Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Schöpfung - absolute, relative Realität 3 (beide in einer bestimmten Hinsicht); Argumente 2; begriffliche Relation: Gott - Geschöpf; Relation: Substanz - Natur - Akkzidenz usw; R. - Wissen; reale, begriffliche R.; Quantität

Kurzinhalt: As it is true that we know nothing without relations, so these relations are either real or conceptual. Thus, we speak of God as being simply absolute as to what is outside of him not because we know God without relations, but because ...

Textausschnitt: 717b Besides, every created thing is a certain nature. But every nature is an intrinsic principle of operations, and every such created principle is really related to another really distinct from it. (Fs)

Also, if any created thing were simply absolute, it would at least be a simply absolute substance. But, as we concluded above, no concrete substantial entity but only the generic formality of substance is simply absolute, since everything that is a substance is also a nature. (Fs)

Furthermore, we know nothing unless we affirm it; we affirm nothing unless we conceive it; but without relations we conceive nothing, and therefore we know nothing without relations. (Fs)

717c The fact that we conceive nothing without relations is clear on both a priori and a posteriori grounds: a priori, because every finite act of understanding is synthetic as apprehending many things as one; a posteriori, because in going through every primary concept you will always find analogy, proportion, and comparison, such as of essence to existence, potency to act, matter to form, nature to operation, a part to the whole, accident to substance, the sensible to the sense, the appetible to the appetite, the intelligible to the intellect. Similarly, in mathematics rules determine operations, and operations generate numbers of every kind; in physics objects are defined through the laws by which they are connected to one another; in chemistry elements are defined through the various series of relations that are found in the periodic table; in physiology organs are defined by the functions they have with regard to the whole body; and so on. (Fs) (notabene)

717d As it is true that we know nothing without relations, so these relations are either real or conceptual. Thus, we speak of God as being simply absolute as to what is outside of him not because we know God without relations, but because we affirm the relations of God to creatures to be not real but conceptual. Likewise, in knowing created things prescientifically, when we still do not know their causes, we do not know them without relations; but these relations are but conceptual relations, since they pertain to connections that are merely linguistic or, more generally, psychological.1 But when we come to understand them, we know them through their causes; and since their causes are real, their relations must necessarily be real as well. (Fs)

719a Someone might say that quantity is simply absolute. But quantity is an accident, and therefore its mode of being is to be in another; and so as an accident it is related to another. Besides, 'quantity' comes from the question, 'Quantum?' 'How much?' There is no answering this question except by comparing one quantity to another. There is no known quantity, therefore, without a relation, and so the objector would seem to be thinking of some unknown quantity. (Fs) (notabene)

719b But it might be further objected that 'to itself and 'to another' are absolutely diverse formalities, and that therefore an absolute and a relative are two absolutely different realities. Our answer is that 'to itself is the relation of something to itself, and hence is only a conceptual being; but it seems improper to make a judgment about reality according to what are merely conceptual beings. Again, 'not to another' and 'to another' are surely utterly diverse formalities. Besides, they cannot both be predicated of the same thing in the same respect, although there is nothing to prevent them from being predicated of the same thing according to different respects. Thus, a thing is not 'to another' according to the generic formality of substance, and yet it is 'to another' according to the specific formality of nature. (Fs)