Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Species (eidos) 1: forma, universale; sp.: impressa, expressa; Akt d. Vestehens folgt auf die Form, kommt aber nicht von ihr -> intellectus agens + phantasma = esse sequitur forma, aber Seinsakt (eg: forma dat esse)

Kurzinhalt: Therefore, just as a finite act of existence does not come from the form which limits it but from something else, similarly a finite act of understanding comes not from the form which it follows but from something else, namely, the agent intellect and ...

Textausschnitt: 587c The Latin for the Greek word eidos is species, whose two principal meanings are 'form' and 'universal.' 'It must be noted, however, that no matter, whether common or individual, in itself pertains to "species" taken as form. But insofar as "species" is taken as the universal - for example, as when we say that 'man' is a species - the common matter pertains per se to the species, but not the individual matter in which the nature of the species is received' (In VII Metaphys., lect. 9, § 1473).

587d There is a well-known distinction between the impressed and the expressed intelligible species which, though not explicitly made by St Thomas, nevertheless is based on his writings. (Fs)

587e In Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, aa. 3, 4, and 7, and q. 85, a. 2, he is referring to the impressed species. This is the species that is received and conserved in the possible intellect. It is received from the phantasm as an instrument of the agent intellect, and once received is the form according to which the intellect understands. Hence, in Avicenna's terminology it has the nature of an active potency and is a principle of action (understanding) and also a principle of the product or effect or term (inner word). But this does not in the least prevent this same species from being, according to Aristotelian terminology, a nature and first act and passive potency to receive the second act (understanding); and this reception of second act is also a passion, not in the proper sense but in a general sense.1 Thus, '... as existence follows upon form, so understanding follows upon an intelligible species' (ibid. q. 14, a. 4 c). '... understanding, which is related to intellect in act in the same way that existence (esse) is related to being in act' (ibid. q. 34, a. 1, ad 2m). Therefore, just as a finite act of existence does not come from the form which limits it but from something else, similarly a finite act of understanding comes not from the form which it follows but from something else, namely, the agent intellect and phantasm. Finally, this impressed and conserved species is not that which is understood, except when the intellect reflects upon itself and its act (ibid. q. 85, a. 2; see also q. 87). (Fs; tblStw: Relationen) (notabene)