Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Akt d. Vestehens; Notwendigkeit des Wortes 2; Objekt als Beweger - als Ziel: vierfache Notwendigkeit d. Wortes (weil das Ziel d. Intellekts weiter ist als das O. als Beweger); Unmöglichkeit des Beweises d. Wortes in Gott

Kurzinhalt: For we have established the necessity of a word in us because of the fact that the object of our intellect as its end is broader than the object that moves it.

Textausschnitt: 7 The Necessity for the Word

597a There is one object that activates our intellect in this present state of existence and another more extensive object to which our intellect tends, and this is why it is necessary for us to form inner words. (Fs)

598b That which moves our intellect in the present state is its proper object, the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 7 c), which is known primarily and per se (ibid. q. 85, a. 8 a), which is known first (ibid. q. 87, a. 3 c), and is the first thing understood by us in our present state (ibid. q. 88, a. 3 c). (Fs)

598c Note here that this first object is not the species received in the possible intellect (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 2 c), nor the act of understanding, nor a definition or inner word, but an external reality, the nature of some material thing (ibid. q. 87, a. 3 c). And since this object moving [the intellect] is restricted to that to which the phantasm stands as the matter of the cause, therefore 'in this present state of life, neither through the possible intellect nor through the agent intellect can we understand immaterial substances in themselves' (ibid. q. 88, a. 1 c.) and 'much less can [the human intellect] understand the essence of the uncreated substance' (ibid. a. 3 c). (Fs) (notabene)
598d But the object to which the intellect tends as to its end is not any genus of things but is being in its widest extension. The intellect is that which can become all things, and 'all' is unrestricted (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 7 a). This object, since it is founded upon the very nature of the intellect, is known by us naturally and per se (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 83, ¶31, §1678) and cannot be unknown to us (De veritate, q. 11, a. 1, ad 3m), but is known immediately by the light of the agent intellect (ibid. c). (Fs)

599a We can come to understand the meaning of 'known naturally' both from principles that are known naturally and from our own experience. For principles that are known naturally are grounded upon the meaning of being (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 83, ¶31, §1678; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m); a habit regarding them 'is, in a way, innate in our minds by the light of the agent intellect' (Super II Sententiarum, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3 sol; De veritate, q. 8, a. 15 c.) and is more comparable to an infused than to an acquired habit (Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad im). This is confirmed by experience. Children are neither taught nor do they learn to ask, Is it? and Why? about everything; when they do so, they are asking about being with respect to its existence and its essence. (Fs) (notabene)

599b From this difference between the object moving the intellect and the object as its end, a fourfold necessity for the word becomes clear. (Fs)

First, since both God and separate substances fall within being taken in its broadest extent and yet do not move our intellect in our present state of life, we need inner words as means in which to know them analogically. Hence, we do know God in this life inasmuch as from his effects we know 'that this statement which we form about God when we say, "God exists," is true' (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 3, a. 4, ad 2m). (Fs) (notabene)

599b Second, it is proper to the intellect to apprehend many things as a unity. But a multitude of material objects cannot be represented simultaneously in a phantasm, and therefore in order to achieve a philosophic or scientific synthesis we need inner words to express many things together. (Fs) (notabene)

599c Third, material things consist not only of form or essence or quiddity but also of another principle called esse or existence. This principle is known in the second intellectual operation when we answer the question, Is it? But the question, Is it? is not properly put unless we first define what it is we are asking about, and therefore the forming of inner words is necessary for us to know material things as to their quiddity and their existence. (Fs) (notabene)

599d Fourth, the proper object of our intellect is the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter. But unless we form an inner word, only the quiddity or nature will be known to us directly through our intellect, and only the corporeal matter through our senses or through a phantasm. But the requirement is that a thing, a unity in itself, become known through one intellectual knowing, and for this the forming of a word is necessary. St Thomas indicates this: 'Therefore what is primarily and per se understood is that which the intellect conceives within itself about the object understood, that is, either a definition or a proposition ...' (De potentia, q. 9, a. 5 c.) (Fs) (notabene)

599e From all that we have been saying, it is immediately evident that by the light of reason alone we cannot demonstrate the existence of the Word in God. For we have established the necessity of a word in us because of the fact that the object of our intellect as its end is broader than the object that moves it. But God is neither moved by anything nor tends to an end. He himself is by identity both existence itself and understanding itself. And because he perfectly understands himself, he perfectly understands both his power and all that lies within the scope of his power. Nor is there within him any discursive reasoning, but in one act and one intuition he comprehends both himself and all other things (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 14). For this reason, then, we say that only by faith do we hold that there is a Word in God (De veritate, q. 4, a. 2, ad 5m; De potentia, q. 8, a. 1, ad 12m; Summa theologiae, 1, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2m). (Fs)