Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Relationen; innere - äußere Relation; absolute - relative R. (Peter ein Mann - P. als Freund von X); Vergleich: formal - objektiv; Bestimmung: formal - objektiv

Kurzinhalt: In external relatives, however, truth regards not only the subject but also the term, and therefore in external relatives there is no truth-correspondence except in the two realities, one of which is intrinsic to the subject and the other extrinsic to ...

Textausschnitt: Preliminary clarifications

699d Since questions of this kind have been discussed since the Middle Ages and apparently never settled, it is quite necessary to present first some clarifications in order to obviate any ambiguity or confusion in our treatment of this matter. (Fs)

699e
1 First of all, then, the question is not the one that is usually discussed, namely, whether a relative really adds something to an absolute. For the reality of an internal relation is certainly something relative. Therefore, the only question now is whether a real external relation adds some further reality onto a real internal relation. (Fs)

701a
2 The question is not about just any additional reality but solely about that which is intrinsic to the subject. For it is clear that a greater determination is present in an external relation because in addition to a real subject, a real term is also taken into consideration. The present question is not about what is clear but about what is in doubt, namely, whether in addition to the reality of the term another reality intrinsic to the subject is to be acknowledged. (Fs)

701b
3 Further, it must be clearly and distinctly understood in what respects absolute predicates and relative predicates agree and in what respects they differ. (Fs)

They agree in this, that both predicates, absolute and relative, are truly attributed to the subject. Thus, Peter is truly a man, and Peter is truly a friend of Paul. (Fs)

They differ, however, in this, that an absolute predicate expresses the reality of the subject and that alone, whereas an external relative predicate expresses the reality of the subject and at the same time points to another reality. Thus, 'to be a man' expresses only Peter's reality, but 'to be a friend of Paul' considers not only the reality of Peter but also the reality of Paul. (Fs) (notabene)

701c
4 From this it follows that there is one truth-correspondence in the case of absolutes and another in the case of external relatives. (Fs)

In absolutes, truth regards only the subject by itself, and therefore in absolutes there is no truth-correspondence except in the reality intrinsic to the subject. For example, no being is truly a man by any other reality than his own. (Fs)

In external relatives, however, truth regards not only the subject but also the term, and therefore in external relatives there is no truth-correspondence except in the two realities, one of which is intrinsic to the subject and the other extrinsic to the subject. For example, just as no thing by itself alone is truly twice, so also this truth, 'A is twice B,' cannot have its truth-correspondence in the reality of A alone. (Fs) (notabene)

701d
5 But further, comparison and composition must by no means be confused. Both, it is true, consist in a certain synthesis. But the relative comparison of a subject to a term leaves the subject and the term distinct from each other and really two. A composition of two things, however, makes those two to be simply one being. For example, potency and act can be compared and potency and act can be compounded; but they are compared through a relation, whereas they are compounded inasmuch as these two coalesce into one real being. One must not think that a new reality results from a comparison simply because a new reality does result from composition. (Fs)

703a
6 Again, since comparison properly speaking is an act of the intellect, and yet the subject of a relation is commonly said to be compared to its term in an objective way, in order that real beings not be confused with conceptual beings one must distinguish between a formal comparison, which is made only in the mind, and an objective comparison, which is nothing other than the order or respect of the subject to its term. (Fs)

703b
7 From this it follows that a similar distinction must be acknowledged between a formal determination and an objective determination. A formal determination is in the intellect which apprehends the subject and the term, compares them, and arrives at an affirmation of their determinate relation. Objective determination, on the other hand, does not take place in the mind but is already in things; for a determinable is objectively present, namely, a subject which by its very nature really through an internal relation 'regards' the totality of at least possible terms; similarly, a determinant is objectively present, namely, the term which, inasmuch as it is found among those things that are necessarily 'regarded' by the subject, provides a real foundation by which the objectively determinable becomes objectively determined. (Fs)

703c
8 Finally, although a relation is called a 'respect' or 'regard,' and although a subject is said to have respect or regard to its term, this metaphor should not be taken literally as if the subject looks at or perceives its term. And therefore although a determination of the object perceived is necessarily also in the perceiving subject, one can by no means conclude that the determination that a relation has from its term necessarily produces an equivalent determination in the subject that has a respect or regard to its term by way of a relation. (Fs)