Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Divinarum Personarum; Theologie (Grenzen); theologisches Vestehen 1-5 (unvollkommen, analog usw, nicht selbst-evident, kein sicheres Beweisen): inneres Wort (einfach- zusammengesetz); erste, zweite Tätigkeit d. Verstandes

Kurzinhalt: ... theological understanding cannot lead to truths that are self-evident to us, or, in modern terminology, to analytic principles... only a hypothesis whose intrinsic possibility is imperfectly, analogically, and obscurely conjectured.

Textausschnitt: Section 3: Further Observations concerning the Same Act

743a After dealing with the nature of theological understanding, we must go on to consider how it is related to truth. This relationship is twofold, since theological understanding is related both to antecedent truth and to consequent truth. The truth that precedes this understanding's the truth revealed by God that we are seeking to understand, while the truth that is consequent upon it is the theological truth that emerges from this understanding. (Fs) (notabene)

743b First, then, one must by all means bear in mind that theological understanding is in itself neither true nor false.1 The reason is that theological understanding is, as we explained above, an instance of the first operation of the intellect, while truth and falsehood are found formally only in the second operation. Therefore, if we are considering only understanding, we can say that it is complete or incomplete, proportionate or analogical, clear or obscure, and so on. But as soon as we ask whether an understanding is true or false, we are no longer considering only understanding but have moved on to the next operation of of the intellect, where we ask, 'Is this so?' and weigh the evidence and make a judgment. (Fs) (notabene)

745a Second, whatever we intellectually grasp we also utter or express or manifest in an inner word. But it is one thing to grasp a cause or a reason, and something else to grasp the sufficiency of evidence. So there are two inner words. The first, by which something is defined in terms of its grasped cause or reason, is called the simple inner word. The second, by which what has been defined is affirmed or denied to exist, is called the compound inner word. And so, just as the understanding in the first operation is in itself neither true nor false, so also the simple inner word in which this understanding is expressed is in itself neither true nor false. (Fs) (notabene)

745b Third, what we conceive in an inner word we also express in outer words; and since a simple inner word is true or false potentially, the outer words themselves also are often said to be true or false by metonymy. But this can be misleading: one can pay more attention to the words themselves than to the intention of the speaker. If the compound inner word of affirmation or negation has not occurred, then outer words express only a simple inner word, whereby a definition or a hypothesis is considered, or some other person's idea is repeated; then of course even if there are many outer words, even if all are taken together, even if they contain the words 'is' or 'is not,' still those outer words cannot be either true or false, since they do not carry an intention to assert something, but only to consider or repeat an idea. Thus, the outer words that express theological understanding as such are not true or false even by metonymy. (Fs)

745c Fourth, as theological understanding itself is imperfect, analogical, obscure, gradually developing, and so on, so also the consequent inner word and the consequent outer words are imperfectly, analogically, and obscurely understood. (Fs)

745d Fifth, it is the nature of the human intellect that its second operation naturally follows upon the first. Once a quiddity is grasped, the question immediately arises whether such a thing exists, and when a cause has been grasped, the question immediately arises whether this or that thing results from such a cause; and from considering many quiddities or causes taken together, principles, demonstrations, and hypotheses emerge. Hence, since theological understanding is a first operation of the intellect, one may ask how it is related to the second, consequent operation. (Fs)

745d Now, theological understanding cannot lead to truths that are self-evident to us, or, in modern terminology, to analytic principles.2 For truths or principles of this sort are absolutely certain because they proceed from an understanding that is perfect, is proportionate to its object, and is clear, and admits of no further development. Theological understanding, on the other hand, is imperfect, analogical, obscure, and gradually developing. Therefore, theological understanding cannot ground truths that are self-evident to us, that is, analytic principles. (Fs) (notabene)

747a Again, theological understanding cannot lead to demonstrations that proceed with certitude from the intrinsic reasons or the causes of things. For the force of a syllogism is not intensive but only extensive; it is not intensive, because its conclusion always follows the weaker premise; it is extensive, because what is known through its premises extends to the conclusions. Therefore, since theological understanding cannot ground premises that are self-evident to us, it is likewise incapable of grounding conclusions that are demonstrated with certitude from the intrinsic reasons or causes of things. (Fs) (notabene)

747b Moreover, theological understanding cannot lead to hypotheses whose intrinsic possibility is clearly and perfectly grasped. For a hypothesis is but a simple inner word that inwardly says what is grasped by an act of understanding. Therefore, since theological understanding is imperfect, analogical, and obscure, it is impossible for a word that proceeds from it to be other than imperfectly understood, analogically understood, and obscurely understood. Hence, when something is understood in this way, its intrinsic possibility can surely be neither clearly nor perfectly grasped. (Fs)

It remains, then, that neither a truth that is self-evident to us nor a truth that is mediately demonstrated with certitude from intrinsic reasons nor a hypothesis whose intrinsic possibility is clearly grasped arises from a theological understanding as such, but only a hypothesis whose intrinsic possibility is imperfectly, analogically, and obscurely conjectured. (Fs)