Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Akt d. Vestehens; Notwendigkeit des Wortes 1; erstes Objekt d. Intellekt: Natur eines materiellen Seins (nicht species im intellectus possibilis); erstrebtes Objekt d. Intellekt.: Sein (per se gewusst); Erkenntnis von Prinzipien

Kurzinhalt: Note here that this first object is not the species received in the possible intellect ... nor the act of understanding, nor a definition or inner word, but an external reality, the nature of some material thing ...

Textausschnitt: 597a There is one object that activates our intellect in this present state of existence and another more extensive object to which our intellect tends, and this is why it is necessary for us to form inner words. (Fs)

598b That which moves our intellect in the present state is its proper object, the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 7 c), which is known primarily and per se (ibid. q. 85, a. 8 a), which is known first (ibid. q. 87, a. 3 c), and is the first thing understood by us in our present state (ibid. q. 88, a. 3 c). (Fs)

598c Note here that this first object is not the species received in the possible intellect (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 2 c), nor the act of understanding, nor a definition or inner word, but an external reality, the nature of some material thing (ibid. q. 87, a. 3 c). And since this object moving [the intellect] is restricted to that to which the phantasm stands as the matter of the cause, therefore 'in this present state of life, neither through the possible intellect nor through the agent intellect can we understand immaterial substances in themselves' (ibid. q. 88, a. 1 c.) and 'much less can [the human intellect] understand the essence of the uncreated substance' (ibid. a. 3 c). (Fs) (notabene)

598d But the object to which the intellect tends as to its end is not any genus of things but is being in its widest extension. The intellect is that which can become all things, and 'all' is unrestricted (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 79, a. 7 a). This object, since it is founded upon the very nature of the intellect, is known by us naturally and per se (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 83, ¶31, §1678) and cannot be unknown to us (De veritate, q. 11, a. 1, ad 3m), but is known immediately by the light of the agent intellect (ibid. c). (Fs)

599a We can come to understand the meaning of 'known naturally' both from principles that are known naturally and from our own experience. For principles that are known naturally are grounded upon the meaning of being (Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 83, ¶31, §1678; Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4m); a habit regarding them 'is, in a way, innate in our minds by the light of the agent intellect' (Super II Sententiarum, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3 sol; De veritate, q. 8, a. 15 c.) and is more comparable to an infused than to an acquired habit (Super III Sententiarum, d. 23, q. 3, a. 2, ad im). This is confirmed by experience. Children are neither taught nor do they learn to ask, Is it? and Why? about everything; when they do so, they are asking about being with respect to its existence and its essence. (Fs) (notabene)