Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Relationen - Argumente 3-8; reale interne Relation: Seele, metaphysische Prinzipien (Potenz, Form, Akt, Habitus, Tätigkeit), analytische P., reale Quantitäten, Naturgesetze, organische Teile (Fuß); rationale Psychologie

Kurzinhalt: Finally, there is an abundance of real internal relations in rational psychology, as is clear from the definitions of faculties and habits, from the specification of acts by their objects, from the close connection between the senses and their organs ...

Textausschnitt: 691b
3 If souls are real, there are real internal relations; but souls are real; therefore there are real internal relations. (Fs)

The major premise is clear from both of Aristotle's definitions of the soul. Whether the soul is said to be the first act of a body capable of life, or is described as that principle whereby we live and sense and understand, the very definition of soul includes a relation either to the body or to vital, sentient, and intellectual operations. Now a relation that is part of a definition cannot be negated without negating the thing defined; and the reality of the thing defined necessarily includes the reality of whatever is part of its definition. (Fs)

The minor premise is proved elsewhere and is commonly admitted. (Fs)

691c
4 If the metaphysical principles of things - potency and act, matter and form, essence and existence, operational potency and habit, and habit and operation - are real and really distinct from each other, internal relations are also real. But the antecedent is true; therefore the conclusion is also true. (Fs; tblStw: Prinzipien) (notabene)

As to the major premise: although the metaphysical principles of things cannot be defined, they are explained in terms of a certain proportion. This proportion is in fact a mutual relation and is also internal, since it cannot be negated without the principles themselves being negated. Therefore if these principles are real and really distinct from each other, the internal relations by way of which they are mutually proportionate are also real. (Fs)

The minor premise is proved elsewhere and is quite commonly admitted. (Fs)

691d
5 If there are analytic principles with a relative predicate, there are subjects of internal relations; and if such subjects are real, their internal relations are also real. But there are analytic principles with a relative predicate, and they are truly applied to real subjects. Therefore there are real internal relations.1 (Fs)

693a As to the first major premise: the predicate of an analytic principle can be either absolute or relative, but in either case it is such that it cannot be negated without negating the subject, since an analytic principle is that in which the predicate belongs to the definition of the subject; therefore, if there are analytic principles with a relative predicate, there are subjects of internal relations. (Fs)

As to the second major premise: if there are real subjects of internal relations, there are real internal relations; for an internal relation cannot be negated without negating its subject, and therefore if there is really a subject, there is really a relation as well. (Fs)

As to the minor premise: the principles of efficient causality and of final causality (1) are analytic, (2) relate the caused to the cause, and (3) are truly applied to contingent beings. (Fs)

693b
6 If there are real quantities, there are real internal relations; but there are real quantities. Therefore there are real internal relations. (Fs)

As to the major premise: to say 'how much' is to ask a question to which no answer can be given except in terms of a relation of proportion. Therefore, all quantified things by their very nature stand in some proportion to all other quantified things; and since this proportion pertains to the very formality of quantity, quantities cannot be real without there likewise being real proportions. (Fs)

The minor is evident.2

693c
7 If there are natural laws that (1) from the very nature of things result according to some physical necessity and (2) link things that are real and really distinct from each other, then there are real internal relations. But there are such laws. Therefore, there are real internal relations. (Fs)

The major premise seems evident, since the first point above indicates the internality of the relation and the second point its reality. (Fs)

The minor premise is clear from physics and chemistry, at least if these sciences are understood according to the mind of philosophia perennis. (Fs)

693d
8 If organic parts are found in living things, real internal relations are also found in them. But the antecedent is true, and therefore the conclusion is also true. (Fs)

695a The major premise is clear from the fact that every organic part is the way it is because it performs determined works and functions with regard both to the other parts and to the organic whole. Hence, Aristotle rightly held that the severed foot of an animal is no longer a foot except in an equivocal sense; and the same holds for all the other parts. Now a subject that ceases to be univocally what it is as a result of being separated from other things is conjoined with those others by internal relations; and therefore, if there truly are organic parts, there really and truly are real internal relations as well. (Fs)

The minor premise is evident. (Fs)

695b
9 Finally, there is an abundance of real internal relations in rational psychology, as is clear from the definitions of faculties and habits, from the specification of acts by their objects, from the close connection between the senses and their organs, from the dependence of our intellects upon the senses, from the dependence of appetition upon apprehension, from the ordering of questions to acts of understanding, of acts of understanding to inner words to be uttered, of inner words uttered to acts of will, and vice versa from the dependence of acts of understanding upon questions, of inner words upon acts of understanding, and of acts of the will upon inner words. All these relations are internal because they either belong to the very definitions, or flow from the definitions, or are determined by human nature in its present state. (Fs)