Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Liebe, Hervorgang, Analogie; das Gute 6, 7 (Wille, Liebe, complacentia; Liebe als Prinzip d. Einheit); Liebe im Liebenden : Gewusste im Wissend (Unterschied, Quasi-Identifikation)

Kurzinhalt: Sixth, of all the acts that the will performs, the most fundamental is love. Love is a certain contented quiescence (complacentia) in what is good ...

Textausschnitt: 675c Sixth, of all the acts that the will performs, the most fundamental is love. Love is a certain contented quiescence (complacentia) in what is good; all the other acts of the will are grounded in love and are different from love insofar as they are concerned with something that is connected with or opposed to the object of love. Thus, longing is concerned with a good that is absent, hope with a future good, joy with a present good, hatred with an evil that is opposed to good, sadness with a present evil, and so forth. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 20, a. 1 c. (Fs) (notabene)

675d Seventh, love is a principle of unity both by reason of its object and by reason of the act itself. (Fs)

Love is unitive by reason of its object because, since every good is a good for someone, love looks to two things, namely, the good which it wills and the one for whom it wills that good (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 20, a. 3). Also, since the good of order itself is the greatest good, a love that is good wills particular goods for those to whom those goods properly belong in accordance with the wise ordering of things. Thus order is observed in God's love for his creatures (ibid, and a. 4), and created charity itself is regulated by order (ibid. 2-2, q. 26). (Fs)

675e Love is unitive by reason of its act inasmuch as the love in the lover is in a way the beloved in the lover. This is partly like and partly different from the way in which what is known is in the knower. (Fs)

675f It is similar with respect to the conditions for the correspondence of truth. The statement, 'This man is known,' is true as long as there exists in someone an act of knowing this person. It is similarly true that 'This man is loved' as long as there exists in someone an act of loving this man. And so 'being known' and 'being loved' are not in the one known or loved but in the one who knows or loves. (Fs)

677a But there [eg: is] a difference according to the way in which being known is in the knower and being loved is in the lover. A man being known is in the knower according to an intellective, an intentional, mode of being. But a man being loved is in the lover, not by way of an intentional representation, but by way of a real inclination and a quasi-identification. For a friend is said by his friend to be dimidium animae meae, 'half of my soul'; and a lover lives not for himself alone but also, and perhaps more so, for the other person (Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 28). (Fs) (notabene)