Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Das natürliches Verlangen d. Intellekts 4 (desiderio intellectus, appetitus); Einwand 3: tatsächliche - mögliche Welt (Scotus - Thomas); Konzepte - Verstehen

Kurzinhalt: ... that Scotus, denying the priority of the act of understanding over concepts, takes concepts themselves as the foundation of knowledge as they would be necessarily either connected to one another or opposed to one another. Hence ...

Textausschnitt: 657c A third objector says that Aquinas seems to speak quite often as if this present order of reality were the only possible one. (Fs)

Our reply is simply that he does not so speak. He may seem to say this when interpreted as if he had adopted the principles of Scotus's methodology, but not if he is interpreted according to his own methodological principles. (Fs)

657d The point we are making here is that Scotus, denying the priority of the act of understanding over concepts, takes concepts themselves as the foundation of knowledge as they would be necessarily either connected to one another or opposed to one another. Hence, he considers theology to be scientific only insofar as it determines truths which, being absolutely necessary and universal, would be valid for every possible order of reality. Accordingly, anyone who is steeped in Scotistic principles thinks that theologians always talk about merely possible orders or, if they happen to be speaking about the actual order of things, supposes this to be an exception that should be noted as such. (Fs) (notabene)

657e St Thomas, on the other hand, having understood that the act of understanding is prior to concepts, distinguishes different degrees of knowledge according to different acts of understanding. Thus, according to him, God, in comprehending the divine essence, knows perfectly absolutely all things that are possible. But Christ as man, by reason of his beatific vision, beholds the divine essence but does not know it comprehensively; thus, he knows all actual reality and all that lies within the power of creatures, but not all that is within the power of the Creator, for this presupposes a comprehension of the divine essence (Summa theologiae, 3, q. 10, a. 2). Finally, a theologian, since he does not know what God is (ibid. 1, q. 1, a. 7, ad 2m), is capable of attaining only that knowledge which is subalternate to the knowledge possessed by God and the blessed (ibid. q. 1, a. 2). Hence, theology knows God through analogies that are imperfect. It relates actual beings to God inasmuch as they manifest God's free will and suppose an ordering on the part of his wisdom (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, cc. 24, 26; 3, c. 97, ¶13, §2735 and ¶16, § 2738); but it treats of merely possible reality only incidentally in its discussion of God's omnipotence (sec, for example, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 25). Contrary though this may be to Scotistic principles, it is surely not unreasonable to consider as mad any theologian who firmly believes that he knows things that he says Christ as man was ignorant of. (Fs)

659a One may conclude from this just how great the difference is between Scotistic and Thomist methods, and how mistaken are those who would interpret St Thomas according to the methodological notions of the Scotists. It was out of the question that Aquinas, who practically always dealt with actual things, should have been continually declaring that what he was dealing with were actual things. Yet this is what is expected by those who, like our objector, seem to think that Aquinas very often spoke as if this present order of reality were the only one possible. (Fs)