Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Das natürliches Verlangen d. Intellekts 2 (desiderio intellectus, appetitus): Bestimmungen 7-9; natürlich - übernatürlich (vitaler Akt, Potenz, Form); Unsterblichkeit - visio beatifica (eg); kein Widerspruch: intellektuelles Geschöpf ohne Gnade

Kurzinhalt: We are left, therefore, with the conclusion that an intrinsic natural principle is related to the vision of God as mere potency which only God can actuate.

Textausschnitt: 649a Now, no principle that is natural to us is capable of producing a supernatural act of any sort. Producer and product are proportionate to each other; but the natural and the supernatural are simply disproportionate. And note that those who recognize a so-called vital act as the sole productive principle (see appendix 1 above, §8) tend to see an internal contradiction in a natural desire for a supernatural vision. (Fs) (notabene)

649b Besides, nothing that is natural can be related to something supernatural as form to second act. For both form and second act have the same definition, as, for example, the definition of sight and seeing. But the definitions of natural and supernatural being are totally different. (Fs)

Again, nothing that is natural can be related to the supernatural as mere potency that can be actuated by a created agent. For what is supernatural exceeds the proportion of any finite substance whatsoever; but nothing produced by a finite agent can exceed the proportion of that agent. (Fs)

649c We are left, therefore, with the conclusion that an intrinsic natural principle is related to the vision of God as mere potency which only God can actuate. See Summa theologiae, 3, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3m, and q. 11, a. 1 c. (Fs) (notabene)
And this is all the more clear from the fact that the form by which God is seen in his essence is the divine essence itself, and the disposition for receiving God in the intellect is the light of glory (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, aa. 4 and 5). (Fs)
649d Seventh, an intrinsic principle can be related to an act in two ways: directly and explicitly, or indirectly and implicitly. (Fs)
The natural desire of the intellect is related to the totality of being in the first way. This same desire is related to the vision of God in the second way, inasmuch as this desire does not rest unless and until it sees what God is. (Fs) (notabene)

649e Be careful, therefore, not to confuse this natural desire with a specifically supernatural act. Supernatural acts belong to a certain genus and are specified by their proper objects. But a universal tendency, whether of the intellect towards being or of the will towards good, is not specifically supernatural: Nor can the supernaturality of such a tendency be deduced from the fact that being implicitly includes supernatural beings and good implicitly includes supernatural goods. All that can be deduced from the tendency is that the supernatural is not utterly impossible; and thus does Aquinas conclude to the possibility of the beatific vision in Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 1. (Fs)

649f Eighth, there is one kind of natural appetite that is founded upon the perfection of its subject, and another that is founded not upon its perfection but only upon its perfectibility. (Fs) (notabene)
649g Our natural desire for immortality belongs to the first kind (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 55, ¶13, §1309 and c. 79, ¶6, §1602; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 75, a. 6 c). For if immortality is not some new perfection added to a spiritual soul but only the perpetual continuation of the same perfection, a continuation which is deduced from the notion of the soul and results naturally from the essence of the soul. (Fs)

650a Our natural desire for the vision of God belongs to the second kind. For that vision can neither be deduced logically from the perfection of a created intellect nor result naturally from the essence of a created intellect. Hence this desire is based entirely upon the perfectibility of the created intellect. The perfection of the intellect does not consist in being ignorant or asking questions, but in knowledge and answers; but its perfectibility does consist in its ignorance and is manifested in its questioning. (Fs)
650b Ninth, exigency can be understood in two ways. In the first sense, exigency is properly speaking a certain need that a thing has for something else. Thus, an end has an exigency for means, a necessary efficient cause necessitates its effect, a formal cause necessitates its primary formal effects, and a relative necessarily calls for a correlative. Understood in the second sense, an exigency is improperly speaking predicated of creatures inasmuch as a need results in them from the exigencies of divine wisdom or divine goodness. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3m, and Summa contra Gentiles, 2, cc. 28-30. (Fs)

650c In the first sense, a natural desire has no exigency whatsoever for the vision of God. It has no exigency by reason of an end, for an appetite is not an end but a means, and the same means can be used for different ends. In other words, if the end is [an intellectual] vision, intellect is necessarily a means to that end; but if intellect is a means, the end is possibly, but not necessarily, such a vision. Nor does it have an exigency by reason of efficient causality, for a natural desire does not cause the vision, much less necessarily cause it; nor by reason of a formal causality, for a desire is not a formal cause; nor by reason of its being a relative term, for its correlative is not the act of seeing but the implicit and indirect desirability of the vision itself. (Fs)

650d Nor does the desire have an exigency for this vision in the second meaning of exigency. For although, when God acts, he necessarily acts in accordance with his infinite wisdom and goodness, it by no means follows that he actually destines an intellectual creature to that vision as to its end. (Fs)

God in his infinite goodness can do whatever his infinite wisdom can conceive: for the goodness of the will consists in following a wise intellect; and the infinite goodness of his will consists in perfectly following his infinitely wise intellect. (Fs)

650e Besides, God can do with infinite wisdom whatever absolutely speaking he is able to do. For God is not more powerful than he is wise, as if his power were more extensive than his wisdom; but, since his power and his wisdom are the same reality with his divine essence, 'the divine wisdom embraces the whole range of his power,' and so 'there is nothing within the power of God that is not within the order of divine wisdom' (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 25, a. 5 a). (Fs)

653a Moreover, God can absolutely speaking do whatever does not involve an internal contradiction (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 25, a. 3 c). But an intellectual creature without grace is not self-contradictory; otherwise grace would not be a free gift but would be given of necessity to every intellectual creature. Absolutely speaking, therefore, God can create an intellectual creature without actually destining it to the beatific vision as its end. But, as we have said, whatever absolutely speaking God can do, he can also do with his infinite wisdom and infinite goodness. There is therefore no exigency on the part of divine wisdom or divine goodness for an intellectual creature to be actually destined to the vision of God as its end. See the encyclical of Pius xn, Humani Generis (db 2318, ds 3891).