Autor: Scheffczyk, Leo

Buch: Aufbruch oder Abbruch

Titel: Aufbruch oder Abbruch

Stichwort: Trinität, trinitarische Analogie; Vatikan I: Offenbarung, Glaube, analoges Verständnis; philosophische (eins, wahr, gut) - theologische A.: Verstehen - processio d. Wortes, Liebe - p. von Vater u. Sohn;

Kurzinhalt: ... although the theological analogies afford a fuller and more intimate knowledge of God, they are more imperfect and obscure than philosophical analogies... The philosophical analogy is not only confirmed by such additions but is also marvelously ...

Textausschnitt: 27 The Trinitarian Analogy

681c Concerning the mysteries hidden in God, the [First] Vatican Council teaches three things: (1) that they cannot be known by us without divine revelation; (2) that, given revelation and faith, human reason, enlightened by faith, can with God's help acquire some understanding, and indeed a most fruitful understanding, of these mysteries by way of analogy with what it knows naturally; (3) that never in this life can we have an understanding of these mysteries comparable to the understanding we have of those truths which constitute the proper object of our human reason. (Fs) (notabene)

683a For a better understanding of this, the following should be noted: (1) although in this life we do not know what God is, we do have a knowledge of him through analogies that are imperfect; (2) some analogies are philosophical, by which, apart from any revelation, we can form some conception of God and demonstrate his existence, while other analogies are theological, by means of which we try to acquire some measure of understanding of the mysteries revealed by God; (3) the philosophical analogies of being and intellect and love are complemented and perfected by the theological analogies of word and proceeding love; and (4) although the theological analogies afford a fuller and more intimate knowledge of God, they are more imperfect and obscure than philosophical analogies. (Fs) (notabene)

683b The reason for the first observation above is that if God is not known by his essence, then he is known through some less perfect medium. But to know what is perfect through a less perfect medium is to know by way of an imperfect analogy. (Fs) (notabene)

683c The reason for the second observation is that as faith is something superadded to our natural knowledge, so does theology add something to our philosophical knowledge. But faith is not a knowledge of God by his essence, and therefore theology, which is based on faith, can only contribute additional imperfect analogies. (Fs)

683d The reason for the third observation is that theological analogies proceed along generally the same lines as philosophical analogies. Apart from the negative predications in our natural knowledge of God (for example, that God is not material, not in time, not mutable, cannot not be, cannot be multiple), we find that all the other divine attributes come down to this, that to an infinite degree and in an ineffable manner God is being, one, true, and good by reason of his unrestricted act of being, understanding, and loving. To these a theological analogy is added, not in order to make assertions that are quite novel, but to venture to say something about this ineffable manner itself. For concerning the divine manner of understanding, it asserts that the infinite act of understanding utters a word, as does our understanding, and concerning the divine manner of loving it asserts that the infinite act of loving proceeds, like ours, from understanding and an inner word. The philosophical analogy is not only confirmed by such additions but is also marvelously perfected by them. There is no more profound characteristic within us than the irresistible drive of our reason to form concepts and judgments, and there is nothing more personal to us than the rational responsibility to will and choose. When, therefore, such intellectual emanations are ascribed to God, the one whom philosophy has shown to be so remote from us in his infinite perfection, theological understanding believes to be very near to us in this familiar deep-seated characteristic. (Fs) (notabene)

685a With regard to the fourth observation, there is a limitation that is common to both philosophical and theological analogy, and a further limitation that belongs only to theological analogy. (Fs)

685b The limitation common to both consists in the fact that in this life our knowledge of God is analogical. Not having a quidditative knowledge of God through the divine essence, both philosophers and theologians form concepts of God by way of comparisons which they know quite well to be imperfect, though they won't know just how imperfect until they reach the beatific vision. Therefore, just as philosophers do not know what God is, neither do theologians know what a divine procession is or a divine immanent relation or a divine person; for in God essence and procession and relation and person are one and the same reality. So it is that without quidditative knowledge the degree to which analogies are imperfect is also unknown. And there is the further fact that conclusions follow from these analogies (more readily and more clearly from the theological) which we know to be compatible only insofar as they are derived with certitude from premises that are certain, and imply no obvious contradiction. (Fs) (notabene)

685c The limitation peculiar to theological analogy is the fact that it is not strictly demonstrable. And for a long time now it has been quite clear what cannot be established with certitude by the light of reason alone. Yet even presupposing revelation and faith, one cannot conclude to the trinitarian analogy by a strict process of reasoning. It is true, of course, that on the basis of this analogy many conclusions follow which are either matters of faith or are deduced with certitude from faith. But this sort of argumentation, however productive of an understanding - and indeed of a most fruitful understanding - of the trinitarian mystery, falls far short of being a demonstration. As even a beginner at logic knows quite well, the following inference is invalid: If A exists, then B exists; but B exists; therefore A exists. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m. (Fs) (notabene)