Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Relationen: tranzendental - kategorial; Antwort auf Einwände (dass Kategorien keine konstituierende Prinzipien seien); operatio, actio - energeia poiesis; Entgegnung zu Krempel: die Relation von Potenz zu Akt usw. nur konzeptuell

Kurzinhalt: Hence he [Krempel] concluded that real transcendental relations were introduced into Thomism not only later on but even contrary to the mind of St Thomas.

Textausschnitt: Objections

725b
1 The essences of things are intrinsic constitutive causes. But essences are defined by genus and [specific] difference. Therefore predicaments, which are ultimate genera, belong to the knowledge of causes itself. (Fs)

Reply. That a definition by any genus and any difference is a definition of an essence, we deny; that a definition by a genus that expresses a cause and by a difference that expresses a cause is an essential definition, we grant. We deny that predicaments are genera that per se express causes, although they might per accidens express causes, inasmuch as they are the starting point from which the search for causes could begin. (Fs) (notabene)

725c
2 Intrinsic causes are those to which other things are ultimately reduced. But other things are reduced in this way to predicaments. Therefore, predicaments are intrinsic causes. (Fs)

The minor premise is proven by the following example: every immanent operation is reduced not to the predicament of action but to the predicament of quality; and this sort of reduction is a reduction to another as ultimate. (Fs)

727a [Reply]: We distinguish the major premise as follows: that an intrinsic cause is that to which something else is ultimately reduced whereby it is better known with respect to us, we deny; but whereby it is better known with respect to itself, we grant. (Fs)

And we distinguish the minor premise accordingly: other things are reduced to predicaments to know them better with respect to us, we grant; but to know them better as they are in themselves, we deny. (Fs)

727b As to the above example: the difficulty arises from the fact that the medieval Latin words operatio and actio were used indifferently to signify what the Greeks without any confusion indicated by the words energeia and poiesis. Also, that difference which is expressed through a reduction to predicaments is even more clearly manifested through reduction to causes. For operatio or actio as poiesis refer to an exercise of efficient causality; but actio or operatio as energeia refer to second act, and second act is explained by way of a fundamental proportion, namely, that of potency to act. For example, as the possible intellect is to an intelligible species as first potency to first act, so the intelligible species is to the act of understanding as second potency to second act. See De potentia, q. 1, a. 1 c. (Fs) (notabene)

Excursus

727c According to A. Krempel,1 St Thomas taught that there was no real relation except that of substance to an actually existing term;2 that therefore relations present in the six last predicaments,3 the relation of potency to act,4 the relation of essence to existence,5 and the relation of matter to form6 were not real but only conceptual relations. Hence he concluded that real transcendental relations were introduced into Thomism not only later on but even contrary to the mind of St Thomas.7

727d This same author, however, did acknowledge as being against his thesis that a real relation of one accident to another was affirmed in Summa theologiae 1, q. 28, a. 1, ad 4m.8 But in order to explain this fact, he resorted to two hypotheses: either that those articles on the trinitarian relations were composed by a secretary, or that St Thomas himself was mentally fatigued.9

729a But these two hypotheses seem to us to be scarcely probable, since here in dealing with the trinitarian relations you will find a new and extremely astute ordering of the material such as could be attributed neither to an inexperienced secretary nor to a mentally fatigued Aquinas. Therefore, this author's thesis, insofar as it is negative and exclusive, must be judged to be false. (Fs)

Besides, the passages we have referred to above which deny that a subject necessarily acquires or loses a certain reality by the fact that it acquires or loses a real relation, the author interprets as follows,10 saying that the distinction between 'to be changed' and 'to become' has been imported from elsewhere and inserted into the text in order to save the systematic thesis; and the word 'nothing' in In V Phys. (lect. 3) is passed over in silence.11 This sort of interpretation once again leads us to deny the author's thesis in its negative and exclusive aspect. (Fs)

729b Nevertheless, since there is no smoke without fire, we feel that we must by all means grant that there are many things in St Thomas that favor this author's thesis. As to how they are to be understood, however, we think it is in some way indicated from the present question, namely, that in every science there are initial, intermediate, and final stages both with respect to a knowledge of causes and with respect to a systematic presentation of this knowledge. And the more one has contributed to the development of a science, the more one knows the causes and the less12 one is able to make use of a systematic presentation of this knowledge. (Fs)