its characteristics which pertain to what it is, it is called, so described, a being in an essential sense. When, on the other hand, it is described in terms of characteristics, one at least of which does not pertain to what it is, it is called, so described, a being in an accidental sense, if it is called a being at all. (Fs)

40b (2) Substance and accidents. If we say that man is a substance, not only do we see that being a substance belongs to what man is but we also understand what being a substance means. Indeed, we must understand what it means before we can see that it belongs to what man is. To be a substance means to be what is or what exists, to be there simply and as something positive, in the sense in which Jack is there (see page 32). So, too, if we say that whiteness is an accident, not only do we see that being an accident belongs to what whiteness is but we also understand what being an accident means. To be an accident means to be what exists in something which is what exists simply, to be there as something positive in what is there simply, to be there in the sense in which Jack's height is there. An accident is such that it is dependent on a subject, ultimately a substance, in which to exist. A substance is such that it is independent of a subject in which to exist; there is no subject in which it exists, for it is the existing subject; this is what it means to say that substance is what exists. What exists is substance; what exists in substance is accident. And this is why we readily predicate the word "being" of things which are there in the way in which Jack is there, and, only after hesitating and reflecting, of things which are there in the way in which Jack's height is there. (Fs)

41a It is to be noticed that to say that a substance is independent in its existence is to attribute to it but a relative independence. A substance is not absolutely independent; if it were, it would be God. Its independence is only an independence of a subject in which to exist; it may have any number of other sorts of dependencies. For example, Jack depends on food, air, sunlight, God, all the while being independent of a subject. (Fs)

41b (3) Actual and potential. The word "being" (or the word "is") is used in an actual sense when it is used apropos of things which are there in the sense we have in mind when we say, "There is a man on the comer," when there in fact is a man on the corner; i.e., in the sense of being there at all as opposed to being there rather than somewhere else. It is used in a potential sense when it is used apropos of things which are not there in the sense in which there is a man on the corner, but things which can be there in that way; e.g., as when with an acorn in my hand I say, "There's an oak tree in my hand," or as when with a five-dollar bill in my hand, which I have marked for clever investment, I say, "There's a million dollars in my hand." (Fs) (notabene)

41c It is to be noted that things of which we use the word "being" in a potential sense are such that considered per se they actually are not, like nothing (in its strongest sense; see page 35); but unlike nothing, they are such per se that they can be there actually. Nothing per se neither is nor can be. One must also notice that although things of which we use the word "being" in a potential sense do not actually exist per se, they do actually exist; but they exist per accidens, where per accidens means by virtue of the actual existence of another; e.g., the oak tree exists per accidens, i.e., by virtue of the actual existence of the acorn which I hold in my hand. Nothing, on the contrary, exists neither per se nor per accidens. (Fs)

41d We have seen four divisions of the uses of the word "being" (these are divisions as well of uses of the word "is"):

I. "being"
1) real
2) of reason
3) true

II. "being"
4) essential (per se)
5) accidental (per accidens)

III. "being"
6) substance
7) accident

IV. "being"
8) acutal
9) potential

42a To summarize, now, and to clarifiy: (1) The main point of division I is to focus on two basic uses of the word "being" when this word is used by itself or simply, i.e., without expressed verbal qualifiers of any kind. This, namely without expressed verbal qualifiers, is what St. Thomas means by the expression per se when he writes, "ens per se dicitur dupliciter," which we have translated in (4) (see page 21) as: "the word 'being,' taken without qualifiers, has two uses." The word "being," used by itself or simply, means what is; and it is used first of all in the sense of what is there; it is used secondly in the sense of what is true. The proposition "it is" is used first of all in the sense of it is there; it refers first of all to real things. "It is" is used secondly in the sense of it is true; in this sense it is used to insist on the truth of propositions. We do not use the word "being" by itself or simply (or the word "is") apropos of beings of reason. We qualify it to make it say being of reason, or we qualify it to make it say non-being, where the being which is negated means what is there. (Fs)

42b (2) Divisions II, III, and IV are divisions of uses of the word "being" apropos of real beings. Their main point is to focus on the fact that the word "being," by itself or simply (so, too, the word "is"), is used first of all apropos of substances (secondly, apropos of accidents), first of all apropos of substances designated or described in terms of characteristics pertaining to what they are (secondly, apropos of substances designated in terms of characteristics not pertaining to what they are), first of all apropos of substances which are there actually (secondly, apropos of those which are there potentially). (Fs)