Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Akt des Verstehens 6 - Quidditas, Washeit; Universalien (2 Arten: Verstand - Sinnesvermögen); getrennte Substanzen: Form ohne Materie; visio beata

Kurzinhalt: Further, just as a separate substance is known differently from the way a man is known, it also knows in a different way. For since it is not sensible, it cannot have either senses or phantasms or an understanding of species shining in phantasms.

Textausschnitt: 583d Finally, one must marvel at the way he conceived the notion of separate substances. He recognized that the nature of separate substances and the nature of man were two quite different questions. The quiddity of man is that because of which 'this' pertains to the existence of a man, where 'this' denotes either the sensible properties of a man or something manifested through them. But such a 'this' cannot be found in a separate substance, since a separate substance is neither sensible nor material (In VII Metaphys., lect. 17, §1669). And since he had already proven that nothing universal subsists, he concluded that a separate substance was a form without matter. Further, just as a separate substance is known differently from the way a man is known, it also knows in a different way. For since it is not sensible, it cannot have either senses or phantasms or an understanding of species shining in phantasms. Therefore, in immaterial beings the understander and the understood are one and the same, and their act of understanding is an understanding of understanding (In XII Metaphys., lect. 11, §§2613, 2617, 2620). (Fs) (notabene)

585a But beware of an illusion. Not without a lengthy inquiry and wearisome labor do we come to know the quiddity of a thing. For it is not by some marvelous intuition but by thinking and reasoning that we arrive at understanding and uttering an inner word. Thus St. Thomas:

... when I want to conceive the intelligibility of a stone, it is necessary that I come to it by a process of reasoning; and so it is in all other things that are understood by us, except perhaps in the case of first principles, which, since they are known simply, are known at once without any discursive reasoning process. Therefore as long as the intellect is thrown this way and that in a process of reasoning, its formation is not yet finished, not until it conceives the intelligibility of the thing perfectly; and only then does it have the intelligibility of the complete thing, and only then does it have the intelligibility of the word. And that is why in our soul we have thinking, by which is meant the discursive process of inquiry, and we have a word, which is now formed according to the perfect contemplation of the truth.. [Super Ioannem, c. 1, lect. 1)

585b We certainly do not know by what sort of reasoning St Thomas arrived at the understanding of stone. But he spoke in the same way about the difficulty of understanding the nature of the human soul (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 87, a. 1 c), and it is evident from Summa contra Gentiles, 2, cc. 46-90, how he labored to come to know its quiddity. Also, how highly he valued a definition is clear from the following texts. (Fs)

De veritate, q. 2, a. 7, ad 5m: '... whoever knows a definition knows potentially the statements that are demonstrated through the definition.'

Ibid. q. 20, a. 5 c: 'Any given thing is understood when its definition is known ... However, the definition of any power is taken from those things to which this power extends itself. Thus, if the soul of Christ knew everything to which the power of God extended itself, he would comprehend completely the power of God; and this is quite impossible.'

585b From this you can understand why St Thomas identified the beatific vision with knowing God's essence (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 12), and how he was able to conclude that man has a natural desire for the beatific vision because he naturally seeks to know what God is (ibid. 1-2, q. 3, a. 8 c). (Fs) (notabene)

587a What leads many astray is the opinion of those who hold that universals are known only through the intellect, and therefore whenever they come to know a universal, they immediately think they have understood something. But there are two universals: one is that which is uttered because a 'why' has been grasped; the other is the universal in a particular individual, which is apprehended by some sensory faculty:

It is clear that the singular is sensed properly and per se, but sense is in a certain way also of the universal. For it knows Callias, not only as Callias, but also as this man; and similarly it knows Socrates as this man. And so it is that given such preceding sense knowledge, the intellective soul can consider man in each of them. But if it were the case that sense apprehends only what pertains to particularity and that it in no way along with this apprehends the universal in the particular, it would not be possible that from sense apprehension there would be caused in us a knowledge of universals (In II Post, anal, lect. 20; see also Summa theologiae, 1, q. 78, a. 4 c, where the evaluative ability in animals is compared to the cogitative power in a human being.)

587b Those, therefore, who claim to understand because somehow or other they perceive a universal are absolutely wrong. Take, for example, the case of the circle: those who know perfectly well the external shape, the Gestalt, of a circle yet have never thought about why a circle is necessarily round have really not progressed beyond the operations of their senses. (Fs)