Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Relationen - Einwände, Antworten darauf; interne R.: real - nicht nur begrifflich (Fehler: falsches Verständnis von real); i. R.: bestimmt (Subjekt) - unbestimmt (Term); i. R.: universal - nicht universal

Kurzinhalt: That every internal relation is indeterminate on the part of its subject, we deny; that it is indeterminate on the part of its term we concede to be true in many cases, but not in all... We deny that an internal relation is universal as to what it ...

Textausschnitt: Objections

695c
1 Internal relations seem to be merely conceptual beings, for they are found not in things themselves but only in the possibly false theories proposed by philosophers and scientists. (Fs)

To this we reply that if by 'real' you mean that which is known prior to all intellectual operation, we grant that in that case internal relations are merely conceptual beings. But if the real is being, that which is, that which is known by understanding and judging, then internal relations that are understood and conceived without being affirmed would be merely conceptual beings, but not those that are not only understood and conceived but also truly affirmed to exist. (Fs) (notabene)

695d Internal relations are not only understood and conceived but are also truly affirmed. For above all it is heretical to deny that the intellectual soul is per se and essentially the form of the human body. But the soul is not the form of a body without a relationship to that body; it is not essentially the form of a body unless related to that body by an internal relation; and this internal relation is not a mere conceptual being, for it would be rash to say that the decrees of the Council of Vienne [1311-12] and the Fifth Lateran Council (DB 480, 738; DS 900-901, 1440-41, ND 410) were dealing only with concepts and not with realities. (Fs)

697a
2 No real being is indeterminate. But every internal relation is indeterminate, and therefore no internal relation is real. (Fs)

The major premise is evident, and the minor premise is clear from examples. For the internal relation of proportion between any quantified beings is not specific and arithmetical, such as the double to the half, but is generic and algebraic, such as a to x. (Fs)

697b To this we reply as follows. The difference between an absolute and a relative consists in this, that an absolute reality possesses its entire meaning within itself, whereas a relative reality has its complete meaning only by comparison to something else. We would therefore make the following distinction regarding the major: we grant that no real absolute being is indeterminate; but that no real relative being is indeterminate is true insofar as it receives its determination from the subject, but not insofar as it receives its determination from the term. (Fs) (notabene)

We contradistinguish the minor premise accordingly. That every internal relation is indeterminate on the part of its subject, we deny; that it is indeterminate on the part of its term we concede to be true in many cases, but not in all. For example, the relation of a finite being to its first cause and ultimate end is internal and wholly determinate. (Fs) (notabene)

As to the conclusion, then, we grant that internal relations do not have the determination that is proper to absolutes, while denying that this indetermination on the part of the term negates the reality that is proper to relations. For a relation, as is commonly observed, is the smallest and weakest of beings. (Fs)

697c
3 No real being is universal. But every internal relation is universal; therefore no internal relation is real. (Fs)
The major premise is common doctrine among Aristotelians, and the minor is proved from the fact that an internal relation is concluded to from the universal idea by which a subject is defined. (Fs)

697d We reply by granting the major premise and distinguishing the minor. We deny that an internal relation is universal as to what it intends, while conceding that it is universal as to the manner in which it is intended. For just as we know absolute beings universally without positing absolute universals in things, so in the same way we know relatives universally without positing relative universals in things. (Fs)