Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Das natürliches Verlangen d. Intellekts (Thomas v. Aquin, desiderio intellectus, appetitus): Bestimmungen 1-6; Unterschied: intellektuelles - willentliches Verlangen

Kurzinhalt: Second, in this psychological fact can be discerned a natural desire. For what is desired is intellectual knowledge; and since this desiring results neither from sense knowledge nor from intellectual knowledge, it is said to be natural ..

Textausschnitt: 24 Excursus: The Natural Desire of the Intellect

645c Since St Thomas's doctrine is so coherent that it cannot be understood by one who would syncretistically accept one part while rejecting another, it would seem desirable at this point to inquire whether he contradicted himself in teaching that man desires the vision of God naturally yet obtains it supernaturally. (Fs)

645d We shall not treat this question in its full extent, since it appears likely that the mind of Aquinas on this matter underwent development; we shall restrict ourselves to certain definite passages, namely, Summa contra Gentiles, 3, cc. 50 and 52; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, aa. 1 and 4; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8 and q. 5, a. 5; 3, q. 9, a. 2, ad 3m. For it is in these four passages from his most systematic works that the apparent contradiction is to be found. (Fs)

645e For the thought of the medieval theologians (all of them, it seems), see Victorinus Doucet, 'De naturali seu innato supernaturalis beatitudinis desiderio iuxta theologos a saeculo XIII usque ad XX,' Antonianum 4 (1929) 167-208; E. Elter, 'De naturali hominis beatitudine ad mentem Scholae antiquioris,' Gregorianum 9 (1928) 269-306. The following observations have to do only with an understanding of this matter. (Fs)

647a First, then, there is the psychological fact that man has an innate tendency to wonder, which (1) precedes intellectual knowledge and leads to it, (2) is not constituted but is manifested by the questions, Is it? and What is it? (3) is so far-ranging that it does not rest until it sees God by his essence, and thus (4) contains implicitly in itself that drive towards the vision of God which Aquinas briefly explains in the Summa contra Gentiles and in the Prima pars and the Prima secundae of the Summa theologiae, in the passages referred to above. (Fs)

647b Second, in this psychological fact can be discerned a natural desire. For what is desired is intellectual knowledge; and since this desiring results neither from sense knowledge nor from intellectual knowledge, it is said to be natural (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 80, a. 1 a). (Fs) (notabene)

647c Third, this natural desire is also a 'nature' in the Aristotelian sense of the word (see above, appendix 1, §4). For it is a principle of motion and rest in that in which it primarily and per se resides. It is through this desire, which is in the intellect, that we primarily and per se desire to understand and, once we have understood, rest in that understanding. (Fs) (notabene)

647d Hence this desire, which is in the intellect as its subject and leads it towards understanding, is totally different from that other natural appetite which is in the will and in an indeterminate way tends towards beatitude (Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 1, a. 7). In Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 3, a. 8, Aquinas argues from this natural desire of the intellect to determine the object of perfect beatitude. (Fs) (notabene)

647e Fourth, the principle, intrinsic to the intellect, by which we desire to understand, is not an acquired habit but is innate within us and spontaneously manifests itself. Wearing their parents out with a virtually endless stream of questions is something that children neither are taught nor learn. (Fs)

647f Fifth, much less is this principle intrinsic to the intellect a supernaturally infused habit. For without it all questioning would cease and we should not acquire even natural knowledge. (Fs)

647g There are, therefore, three ways in which this desire that is not satisfied with anything short of the vision of God can be called natural. In the first place, it is neither a sense appetite consequent upon sense knowledge nor a volitional appetite consequent upon intellectual knowledge. In the second place, it is the principle of motion and of rest which is primarily and per se in that in which there is the motion or rest. And in the third place, it is in us by our very nature, and is neither something learned nor superadded to our nature by some special infusion. (Fs) (notabene)

647h Sixth, an intrinsic principle of any act can be related to that act in several ways: as a productive principle of the act, or as a receptive principle of the act, either proximately receptive as a form, or remotely receptive as mere potency. (Fs)