Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ

Titel: The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ

Stichwort: Person (Elemente d. Definition); Unterschied: intentio intendens - i. intenta (bewusstes Streben nach Sein - Seinsbegriff)

Kurzinhalt: Now, if a finality and dynamic orientation is intellectually and rationally conscious, it is rightly called 'intention.' However, since this intention does not constitute knowledge but leads to it through questioning, it is an intending intention, not ...

Textausschnitt: 3-4 Intention of being (eü)

3 The intention of being is either intending or intended.

8/1 The intention intending being is simply the cutting edge of the intellect in accordance with its natural finality, that is, in accordance with its radical dynamic orientation. For the intellect is 'that by which it is possible to make and become everything.' Hence, since the intellect regards 'everything,' it regards being; and since it regards 'everything' with respect to making and becoming, it regards being in accordance with its finality or dynamic orientation. Finally, since the intellect is defined as 'that by which it is possible to make and become everything,' this finality is natural and this dynamic orientation is radical. (11f; Fs)

9/1 Furthermore, this natural finality and dynamic orientation (1) is not unconscious, like that of a heavy object with regard to the law of gravity, nor (2) is it only sensitively conscious, such as the desire of a hungry being for food, but (3) it is intellectually and rationally conscious, since it is that sense of wonder that Aristotle considered to be the beginning of all knowledge and all philosophy. For from this wondering all questions arise, whether about the essences of things (What is it? Why is it so?) or about their existence (Is it? Is it so?). (13; Fs)

10/1 Now, if a finality and dynamic orientation is intellectually and rationally conscious, it is rightly called 'intention.' However, since this intention does not constitute knowledge but leads to it through questioning, it is an intending intention, not an intended one. (13; Fs)

11/1 Through this intending intention, being becomes known to us of itself and naturally1 and cannot be unknown to us.2 Moreover, since this intending intention itself is natural and cannot go unknown, it is specifically one and the same in every single human being; for what is natural both existed before the rise of Greek culture and does not cease to exist just because the Scholastics are scorned. (13; Fs)

4 On the other hand, the intended intention of being, the explicit concept of being, differs with different thinkers. Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Avicenna, Aquinas, Scotus, Hegel3 - they all conceive being differently. (13; Fs)

12/1 This diversity stems from the fact that being is the most fundamental concept of all, one from which many consequences flow. A science that deduces conclusions from premises is easy enough. Nor is that understanding difficult by which principles become known, for as soon as the terms are known, the principles are grasped. But that sapiential knowledge whose function it is to order all things and make judgments about all things is extremely difficult; and therefore it is very difficult to choose primitive terms in such a way that true principles are grasped, and that not only true but also all true conclusions are deduced from them. Since this most fundamental concept presents the most formidable difficulty, it is no wonder that many brilliant thinkers have gone astray in this matter of the intended intention, or concept, of being.4 (13f; Fs)

13/1 Now, however, from what we said about the quiddity and the intending intention of being, we may safely go on to consider the explicit concept of being. (15; Fs)

Since the cutting edge of the intellect regards 'everything,' it follows that the concept of being embraces the total reality of the entire universe; for if even the least part or aspect is left out, it no longer regards 'everything.' (15; Fs)

Since the process whereby we gain knowledge of each single thing involves two questions (What is it? and Is it?), it follows that the concept of being is the concept of a composite consisting of essence (what it is) and existence (that it is). (15; Fs)

Since the intending intention does not constitute knowledge but only leads to knowledge through questioning, the concept of being may seem to be empty, yet in fact it is the fullest of all. It seems empty because through the intending intention alone nothing is yet known. On the other hand, it is the fullest of all, because the concept of being denotes and signifies not what is already known but that towards which the intending intention tends; and since it intends everything, since it drives on to know the full reality of the entire universe, it is indeed the fullest of all concepts. (15; Fs)

14/1 Further, it follows that the differences of being are not something over and above being. If they were, they would indicate something other than being; but apart from being there is nothing at all, and so the differences of being cannot be over and above being.
Again, it follows that being is not a genus; for a genus does not include its differences within itself. Etc., etc.5 (15; Fs)