Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Wort, Analogie; Unterschied 6: inneres Wort - göttliches Wort (Notwendigkeit); Wort Gottes - Wissen um viele Dinge (eminenter im Wesen, virtualiter in d. Macht), Einwände: Scotus, Beweis d. Wortes in Gott?

Kurzinhalt: The sixth difference is that we can prove the necessity of our inner word, but can only accept on faith the necessity of the divine Word, although it is knowable in itself... Similarly, in God the existence of a Word cannot be demonstrated from ...

Textausschnitt: 665c The sixth difference is that we can prove the necessity of our inner word, but can only accept on faith the necessity of the divine Word, although it is knowable in itself. (Fs)

For as we said above (appendix 2, §7), in our case there is a fourfold necessity for an inner word because the object that moves our intellect, namely, a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter, is not the same as the object to which our intellect tends as to its end, that is, being in its fullest extent. (Fs)

665d In the case of God, however, as he cannot be moved by anything else, so also he cannot tend to anything else as to an end. In God, therefore, the one who understands and the act of understanding and that which is understood are all one and the same. The primary object of the divine intellect is the divine substance itself, which is one with the divine act of existence and the divine act of understanding. But the secondary object of the divine intellect is this same divine substance as eminently containing other things within itself, and the divine power as virtually containing other things within itself. (Fs)

665e So, then, in God the existence of a Word cannot be demonstrated from the fact that God knows himself; for through the same pure act there are verified in God both what is knowing and what is known. (Fs)

665f Similarly, in God the existence of a Word cannot be demonstrated from the fact that God knows many other things. For every act of understanding apprehends many things as one. This apprehension of many realities together implies multiplicity neither in the act of understanding itself, nor in the species by which understanding occurs, nor in its primary object, nor, per se, in other things besides the act of understanding. No multiplicity is implied in the act of understanding itself, because it is a single intellectual apprehension of many things. No multiplicity is implied in the species by which understanding occurs, for this species is to the act of understanding as first act is to second act and therefore, since the second act is one, so also is the first act. No multiplicity is implied in the primary object, for in it many things are understood not in a multiplicity but in and through a unity. No multiplicity per se is implied in other things besides the act of understanding, for the act of understanding per se is the ultimate source of multiplicity and produces multiplicity not of necessity but by a wholly free decision. (Fs) (notabene)

667a One may object that multiplicity in the primary object is implied insofar as many other realities are contained eminently in the divine essence and virtually in the divine power. (Fs)

667b To this we would reply that 'to be contained eminently in the essence and virtually in the power' means simply that the intellect understands many other things in one absolutely simple essence or power. In other words, according to our way of conceiving things, what are contained eminently in the divine essence or virtually in the divine power add to the mere essence or power not real relations but conceptual relations (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 15, a. 2, ad 4m). (Fs)

667c One may further object, with Scotus, that those relations would not be conceptual relations but real relations. For God's knowledge is perfectly objective. If, then, those relations are in the divine essence prior to every act of the divine mind, they are indeed seen by God but they are real relations because they precede the act of his mind. If, on the other hand, they are not in the divine essence prior to every act of the divine mind, they are obviously conceptual relations but cannot be seen by God's perfectly objective knowledge. See [Duns Scotus] In I Sent. (Opus Oxoniense), d. 35, q. unica, n. 7 (Vives x, 544). (Fs)

667d Our answer to this objection of Scotus is that certainly it is valid if one grants the Platonic principle that in all knowledge, and indeed by the very nature of knowledge, there is a duality, so that an object is somehow prior to knowledge. If, on the contrary, one affirms Aristotle's principle that all knowledge is grounded upon an identity, the whole objection vanishes. For if the one who understands and the act of understanding and that which is understood are one and the same, the criterion for distinguishing between real relations and conceptual relations depending on whether they precede or follow every act of the mind cannot be applied.1

667e Note that this is the same solution to the argument in favor of a formal distinction on the side of the reality. Scotus maintains that God's objective intuition either sees paternity as totally identical with divinity on the side of the reality or sees it as in some way distinct on the side of the reality. Well, if you grant this, Scotus has won his point. If you deny it, then on the side of the reality paternity is totally identical with divinity, so that the Son cannot be seen as God without by the same token being seen as Father. The solution to this is to deny the supposition: God's act of understanding and his essence are not two different things; and both the Father and the Son perfectly understand the mystery that each is identical with the divine essence without being identical with each other. (Fs; nicht klar dieser Absatz)

669a A further objection might be raised that we are unable to understand a multiplicity of things without uttering a multitude of inner words; and therefore since God perfectly understands an infinity of things, he must utter at least one Word. (Fs)

669b In reply we would say that we understand many things through many words because we proceed through several acts in which we understand particular things to an understanding of these several things in a unity. And yet when we have understood several things in a unity we also are wont to utter a single word, words like 'geometry,' 'history,' 'Catholicism,' 'romanticism.' But whether we utter one word or many, we do not on that account understand more; for since every word proceeds from the knowledge of the one who understands, every single thing must be understood before being conceived or uttered, and nothing more is contained in the word than is understood in the act of understanding itself - something that can be seen in a way in people who do not understand very much but spout a great deal of sesquipedalian verbiage. Now, God in a single intellectual intuition perfectly understands both himself and all other things. Without this understanding he could not utter both himself and all else in a single Word; and given this understanding, since he already has a perfect understanding of all things, it is not apparent to us why he should utter any Word. (Fs)

669c A further objection might be that the existence of a Word in God can be demonstrated; for every pure perfection must be acknowledged to be in God as we know God by our natural knowledge. But an intellectual emanation is the best and greatest perfection to be found among creatures; therefore an intellectual emanation must be acknowledged to exist in God. (Fs) (notabene)

669d Our answer to this objection is that a pure perfection must be acknowledged to be in God if it is known by natural reason to be pure, but not if it is known to be such by faith alone. (Fs)

Now by our human reason we do not know intellectual emanation to be a pure perfection, although from what we know by faith we may conclude with some probability that it is. (Fs) (notabene)
On the basis of this distinction we deny the objection. (Fs)

669e Finally, in order to understand the solution to these and all other difficulties, one must keep in mind the distinction between a quidditative knowledge of God by which he is known in his essence and the analogical knowledge of God by which from his effects, by way of proportion, negation, and excess, God is conceived and his existence proven. (Fs) (notabene)

671a If God is known in his essence, then certainly the divine procession of the Word is also known. But all that we can conclude from this is that the procession of the Word in God is necessary with respect to itself, quoad se, for in this life we do not know what God is. (Fs)

671b But if God is known only by way of analogy, then (1) it is certain that God both understands and is understood, and yet from this the procession of the divine Word cannot be proven; (2) it is certain that God knows many other things, but neither from this can the procession of the Word be proven; (3) without revelation it is not certain that the intellectual emanation of the Word is a pure perfection, (a) because all realities are present in God in a more eminent way than in us, (b) because we cannot positively reconcile the utter simplicity of God (which is demonstrable) with the plurality introduced by an emanation, and (c) because one cannot argue from an emanation to the notion of person as a subsistent relation by the light of reason alone; but (4) given divine revelation, human reason, enlightened by faith, has gradually over the course of many centuries arrived at some understanding of this mystery, albeit imperfect and merely analogical. (Fs) (notabene)