Autor: Thomas Aquinas

Buch: Aquinas on Being and Essence

Titel: Aquinas on Being and Essence

Stichwort: Seiendes: Analyse d. Verwendung in d. Sprache: real, Vernunftding, wahr o. falsch in d. Aussage; Negation, Privation, "nichts" ist (Privation: relative Negation ); Beispiel (Jack, Höhe, fehlender Knopf, Kobold ...); something there

Kurzinhalt: ... "Being": (1) Apropos of Real Things and (2) Apropos of the Truth of Propositions ... If a thing (in this case Jack) is there, in the sense of being there at all rather than in the sense of being there and not here, we call it a being. Thus ...

Textausschnitt: Two Uses of the Word "Being": (1) Apropos of Real Things and (2) Apropos of the Truth of Propositions

31a It was pointed out above that most of us know the many meanings of the word "being"; for we use this multiplicity of meanings, and with great accuracy, in everyday discourse. Yet our knowledge of this multiplicity is an unanalyzed knowledge. This unanalyzed knowledge will readily lend itself to analysis if we begin with a consideration of things with which we are familiar. We are all familiar, to some extent at least, with the things appearing in the following list:

(a) Jack
(b) Jack's height
(c) the missing button on Jack's shirt; Jack's blindness
(d) nothing
(e) centaurs, phoenixes, witches, goblins
(f) genera, species, differences
(g) human souls, angels, God

31b What follows is an attempt to come to some understanding of three fundamental uses of the word "being": (a) real being, (b) being of reason, and (c) being as true (or true being, or propositional being). Though St. Thomas does not here discuss being of reason, we shall touch on it as an aid to understanding the distinction which he does discuss, namely, propositional being as opposed to real being.1

31c Consider, now, whether we would in fact say, or at least be willing to say, that any member of the above list of seven is a being, or a thing (the word "thing" is more usual than the word "being," and an equivalent of it); or be willing to say of it, "it is," which is the same thing. Or, perhaps better, consider whether we would in fact, or at least be willing to, call by the word "being" or by the word "thing" anything for which we already have a word, but a word other than the word "being" or the word "thing." And consider why, i.e., consider what we mean by the word "being" or by the word "thing" when we predicate it. We shall limit this consideration to the above list of seven. (Fs)

32a We would certainly call Jack a being (by Jack I mean this man, the one I'm pointing to, here and now before me). Why, now, would we call Jack a being? Clearly, because he is, in the sense of he exists. Or (which is to ask the same question) what do we mean by the word "being" when we say, "Jack is a being"? Clearly, we mean he is in the sense of he exists. Anything of which we say, or of which we are willing to say, "it is," in the sense of it exists, we also say, or are willing to say, of it, "it is a being." (Fs) (notabene)

32b Perhaps this can be made clearer. If a thing (in this case Jack) is there, in the sense of being there at all rather than in the sense of being there and not here, we call it a being. Thus, to call Jack a being, or to say of him, "he is," is to say that he is there in the sense just described. This is what everybody understands by the word "being," that which is, i.e., that which is there. Perhaps this too can be made clearer. That which is, in the sense of that which is there, is first of all something present to, or given to, and grasped by the senses, something seen, heard, tasted, etc.; something experienced. (Fs)

32c We would not in fact, it seems, call Jack's height a being. Or would we at first be willing. On reflection, however, and perhaps with some hesitation, we would not be unwilling to say that it is something which is there in part of the sense described above—i.e., there as opposed to not there at all—but not in the sense in which we say that Jack is there, i.e., simply or without qualification. We would want to make a qualification; we would say it is there in something which is there simply, in this case in Jack. The word "in" would mean as a modification or characteristic of. (Fs)

33a We would not call the missing button on Jack's shirt a being. Yet we would without hesitation refer to it as something which is there. Consider a mother addressing her four-year-old, just returned home from an afternoon of rough outdoor play. "How many missing buttons are there on your shirt today?" "I think there are three of them, Mother." But we would immediately point out that we do not mean is there in the sense in which Jack is there, nor in the sense in which Jack's height is there. We mean simply to call attention to the fact of the absence or privation of what in other circumstances would very likely be there in the way in which a part of Jack, say Jack's hand, is there, namely, the button. A button, like Jack's hand, is there as something positive (in St. Thomas' words a button posits [hence our word positive] something in reality: "aliquid in re ponit"), rather than as the absence of something positive. From this point of view, then, we would just as readily say that the missing button is something which is not there (and this is why we would not call it a being) as that it is something which is there; the missing button, from this point of view, is something we can talk about rather than something which is there. Similarly, in referring to Jack's blindness as something which is there, we mean to call attention to the fact of the absence of sight, which in other circumstances was, or may have been, there in the eye in the way in which Jack's height is now in Jack. (Fs)

33b Though we would not call nothing a being, we would nonetheless, in certain circumstances, say that nothing is there with as little hesitation as we say that the missing button is there. Consider being sent to the living room to get the dog, discovering on arrival that it is not there, and exclaiming, "There is nothing in the living room!" It is clear that "there is" is not used in the sense in which we use it when we say that Jack is there, or in the sense in which we would say that Jack's height is there, or, lastly, in exactly the sense in which we would say blindness is there. For the word "blindness" is used to call attention to the absence of sight, and sight is a characteristic of something; whereas the exclamation "There is nothing in the living room!" is used to call attention to the absence of the dog, and the dog is rather a something than a characteristic of something. Moreover, to speak of the dog's absence from the living room is to indicate that the dog is to be found elsewhere; to speak of Jack's blindness, of the absence of sight in his eyes, is not to indicate that his sight is to be found elsewhere. (Fs)

34a In other circumstances we would deny that nothing is there. Consider being asked the question, "Does nothing exist?" A characteristic response would be to say, "Look out there, and you will see that many things exist; there are trees, dogs, etc." This response indicates that the question was taken to mean, "Is it true that there is nothing in existence?" Consider, now, the question, "Can nothing exist?" There are at least two possible characteristic responses, according to at least two possible interpretations of the sense of the question: (1) "Yes, nothing can exist" in the sense of "Yes, it is possible that there be nothing in existence, i.e., it is not necessary that any of these things which I see about me be in existence, though it is a fact that they do exist." (2) "No, nothing cannot exist" in the sense of "No, that which is an absence of all things which exist simply, i.e., in the way in which Jack exists, cannot exist." To use the word "nothing" in this last sense—i.e., in the sense of an absence of all things which exist simply—is not to indicate that these simply existing things are to be found elsewhere any more than to speak of the absence of sight in a blind man's eyes is to indicate that his sight is to be found elsewhere. Absence, here, is absence in a strong sense, in the sense of a negation; and negation, here, may be taken in at least two senses, which give us two strong senses of the word "nothing:" (1) what does not exist and (2) what neither is nor can be. We would not call nothing, in either of these senses, a being. Nor would we say that nothing, in either of these senses, is an absence which is there; though we would speak of privations, like blindness, as absences which are there. The word "blindness" is taken to refer to an absence in a subject, ultimately in something positive which is there simply, i.e., in the way in which Jack is there. It is because the subject of a privation is there that we say that the absence is there, meaning in the subject which is there. But if all simply existing things are negated, and this is what is intended by the word "nothing" in both its strong senses, we do not speak of an absence which is there. Such an absence is not an absence in a simply existing subject; it is the absence of simply existing subjects, of all of them. Privations have been called relative negations, i.e., negations in things; nothing has been called absolute negation, i.e., the negation of things, of all of them. (Fs; tblStw: Negation, Privation)

35a As regards centaurs, phoenixes, and such, and the logical intentions—genus, species, and difference—we would not say that any of these is a being, that any of these is there, in the sense described above (see page 32). We, would, however, say that they are beings of (i.e., produced by) and in (i.e., modifications or characteristics of) the mind (and of the imagination). Logical intentions are of the mind in the sense that they are relations which the mind discovers among its concepts. Witches, phoenixes, and such are of the mind in the sense that the mind invents or creates them. (Fs)

35b Apropos of human souls, angels, and God, we would certainly say that each is a being, that each is something which is there; but in a sense partly like, and partly unlike, the sense in which we say Jack is there. Jack is there sensibly; they are not. We cannot see, feel, touch, or hear them. And not only can we not see them, but they are such in themselves that they are not sensibly perceivable. But each is something which is there simply, i.e., in the way in which Jack is there as opposed to the way in which Jack's height is there. (Fs)

36a To summarize, now, and to clarify: of Jack and of Jack's height we would say that each is something which is there as something positive (aliquid in re ponit) and as something sensibly perceived. Of human souls, of angels, and of God, we would say that each is something which is there as something positive, but not as something sensibly perceived. What is important here is that we would say of each of them that it is something which is there as something positive. Of Jack's blindness, and of the missing button on his shirt, we would say that each is an absence which is there, but this is only to say that neither is something positive which is there. If we would say that each is there, but not as an absence, "there" would mean in the mind; and "in the mind" would mean in the mind in knowledge, i.e., as a known content. So, too, if we would say that nothing is there; or that centaurs, phoenixes, and such are there; or that logical intentions are there; "there" would mean in the mind. If therefore, we say of a thing "it is," in the sense of being there as something positive, it is a real being (or a categorical or predicamental being); if we say of a thing "it is," in the sense of being in the mind, it is a being of reason. (Fs) (notabene)

36b But there is a third way in which we say of a thing "it is."2 Consider two men disputing the statement that a phoenix is a mythical bird. "It is not," says the one. "It is," replies the other. "It is not," emphasizes the first. "It is," insists the other. Notice that one of these men has said of the phoenix "it is." Is "it is" being used here in the sense of real being? Clearly not. First of all, the phoenix is an imaginary being, or a being of reason. Secondly, the context of the dispute indicates that "it is" said of the phoenix means, It is a mythical bird, in the sense of If is true that the phoenix is a mythical bird; or, in this sense, namely, the statement "the phoenix is a mythical bird" is a true statement. The "is" of "it is" is the copula, the predicate not being explicitly stated. Here, "to be" means to be true. Here, to say "it is" is to insist that phoenix is a suitable subject for the predicate, mythical bird. Thus, not only is "it is" not used here in the sense of real being, but it is also not used in the sense of being of reason. "It is" is here used simply in the sense of it is true. (Fs)

37a It is to be noticed that of anything at all for which we have a word we can say "it is" in this third sense of "it is." That is, we can make true affirmative statements, or at least statements which we feel are true, about anything for which we have a word, whether it is a real being or a being of reason. Anything, therefore, which is the subject of a true affirmative proposition can be said to be a true being or a propositional being, i.e., a being in a third sense of the word. A true being or a propositional being is anything which has a true affirmative statement made about it, precisely as having that statement made about it. (Fs) (notabene)

37b Thus, whether a thing is something which is there (real being) or not (being of reason), it is in any case something one can make statements about. One can make statements about beings of reason as well as about real beings; and precisely as having statements made about them, they are all in the mind. This is why one can say that both beings of reason and propositional beings, as such, are only in the mind. Still one must not say that propositional beings are the same as beings of reason; for beings of reason are found among the products of all three of the intellect's operations, whereas propositional beings pertain to the intellect's second operation, composing and dividing. Moreover, beings of reason can exist only in the mind, whereas what has a statement made about it can be real. (Fs) (notabene)

38a The word "being" means what is; and "what is" means what is there (real being); but "what is" also means what is true. The proposition "it is" means it is there, but "it is" also means it is true. These are the two uses of the word "being" (and of the word "is") which St. Thomas appears to have in mind when he writes here: "the word 'being,' taken without qualifiers, has two uses." (Fs)