Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Intellektuelle, materielle Emanation; "intelligibile" (2 Bedeutungen); Gott -> Sohn -> Geist (eine Realität; Ggs: Hitze als Ursache - Erhitztes als Wirkung); Verstehen -> inneres Wort -> Urteil -> Wille (Bejahung des Guten)

Kurzinhalt: ... in the same way the act of understanding is really different from the proceeding inner word. Besides, if this duality between the principle and the resultant did not exist, the principle could not be a cause and the resultant could not be an effect..

Textausschnitt: 18 Intellectual Emanation

609c There are two points that should be especially noted with regard to intellectual emanation: first, the fact that 'the higher a particular nature is, the more that which emanates from it will be intimately (one) with it' (Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, ¶1, §3461), so that if there is an emanation in God, that which emanates would be consubstantial with that from which it emanates; second, that although the one who emanates and the one from whom he emanates are one and the same substance, nevertheless there is still an emanation in the true and proper sense. (Fs)

609d The first point is made by St Thomas in the passage just quoted (Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, ¶1, §3461; see also Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 1, ad 2m). The second will become clear insofar as the difference between intellectual emanation and material or sensible emanation is understood; so our task now is to try to acquire that understanding.1 (Fs)

611a Note, first, that the Latin word 'intelligibile' can be taken in two ways: in the first way, even material and sensible realities are in some way considered intelligible, inasmuch as they are produced by God's knowledge (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14, a. 8 c.) and are known by us through understanding; in the second way, intelligible realities (intelligibilia) are contradistinguished from material and sensible things. It is in this latter sense that 'the human intellect is in the order of intelligible things (intelligibilium) as a being that is only in potency, just as prime matter is in the order of sensible things' (ibid. q. 87, a. 1 c). It is in this exclusive sense that we speak of an emanation as 'intellectual' (Summa contra Gentiles, 4, c. 11, ¶8, §3468) or (in Latin) 'intelligibilis' (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 1 c), since the image of God is in a human being only with respect to the mind (ibid. q. 93, a. 6).2 (Fs)
611b Next we must distinguish between what among created things is common to both intellectual emanation and material or sensible emanation and, on the other hand, what is proper to intellectual emanation alone. (Fs)

611c Now, in created things, an element common to all emanation is that the originating principle of emanation is really different from that which emanates from it. The heat of a heater is really different from the heat of that which is heated; in the same way the act of understanding is really different from the proceeding inner word. Besides, if this duality between the principle and the resultant did not exist, the principle could not be a cause and the resultant could not be an effect; for since nothing can be a cause of itself, no causality in the proper sense exists without duality. Hence, if we are to get some understanding of the divine processions we shall have to go to something other than causality; for although in God the Son proceeds from the Father and the Spirit proceeds from both, the three Persons are one God, one substance, one reality. (Fs) (notabene)

611d Note, therefore, that it is proper to an intellectual emanation that the inner word is not only an effect produced by the act of understanding but also that it can only result and does only result insofar as the reason why it should be produced is grasped in an act of understanding.3 We can only conceive a definition and only do actually conceive it insofar as we understand the because of, the why, of the thing to be defined. Again, we can only affirm or deny that something is inasmuch as we grasp that there is sufficient evidence for that affirmation or negation; there is no other way to make a rational judgment. Finally, since the will is defined as a rational or intellectual appetite, we can similarly in no way will something unless we affirm the reason why we are willing it, namely, goodness. (Fs) (notabene)