Autor: Thomas Aquinas

Buch: Aquinas on Being and Essence

Titel: Aquinas on Being and Essence

Stichwort: Wissen, Wesen; Ordnung der Erkenntnis; processus in determinando - demonstrando; universalia per praedicationem (o. secundum simplicem apprehensionem) - in causando; Beispiel (Sprache); Wissenschaft

Kurzinhalt: The Order of Determination: From What Is Easier to What Is More Difficult ... The general rule of the order of determination is this obvious one: begin with those matters which are for us the easiest and then pass on to the more difficult, except ...

Textausschnitt: Paragraph 3

22b Apropos of what he does in (3), it will be helpful to consider, in a general way, how one can advance more suitably (perhaps most suitably) in the acquisition of knowledge. What comes immediately to mind is St. Thomas' distinction (but not his alone) between the order of determination (ordo or processus in determinando) and the order of demonstration (processus in demonstrando). 1

The Order of Determination: From What Is Easier to What Is More Difficult

22c Very generally described, the order of determination is the order in which one takes up topics in his pursuit of knowledge, whether knowledge in general or in some particular domain, i.e., the order in which one makes determinations about (investigates) the topics he is pursuing. The order of demonstration (see page 27) refers to what one does when one does science about each of the topics set into order within the order of determination. (Fs)
22d The general rule of the order of determination is this obvious one: begin with those matters which are for us the easiest and then pass on to the more difficult, except when the more difficult is necessary for what is to follow. For example, logic, both formal and material, is certainly not the easiest of disciplines, yet most men must study and master it before they can master the other sciences. No science can be mastered without a firm grasp of the ins and outs of valid and true and necessary reasoning, and not all men are naturally endowed with a grasp firm enough. (Fs)

23a In applying this general rule, one looks to man's knowing equipment, his senses and his intellect, and to the relation between them; one also looks to the knowable objects themselves, especially to their accessibility to human investigation. Sense knowledge is easier than intellectual knowledge. Since intellectual knowledge takes its origin in sense knowledge, intellectual knowledge about sensibly perceivable things is easier than intellectual knowledge about things removed from sense observation. And this appears to be what St. Thomas has in mind when he writes in chapter two: "But because the essences of the simple substances are more hidden from us, we ought to begin with the essences of composed substances, so that we may progress more suitably in learning from what is easier" (see page 49, [13] in the text of the treatise). But God and the other simple substances are not the only knowable objects which can be described as things removed from sense observation. Concepts, or the meanings we attach to words, are also such objects. And there are other objects which, unlike God and the other simple substances and concepts, are in themselves sensible, but which can nonetheless be said to be removed from sense observation, either because they are too small to observe—e.g., subatomic particles—or because they are too far away, e.g., celestial bodies. (Fs)

23b The application of this general rule—namely, to begin with what is easier and then pass on to the more difficult—can be summarized by two apparently opposed statements, on which St. Thomas comments in several places: 2
(1) What is particular is easier than what is universal.
(2) What is more universal is easier than what is particular. (Fs)

24a (1) takes into account all of man's knowing equipment, both the senses and the intellect; it is saying simply that sense knowledge, which is a grasp of particulars in the sense of individuals, is easier for us than intellectual knowledge, which is a grasp of universals; it is easier, for example, to look at and see a tree than to know what a tree is. (2) is a statement at the level of intellectual knowledge; it is saying that the more universal is easier for us than the particular in the sense of less universal; this is so because the more universal is the less detailed; for example, triangle is less detailed than right triangle, for the definition of right triangle includes that of triangle but adds a detail, namely, that of including an interior angle which is a right angle. (Fs)

24b In his Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics3 St. Thomas gives both (1) and (2) an interpretation at the level of intellectual knowledge. He does this in terms of a distinction between two sorts of universal: (a) universals which are, or can be used as, predicates; these are products of the intellect's first operation, simple apprehension (universalia per praedicationem or secundum simplicem apprehensionem); and (b) universals which are causes or explanatory factors in the real world (universalia in causando). Apropos of (a) he points out that we know the more universal in some way (aliquo modo, he writes) before we know the less universal. He gives the universal "being" as an example, from which one can conclude with some measure of certainty that by aliquo modo he means "in an implicit and unworded way" (see pages 4-5, 8). That is, whatever else we may know about sensible things when we first come to know anything at all about them, we know that they are something-there, at least implicitly; this, therefore, is what is easiest for us at the level of intellectual knowledge. (Fs)

24c Apropos of learning to use a language, we must notice that the words first learned are very restricted in their applicability in proportion to one's restricted experience of the sensible world, e.g., the word "hot." Words with more universal meanings are learned later on. This is to say that the simply apprehended universals, especially being, which are implicitly grasped, but unworded, whenever anything at all is grasped about sensible things, become worded. However, though worded, they remain unanalyzed; that is, one knows how to use these words in different everyday situations or contexts, and knows how to use them accurately; but one is unable to give a precise formulation of their meanings, and this is so primarily because there is nothing in everyday situations which requires that a man reflect on them and give them precise formulations. It is not until one begins to bother about doing things like philosophy that he finds himself in a situation which requires such reflection and such attempts at precise formulation. (Fs)

25a But the doing of philosophy does not end with reflection on, and analysis of, these simply apprehended universals. This is only its beginning point. Its goal is a knowledge of the real causes of real things, of all real things at all possible levels of universality, including the highest, and at all levels of our experience with them. That is, philosophy does not terminate in a precise formulation of the meanings of the word "being," for its goal is to understand the being of real things, of all real things; it does not terminate in a precise formulation of the meanings of the word "cause," for its goal is to come to an understanding of the causes of real things, of all the causes, both intrinsic and extrinsic, of all real things. And its goal is not only the causes appropriate to this and that given sort of thing (even if all the sorts of things were known)—i.e., not only particular causes—but also causes common to all the sorts of things, i.e., universal causes. (Fs)

25b Since the investigation of the causes of real things cannot, obviously, be accomplished by simply analyzing the meanings of words, and since such an investigation requires careful observation of, or experience with, real things, it is clear that this investigation will grow only in proportion as our experience with the world grows, and that it will begin with those things which lend themselves most easily or readily to our careful observation. Such things are things which are sensibly observable. We will come to know the causes of things removed from sense observation, in all the senses of "things-removed-from-sense-observation" (see page 23), only later on, if at all, as our experience with the world broadens and reveals to us different sorts of things. And lastly, we will come to know the universal causes of all things only when our experience with things reveals to us that which they all have in common, and which is such that it requires universal causes. And this is why St. Thomas writes that the investigation of the causes (and of the properties) of things proceeds in an order which can be described as the opposite of that which is found in our simple apprehension of things:

Things which are more universal in simple apprehension are known first, for being is what first falls into the intellect, as Avicenna says, ... But in the investigation of natural properties and causes, those which are less common are known first; because it is through particular causes, which are appropriate to some one genus or species, that we arrive at universal causes. Things which are universal in causing are posteriorly known by us (though priorly known according to nature), although things which are universal in predication are in some way known by us before things which are less universal (though not known before singular things). For knowledge of the senses which grasp singular things precedes in us intellectual knowledge which grasps universal things.4

26a What one does in pursuing the topics within a given science, as we have seen, is to begin with the more universal, the more universal being easier because it is less detailed, and proceed to what is progressively less and less universal, this being more difficult because more detailed (this is the order of determination within a given science). Now, what one does in doing science about each of the topics set into order within the order of determination (this is the order of demonstration) is somewhat different. First of all, the order of the movement in the order of demonstration is not from topic to topic; it is rather from the subject of the science to its definition, then to its properties, and lastly to its extrinsic causes (if it has any), and this movement within the confines of a single given topic. The mind moves with a view to formulating an acceptable and fruitful definition of the subject; that is, a definition which squares with the observed or introspected facts, and which will reveal necessary connections between the subject and its properties; a definition which can be used, further, to establish the existence and the characteristics of the extrinsic causes of the subject (in those cases in which it becomes clear that the subject must have extrinsic causes). Secondly, one is not moving from the more universal to the less universal; rather, one maintains the same level of universality. That is, in moving from the subject to its definition one does not produce a definition which is less universal than the subject. Such a definition would be, clearly, unacceptable. Nor does one proceed to properties and extrinsic causes which are less universal than the subject, for these, too, would be unacceptable. What one must do is to maintain the same level of universality, for this alone guarantees that the definition is the definition of the subject, and that the properties and extrinsic causes are the properties and the extrinsic causes of the subject. This is what is meant when it is often said that the subject, its definition, its properties, and its extrinsic causes must be commensurately universal. (Fs)