Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Analogie, Gott; Thomas: über Aristoteles hinaus (Seinsweisen: Mensch, Engel, Gott - erstes Objekt d. Intellekts); das Eine - Viele (Plotinus, Rosmini); Thomas: viele Ideen (rationes) in Gott - aber: virtuell, emminenter, formal; Quelle d. Einheit

Kurzinhalt: Thus, the primary object of the divine intellect is 'the universal principle and active power of all being,' that is, 'Being itself (ipsum esse); its secondary object is everything to which the divine power extends. The angelic intellect, however ...

Textausschnitt: 633d Third, Thomas's analogy goes far beyond that of Aristotle. (1) Aristotle's 'understanding understanding' is itself scarcely understandable (Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 26, ¶10, §2080); (2) one cannot derive from it the knowledge God has of other things and God's providence over them; (3) it does not furnish a basis for distinguishing between the divine intellect and an angelic intellect. These very serious obstacles are removed by St Thomas by his comparison between different intellects and being quidditatively, or comprehensively, understood. Thus, the primary object of the divine intellect is 'the universal principle and active power of all being,' that is, 'Being itself (ipsum esse); its secondary object is everything to which the divine power extends. The angelic intellect, however, has as its primary object the essence of the angel itself. (Fs) (notabene)

635a Fourth, this knowledge that God has of other things must be very carefully understood. When Plotinus was unable to reconcile the one and the many in one simple reality, he first posited the One and then Intelligence, or Mind (Nous). Clement of Alexandria erroneously distinguishes between Father and Son as if the Father were the One as the One and the Son were the One as the All. (For the text, see R. Arnou, De 'Platonismo' Patrum: Textus et collegit et notis illustravit. Series theologica 21 [Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1935] 19, where other passages are referred to; see also pp. 8, 40-41). Rosmini tried to demonstrate some multiplicity in God, namely, the Trinity, on the basis of multiplicity in things (see Francesco Bruno, 'Le dimostrazioni trinitarie di Antonio Rosmini.' Divus Thomas [Piacenza] 55 [1952] 181-83). (Fs)

635b Now Thomas clearly taught that there are many ideas in God (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 15, a. 2), which in [God's] speculative knowledge are called 'ideas' (rationes) and in [God's] practical knowledge are called 'exemplars' (ibid. a. 3). This multitude is contained virtually (i.e., as in its cause) in the divine power, eminently in the divine essence as being in a multitude of ways outwardly imitable, and formally in the divine intellect. (Fs)

635c Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 5 c: '... the very act of existence of the first efficient cause, which is God, is his act of understanding. Thus, whatever effects preexist in God as in their first cause must be in his act of understanding, and all that are in it must be there in an intelligible manner; for whatever is in something else is in it in the manner of that in which it is.'

635d But God does not behold the many ideas in themselves, since ideas do not subsist, but sees them in himself (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 5 a). Nor are they species by which God understands, for the species by which God understands is unique and is God's essence itself (ibid. q. 15, a. 2). Nor are they many words uttered by God, since in God there is but one unique Word (ibid. q. 34, a. 3, ad 4m). Nor are they conceptual beings (entia rationes) except according to our way of thinking, for God truly knows many ideas which, if they were in God as conceptual beings, would also be [inner] words. But they are secondary objects of the divine act of understanding itself, for they are 'as that which is understood'; 'there are many ideas in the divine mind as things understood by him' (ibid. q. 15, a. 2 a); 'many ideas are in his intellect as understood' (ibid, ad 2m) as its secondary object, which does not specify its act (ibid. q. 14, a. 5, ad 3m). (Fs)

635e Therefore, the first source of multiplicity is the divine intelligence. For it is of the nature of its act to understand in such a way that many other things are understood in one understood content. And since the very act of existence is the universal principle of all being, it is quite impossible for God to know himself without formally knowing many things through the same act of understanding, without any multiplication of reality. See Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 5; see also a. 6 and q. 15, a. 2. (Fs)
637a You may interject here that God's essence or his power is the ultimate origin of multiplicity. But the multitude is in his essence eminently, not formally, and in his power virtually, not.formally; whereas in the act of understanding himself, God clearly and distinctly and properly understands many, indeed an infinity, of things. (Fs)

637b You may further object that there cannot be a clear and distinct understanding of many things unless many inner words are formed. Our answer to this is that every inner word proceeds from the knowledge of the one who understands and therefore an understanding of many things is a prerequisite for the formation of many words. Now in us, to be sure, such an understanding occurs only through many acts of understanding and the formation of many words; but in God's case, as he comprehends all things in a single act of understanding, so does he utter all things in a single word (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 34, a. 3). Besides, there is no legitimate argument to prove the existence of the divine word from the fact that we, with our weak intellects, need many acts of understanding and many words. See appendix 2, §7, above, on the necessity of the word in us, and §25, below. (Fs)

637c Fifth, let it be clearly understood that God is of an intellectual nature. No divine perfection is unknown to God, and all knowledge is rooted in identity. In God's self-knowledge, therefore, the one who understands and the act of understanding and what is understood are one and the same, so that all divine perfection is identical with his act of understanding. Since, however, knowledge is rooted only in identity, to the primary object is added a secondary object whereby God in the one and the same unique act of understanding clearly, distinctly, and properly knows all other things to be contained eminently in his essence and virtually in his power. Note here that in God 'to be understood as a secondary object' and 'to be understood in his essence' and 'to be understood in his power' and 'to be contained eminently in his essence' and 'to be contained virtually in his power' are all the same. That which in God is one, in us is conceived in many different ways according to various analogous concepts of the same reality.1 (Fs) (notabene)