Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Relationen - Argumente 1-2; Akzidenz - Relation - reale interene Relation; Substanz: per se - Natur, in Relation zu Akzidentien, Tätigkeiten

Kurzinhalt: If there are real accidents, there are real internal relations; but there are real accidents; therefore there are real internal relations.

Textausschnitt: Arguments

689b
1 If there are real accidents, there are real internal relations; but there are real accidents; therefore there are real internal relations. (Fs)

The major premise is proved in two steps: (1) if there are accidents, there are internal relations; (2) if accidents are real, internal relations are real. (Fs)

As to the first step: an accident is defined as that whose mode of being is to be in another; but to have the mode of being of being in another is to have a relation to that other; and since this relation is part of the definition of accident, it is an internal relation, since no part of a definition can be negated without negating the thing defined. (Fs) (notabene)

As to the other step: the reality of an accident is the reality of what is stated in the definition of an accident; therefore, the reality of an accident necessarily includes the reality of an internal relation. (Fs)

The minor premise is proved elsewhere, and is commonly admitted. (Fs)

689c
2 If there are real finite natures, there are real internal relations; but there are real finite natures; therefore there are real internal relations. (Fs)

As to the major premise: every finite nature is defined by its relation to something else, namely, to accidents that naturally result from it, and to operations of which it is the remote or the proximate principle. Also, it is clear that no nature can be real without that relation that is in its very definition also being real. (Fs) (notabene)

The minor premise is evident and is proved elsewhere. (Fs)

691a
Corollary: Since every finite substance is also a finite nature, it follows that every finite substance possesses real internal relations. Note, however, that a finite substance can be considered in two ways: first, generically, and in this way it is defined absolutely as that whose mode of being is to be per se, in its own right; second, specifically, and in this way a specific nature can be defined only in relation to its accidents and operations. Thus, a man is both a substance and a nature; but inasmuch as he is said to be a substance he is considered only generically as a being per se, while inasmuch as he is a nature he is defined as a rational animal, where the word 'rational' can be neither defined nor explained except in relation to an intellect. (Fs) (notabene)