Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Hauchung, Wort; Unterschied: processio operati (Akt von Akt) - processio operationis (aus Potenz zu Akt); Akt d. Wortes -> Akt d. Willens (p. operati); Wille: 2 Beweger;

Kurzinhalt: ... whether the procession of love from a word is a processio operati. To this the answer would seem to be in the affirmative... that the apprehended object of desire moves the appetite, and that this apprehended object is an unmoved mover while ...

Textausschnitt: 617c One may ask, however, whether the procession of love from a word is a processio operati. To this the answer would seem to be in the affirmative. The distinction made in De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 7m, consists in this, that a procession of an operation (processio operationis) is a procession of a perfection from or in that which is perfectible, while a processio operati is a procession of a perfection from a perfection. Again, a procession of an operation is a procession of an act from a potency, which cannot be admitted in God, but a processio operati is a procession of an act from an act, and it is at least not so clear that this is to be excluded from God. Therefore, if an act of willing comes either from the potency of willing or from a potency that has been disposed or informed by a habit, the procession is that of an operation; if, on the other hand, the act of willing comes from another second act, namely a word, the procession is a processio operati, for it is the procession of a perfection from a perfection, of an act from an act. (Fs) (notabene)

619a As to the manner in which love proceeds from a word, there is considerable confusion, since some assign the influence of the apprehended object of desire upon the appetite to final causality while others assign it to efficient causality. Cajetan (In Sum. theol, 1, q. 27, a. 3, §§IX-XI; Leonine edition, vol. IV, 312) holds this influence to be by way of efficient causality and refers to Averroes. John of St Thomas states, 'Final causality is real, as the real is contradistinguished from a conceptual being [ens rationis], not as the real is contradistinguished from the intentional ... which is an intentional motion, but which nevertheless truly exists in reality and produces a true effect in the will ..." (Joannis a Sancto Thoma Naturalis Philosophiae, 1, q. 13, a. 2, ad 3m [ed. Beato Reiser] Taurini [Turin]: Marietti, 1933, vol. 2, p. 281). Aristotle in De generations et corruptione (1, 7, 324b 14-15) distinguishes between an end and an agent (poietikon) and says that an end is an agent in a metaphorical sense only; hence his well-known statement about metaphorical motion from an apprehended object of desire. The significance of this statement may be gathered from the fact that it is this motion that is the effect of Aristotle's prime mover. (See In XII Metaphys., lect. 7, §§2519-22; Summa contra Gentiles, 1, c. 13, ¶29,. §108.) And if this motion is reduced to a mere metaphor, it needs nothing more than a metaphorical prime mover. (Fs)

619b As Aristotle distinguished between an end and a maker, so also Aquinas, along the same lines it seems, recognizes two influences upon the will, one by way of an agent and one by way of an end. The influence by way of an agent is exerted by God alone: it belongs to the creator of the will to impress forms upon the will, to infuse virtues in it, to change its dispositions, and to bring about an exercise of its act (Summa contra Gentiles, 3, c. 88, ¶5, §2641; De veritate, q. 22, a. 8; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, a. 6; q. in, a. 2. See also Theological Studies 3/4 [1942] 537-41 [Grace and Freedom 98-104]). The influence by way of an end is exerted by the apprehended object of desire, which moves the appetite to a specification of its act by presenting an object to the will. (See, for example, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 9, a. 1 c.)

621a It is abundantly clear that an apprehended object of desire is a true cause and not a mere condition. (Fs)

The only reason for hesitation on this point is Augustine's opinion that all the powers of the soul move themselves to all of their acts, an opinion which, as we have seen [appendix i, §8], has been wrongly foisted upon St Thomas. (Fs)

621b Aquinas constantly repeats Aristotle's doctrine that the apprehended object of desire moves the appetite, and that this apprehended object is an unmoved mover while the will is a moved mover. (Fs)

Nowhere in the writings of St Thomas will you find any other cause for the specification of the act of the will than the apprehended object of desire. (Fs)

621c What causes the specification of an act is not to be disregarded as being unimportant. For among the powers of the soul, only the will causes the exercise of both its own act and that of the other powers {Sutnma theologiae, 1-2, q. 17, a. 1; see also 1, q. 82, a. 4). (Fs)

Moreover, an end is in the highest degree a cause, and the first of causes; and yet, 'an end is not a cause except insofar as it moves an agent to act' (De potentia, q. 5, a. 1 c). (Fs)

621d For our present purpose, however, concerning the manner in which love proceeds from a word, the most important point to be attended to is intellectual emanation. The will is a rational, an intellectual, appetite. But love is good on account of the goodness of the object apprehended by the intellect. This dependence upon the intellect is more than just the relation between a material cause and a material or sensible effect; and it is not at all clear that there is no such dependence when the Love is so intimately related to the Speaker and the Word as to be in reality absolutely the same act with them. (Fs)