Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Analogie, Mensch 2; Potenzen: entsprechende Erfordernisse (exigencies, exigentia); intellektuelles Verlangen (desire, appetitio) - Wesen Gottes: potentia obedientialis; Sein - Analogie (dem Umfang nach, quiddidativ); Erkenntnis Gottes - die Seligen

Kurzinhalt: First there is a determinate exigency, and, since every determination comes from a form ... so the created intellect is to the totality of being as potency. Now this potency is not second or accidental potency ... It is, rather, obediential potency

Textausschnitt: 639d Further, as we have distinguished between different potencies, so we must carefully examine the matter of exigencies. First there is a determinate exigency, and, since every determination comes from a form, only second or accidental potency can exert a determinate exigency; thus, whatever does not have a human form cannot have a determinate exigency to perform human activities. A second kind of exigency is an indeterminate exigency, which is found in first or essential potency; thus, prime matter calls for any kind of informing, though matter that is not properly disposed cannot require that it be informed by a human soul. Finally, with obediential potency no exigency of any kind, determinate or indeterminate, can exist or even be thought of. For God does not exist for the sake of order in the universe, but the order of the universe exists for God. And the order of the universe does not exist for the sake of intellectual creatures, but intellectual creatures exist for the sake of the order of the universe (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 103, a. 2 c. and ad 3m; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 112, ¶¶8-10, §§2863-65), an order which God has chosen in an utterly free decision (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 19, a. 3; q. 21, a.1, ad 3m). (Fs) (notabene)

639e Second, St Thomas did acknowledge a true and real relationship of the created intellect to the totality of being. For the intellect is really and truly related not only to what it does know or can know naturally but also to what it desires to know. So, having learned about the existence of a first cause, we automatically wonder what that cause is; and as the fact of questioning manifests intellectual desire, so the question itself determines the object of that desire, since one who asks the question What? desires to understand the essence of the thing in question. Intellectual desire, therefore, is such that it does not rest until it knows God by his essence (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, a. 1; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 50; for the systematic character of this doctrine, see ibid. cc. 25-63. Aquinas immediately goes on to note the supernaturality of this vision, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12, aa. 4 and 5; 1-2, q. 5, a. 5; Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 52; we have pointed out the confusions to be avoided in this matter in a section appended to this section: see §24, below). (Fs)

641a From the foregoing we conclude that as the divine intellect is to the totality of being as act, so the created intellect is to the totality of being as potency. Now this potency is not second or accidental potency, for it is not founded upon a form or habit, since one who asks a question has not yet received the intellectual form or habit. Nor is it first or essential potency, which can receive its form through a created agent; only God is equal to uniting the divine essence to a created intellect. It is, rather, obediential potency, which is founded upon the perfectibility of the intellect, and, indeed, on a perfectibility which only the omnipotence of God can perfect. (Fs) (notabene)

641b Third, we conclude that only the blessed understand what God is; for to understand what a thing is is the same as to know it by its essence (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 1, a. 7, ad im; q. 12, a. 12, ad im; a. 13, ad im; 1-2, q. 3, a. 8). (Fs)

641c We may further conclude to the difference between being taken analogously and being taken quidditatively. (Fs)

For in both cases we use the word 'being,' and in the same respect in both according to its extension, what it denotes on the part of the object, namely: all things that are, whether existing necessarily as God or contingently as creatures, both with respect to their total actual reality past, present, or future, and even with respect to all that lies within the power of a creature or in the power of God himself. (Fs)

641c But when we add 'analogously' or 'quidditatively' we do so with respect to the manner in which the totality of being is apprehended. For it belongs to the intellect to apprehend many realities in one. But if that 'one' is the very essence of God, which is the universal principle of all being and, in a way, the 'because of which' (propter quid) of the existence of God and of every possible being, then we are considering being quidditatively.1 If, however, that 'one' is some created being, or a species or genus of created beings, then we have, it is true, the beginning of and basis for knowing something about all beings; but, since all creatures fall short of the infinite perfection of the divine essence, we have neither the beginning of nor the basis for being able to understand the total reality of all being. Therefore, whenever the divine essence is not apprehended through itself, it is impossible to know all beings except according to an imperfect analogy - by way of analogy, because by reason of a certain proportion among them, we can go from knowing created things to knowing all being; by way of an imperfect analogy, because created being is an imperfect basis for knowing all being. See, for example, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 88. (Fs)

643a Fourth, we draw these further conclusions: (1) God knows himself comprehensively (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 3); (2) the blessed see God in his essence but do not know God comprehensively (ibid. q. 12, a. 7); (3) there are truths so deeply hidden in God that not even the blessed know them; (4) there are truths so deeply hidden in God that they can never be known through analogical knowledge; (5) from the fact of revelation there are truths hidden in God which can be revealed to us by God and in fact have been revealed; (6) through revelation and faith it is certain that these revealed matters are true; (7) through reason enlightened by faith an analogical understanding of mysteries is possible (db 1796, ds 3016, nd 131); (8) this understanding, fruitful though it is, is attained only through analogies that are imperfect; (9) these limitations cannot be removed while we are walking by faith and not by vision; for concerning the mysteries, faith teaches us how to answer the question, Is it so? but only the vision of God provides us with the grounds for understanding what God is. (Fs)