Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Form: (auf 2 Weisen im Intellekt): Prinzip - Term des Verstehens; species - phantasma - intellectus (Beispiel: Farbe, Sehen - phantasma, Intellekt); species im phantasma (Warnung); Unfehlbarkeit des Intellekts; Wende zum - Reflexion über phantasma

Kurzinhalt: ... no intelligible species, as strictly spiritual, is or can be formally in a phantasm. But a species can be said to be in a phantasm virtually, both inasmuch as a phantasm is an instrument by which a species is impressed upon the possible intellect ...

Textausschnitt: 593c 'Form': 'There are two ways in which form can be in the intellect. In the first way, it is that which is the principle of the act of understanding, as the form of the one understanding inasmuch as he understands; this is the likeness of the thing understood in the one understanding. In the second way, it is the term of the act of understanding, as an architect through understanding devises the form of a house. And since this form is devised through an act of understanding and is, as it were, produced through that act, it cannot be a principle of the act of understanding as something pre-existing by which understanding takes place, but is rather that by which, when it is understood, the one understanding operates' (De veritate, q. 3, a. 2). (Fs; tblStw: Form) (notabene)

593f To understand this, consider the relation that exists between a phantasm that is properly disposed and an intelligible species. A phantasm is to the species not as its total and complete cause but rather, in a way, as the matter of the cause (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 6 a). On the other hand, the species is to a phantasm as cause of the matter, that is, just as the form or the quod quid erat esse by which the matter comes to be something or to be a substance (In VII Metaphys., lect. 17, §1668). Therefore, just as natural dispositions induce a natural form in the matter, so the dispositions represented in a phantasm in the order of intentional existence are as instruments in the production of the intelligible species in the possible intellect. Moreover, just as from a consideration of the dispositions that emerge in matter a person can understand the form induced from those dispositions, so in like manner one can understand in one's duly disposed phantasm the species of a thing similar to the species for whose production the phantasm is disposed. (Fs) (notabene)

595a This virtual, dispositive presence of a species in the phantasm is entirely sufficient. First of all, it is sufficient that the phantasm be an instrument in the production of the species, for an instrument is such that it produces an effect beyond its proper proportion. Also, it is sufficient that the phantasm be the ground in which the species shines forth and is understood; for 'intellect' is from intus legere, 'to gather inwardly,' that is, to grasp the inner form and essence of a thing in externals apprehended by the senses. This can be illustrated in another way. Just as colors on a wall that are actually being seen are identical with the faculty of sight rendered in act and yet are not seen in one's eyes but on the wall, so in a similar way species that are actually understood are one with the possible intellect rendered in act and yet are understood not in the intellect but in the phantasm. See In IIIDe anima, lect. 2, §§592-93, 595; Summa contra Gentiles, 2, c. 59, ¶[14, §1366. (Fs; tblStw: Beispiel)

595b With regard to the above, three points should be noted. (Fs)

First, do not confuse this understanding of the species in the phantasm with knowing the species received and conserved in the possible intellect. For the species shining in the phantasm, the intelligible in the sensible, the quiddity existing in corporeal matter, is the proper object of our intellect, and therefore our intellect understands nothing whatever unless it turns to the phantasm. But the species received in the possible intellect is not known except when the intellect reflects upon itself (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 2 c.) and in its inquiry proceeds from its object to its act, from acts to habits, from habits to potencies, and from potencies to the essence of the soul (ibid. q. 87). (Fs) (notabene)

595c Second, note that the intellect is infallible primarily and per se with respect to a quiddity or species, and secondarily with respect to other things as more or less closely related to a quiddity (Aristotle, De anima, III, 6, 430a 26 - 430b 30; In III De anima, lect. II, §§746-63). For what is understood in the phantasm is indivisible and simple, and therefore it is either truly understood or not at all, as is the case with separate substances (In III De anima, lect. II, §763; In IX Metaphys., lect. 11, §§1904-09). From this infallibility there follows infallibility (1) in defining, as long as the concept really proceeds from the understanding, (2) in predicating, as long as what are imagined accord with what are sensed, and (3) in understanding primary principles, as long as two intelligibles that have been separately understood coalesce into one intelligible likewise understood in the sensible (see Theological Studies 8:1 [1947] 36-46 [Verbum 61-71]; P. Hoenen, 'De origine primorum principiorum scientiae,' Gregorianum 14 [1933] 153-84). (Fs) (notabene)

595d Third, one must avoid the common error of confusing the intellect's turning to the phantasm with its reflection upon the phantasm. Turning to the phantasm is necessary for it to know its proper object, the quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter (Summa theologiae, i, q. 84, a. 7 a). But reflection upon the phantasm is done in order to know the indirect object of the intellect, which is the singular already known through sense and imagination but not known by the intellect except indirectly and by this sort of reflection (ibid. q. 86, a. 1 a). The possibility and basis for this indirect reflective knowledge lies in the fact that the intelligible species is linked to and has a certain continuity with the singular phantasm, since the species itself is understood in the phantasm. Accordingly, the intellect understands directly the species illuminated in the phantasm, while indirectly it knows the singular represented through the phantasm. (See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 86, a. 1; Aristotle, De anima, in, 4, 429b 10-21; Aquinas, In IIIDe anima, lect. 8, §§705-18; Theological Studies 10:1 [1949] 20-23 [Verbum 169-73].)