Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Liebe, Hervorgang, Analogie; das Gute 5 (Wille - Vernunft); Notion d. Willens: Objekt, Vernunft, Endziel; Präexistenz - Ursache; intellektuelle Emanation - Hauchung (spiratio): aktiv (Vernunft), passiv (Wille)

Kurzinhalt: ... the essential notion of will consists in this, that it is an inclination that follows the intellect, so that it not only wills the object presented to it by the intellect but also wills it on account of the motive or end for which the intellect ...

Textausschnitt: 673c Fifth, as we proceed from good to order and from order to wisdom, so we must proceed from wisdom to will. Beings that have a natural mode of existence also have a natural inclination to operate in accordance with their mode of existence. But those that have an intentional mode of existence, either in sense or in an intellect, are inclined to action not by themselves but by a conjoined appetite, sentient or rational as the case may be (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 80, a. 1). Therefore, the essential notion of will consists in this, that it is an inclination that follows the intellect, so that it not only wills the object presented to it by the intellect but also wills it on account of the motive or end for which the intellect judges that the object ought to be willed. (Fs; tblStw: Wille) (notabene)

673d The following will illustrate this intrinsic dependence of the will upon the intellect: 'Effects proceed from a causal agent inasmuch as they preexist in it; for every agent produces some likeness to itself. Effects preexist in their cause, however, according to the manner of the cause. Hence, since the divine act of existence is its act of understanding, its effects preexist in it in an intellective manner, and accordingly they proceed from it in an intellective manner. Consequently they also proceed in a volitional manner; for its inclination to do what the intellect has conceived pertains to its will' (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 4 c). (Fs)

675a Be careful, therefore, not to think of the will as if it were a natural appetite ignorant of its object, or as if it were an animal appetite that knows its object and desires it as known but without any concern about motives or ends. For the will is such that it not only desires good ordered in an intelligible way but also desires it because of the principle of that order, that is, the end - in other words, it desires value. (Fs)

675b Besides, as the will is moved by its object because of a motive, so an inner word or concept moves the will not only as attracting it by presenting it with an object that is good, but also as obliging this rational appetite in a rational way by determining a motive or end. This intellectual emanation is called spiration, and is active on the part of the intellect but passive on the part of the will. (Fs) (notabene)