Autor: Thomas Aquinas

Buch: Aquinas on Being and Essence

Titel: Aquinas on Being and Essence

Stichwort: Ordnung d. Erkenntnis: vom Seienden zur Wesenheit (1 zusammengesetz -> einfach, 2 posterior -> prior;); Beispiel (Rechteck); Seiendes: Ersterfasstes

Kurzinhalt: From the Meaning of the Word "Being" to That of the Word "Essence" ... the meanings of the word "being" are many ... in relation to the meaning of the word "essence ... all of us ... know in some way the many meanings of the word "being" ...

Textausschnitt: From the Meaning of the Word "Being" to That of the Word "Essence"

28a St. Thomas' reason for clarifying the meaning of the word "being" before that of the word "essence" is but another application of the general rule of the order of determination, namely, "so that, beginning with what is easier, we may progress more suitably in learning. ..." To proceed in this way is (1) to proceed from what is composed to what is simple, and (2) from what is posterior to what is prior, and (3) this is to proceed from what is easier to what is more difficult. (Fs) (notabene)

28b (1) From what is composed to what is simple. The meaning of the word "being" in relation to the meaning of the word "essence" is as what is composed to what is simple. What is simple is as something one in the relation in which it is simple. What is composed is as something multiple in the relation in which it is composed. For example, consider a rectangle which has been divided into two parts, each of which has been left undivided. The rectangle can now be described as composed of two parts, and so as something multiple in relation to these parts. But each of the parts, viewed precisely as a part, is actually undivided, and can therefore be described as something simple, that is, as not composed; and so as something one. Now divide the parts, which entails considering each of them as in its own turn a whole. Each part can now be described as itself composed of parts, and so as something multiple in relation to its parts. And so, a whole in relation to its parts is something composed, and so is something multiple; a part in relation to its whole is something simple, and so is something one. Applied to the words "being" and "essence," this is to say that the meanings of the word "being" are many (at least two, in the context here) in relation to the meaning of the word "essence." It is also to say that the meaning of the word "essence" is one in relation to the many meanings of the word "being"; that is, it is to say that one of the many meanings of the word "being" is the meaning from which the meaning of the word "essence" is taken. (Fs)

29a (2) From the posterior to the prior. Our grasp of the many meanings of the word "being" in relation to our grasp of what we later call by the name "essence" is as what is posterior to what is prior. The word "being" used apropos of being which has essence is analytically (and temporally) prior to all other meanings of the word "being"; and this is why our grasp of what we later call by the name "essence" is analytically prior to all meanings of the word "being" other than its first meaning. (Fs)

We have pointed out that the meaning to which we later give the name "being" is grasped in the temporally first meaning which a child forms, but that it is implicit and that it is unworded; recall the example of hot. The same thing is to be pointed out about the meaning to which we later give the name essence; it, too, is grasped in the temporally first meaning which a child forms, but it is implicit and it is left unworded. The same thing is to be said about the meaning to which we later give the name "existence."

29b Any process of analysis is such that it begins with a given that is composed or multiple, and seeks to distinguish each of its many elements and their interrelations. The word "being" is a given with many elements, a word with many interrelated meanings. The elements of a composite are analytically prior to the composite. It is obviously easier to know a composed thing, in the sense of identifying it as a composed thing, than it is to know its simple components, for its simple components come to be known only after the effort and pain of analysis. (Fs)

29c (3) From what is easier. Human knowledge can advance only when it begins with what is easier for us men to know. And clearly what is known by all men, or by most men, is to be counted among the things which are easier for us to know. It is a fact of experience that we, all of us (or better, most of us), know in some way the many meanings of the word "being"; for we use this multiplicity, and with great accuracy, in everyday discourse. It is also a fact of experience that all of us do not know this multiplicity precisely as analyzed, i.e., we have not reflected on the ways in which we use the word "being" (or the expressions "what is" and "it is"), or have we taken the trouble to notice the precise differences among them and to formulate or articulate these differences. For, although we know how to use these many meanings, we are hard put to it to formulate them in answer to questions of the form, "But what exactly did you mean by the word 'being' when you just used it?" Clearly, then, an unanalyzed knowledge of the many meanings of the word "being" is to be counted among the things which are easier for us to know. To know this multiplicity as analyzed means, among other things, to know the meaning of the word "essence" as analyzed. (Fs) (notabene)

30a It is important to notice that St. Thomas at this point is concerned with the meanings of words, those of the word "being" and those of the word "essence"; he is not at this point concerned with the essences of real things. This is why it is not acceptable to interpret St. Thomas' reason for proceeding from the meaning of being to that of essence in terms of the distinction between essence and existence, as some do,1 following Cajetan. What they say is, or at least appears to be, acceptable, in a different context, in a context in which one has already established the distinction between essence and existence in real beings; or at least in a context in which one is concerned with the difference between the question What is it? and the question Is it? The context, at this point in On Being and Essence, is one in which the meanings of the word "being" are about to be looked at, meanings which in fact extend in their use beyond the realm of real beings (where alone the distinction between essence and existence applies) into the realm of beings of the mind. All one needs at this point is to be able to use the word "being," and/or its verb form "is," in everyday discourse. (Fs) (notabene)