Autor: Lonergan, Bernard J.F.

Buch: The Trinune God: Systematics

Titel: The Triune God: Systematics

Stichwort: Der Akt des Verstehens 5 - Quidditas, Washeit; Form, species, morphe; quod quid est, quod quid erat esse; Imagination - Verstehen : Materie - Form; 3 Objekte: Imagination, Verstehen, Definieren; Aristoteles: 4 Grundfragen (Reduktion auf 2)

Kurzinhalt: Thus there are three objects: the object of the imagination (equal radii), the object of the understanding (the necessity of roundness), and the object of the interior utterance (the definition of a circle).

Textausschnitt: 5 Quiddity

577b St Thomas time and again repeats that the proper object of the human intellect in its present state is quod quid est, 'what a thing is,' or quidditas, 'whatness' or 'quiddity.' Now we must ask, What is this 'what a thing is'?

Aristotle recognized two realities and made a certain distinction between them, namely, to ti esti and to ti en einai. Moreover, he used a more nuanced expression, to ti en einai tini, that is, to ti en einai toi toioidi somati (De anima, ii, 1, 412b 11), and even more briefly, einai with the dative case, as pelekei einai, megethei einai, sarki einai, euthei einai. (Fs)

For these expressions the medieval translators wrote, respectively, quod quid est, quod quid erat esse, quod quidem est esse eiusmodi corporis (sic, the Pirotta edition, Marietti, p. 63), dolabrae esse, magnitudini esse, carni esse, recto esse. (Fs)

577c In addition to these, the word quidditas is found in the writings of St Thomas, which had the advantage of being able to be declined through the various cases. (Fs)

On the use of these terms, see Theological Studies 7:3 (1946) 364-72 [Verbum 29-38]; 10:1 (1949) 18-25 [Verbum 168-75]. (Fs)

577d With regard to their meaning and signification, we have already made a distinction between the imagined equal radii, the understood necessity of roundness, and, finally, the spoken or uttered definition of a circle. Now, anyone can imagine equal radii. It is a matter of intelligence to grasp the necessity of roundness in that equality of radii. Finally, the act of defining is a matter of attributing to a circle and only to a circle that series or locus of points which lie in die same plane surface equidistant from a center. Thus there are three objects: the object of the imagination (equal radii), the object of the understanding (the necessity of roundness), and the object of the interior utterance (the definition of a circle). These are not only distinct but are also interrelated. The object of the imagination is to the object of understanding as matter to intelligible form, and the object of understanding is to the object of an interior utterance or word as its reason or cause or 'because of which' (propter quid). (Fs) (notabene; tblStw: Relationen)

577e That the object of the imagination stands as matter is stated in Summa theologiae, 1, q. 84, a. 6 c: 'Sense knowledge cannot be said to be the total and complete cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather, as it were, the matter of the cause.'1

579a That the object of understanding is as an intelligible form can be seen from its ordinary name. In Greek the word 'form' is either morphe or eidos; eidos is generally translated into Latin as species; and the intellect not only abstracts intelligible species from phantasms but also understands them in the phantasms (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 85, a. 1, ad im). (Fs)

579b That the object of an interior utterance has its reason and cause and its 'because of which' in the object of understanding is clear both from our intellectual experience - we are able to define a thing because we have understood it - and also on the authority of St Thomas: 'Whenever we understand, by the mere fact that we do understand, something proceeds within us, which is the conception of the thing understood, issuing from our intellectual power and proceeding from its knowledge. A spoken word signifies this conception; and this conception is called "the word of the heart," signified by the spoken word.' '... according to intellectual emanation, such as that of the intelligible word from the speaker, which remains within the speaker. Thus does the Catholic faith affirm procession in God' (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 27, a. 1 a). (Fs) (notabene)

579c If you have understood this, you will now be able to go on to consider the Aristotelian and Thomistic way of speaking. In Posterior Analytics, II, 1 and 2, Aristotle states that all questions can be reduced to four types: Whether there is an A? What is an A? Whether A is B? Why A is B? And these four can be further reduced to two; for the first and the third are about existence, while the second and the fourth are about 'why,' 'because of what.' (Fs) (notabene; TblVrw)

579d This is easy to see in the case of the first, third, and fourth questions. The first asks about the existence of some A, the third asks about the existence of a property B in a subject A, and the fourth deals expressly with why A is B. But it seems odd, perhaps, that the question, What is an A? is regarded as asking about a why. For it expressly asks What? rather than Why?

579e Yet, as Aristotle remarked, the question What? very often without any difficulty changes into Why? If I ask, for example, 'What is a lunar eclipse?' the question really means, 'Why is the moon covered over like this?' And in fact, whether I understand what an eclipse is, or whether I understand why the moon is covered over, I am understanding the same thing, namely, that the earth moves in between the moon and the sun, thus preventing the moon from being illuminated. (Fs)

581a In certain cases, however, it is not easy to show that a person who asks What? is really asking Why? In Posterior Analytics Aristotle left this problem unsolved, but took it up again in the Metaphysics. There he concluded that the questions What is a man? and What is a house? are really asking, Why is this (pointing to a man) a man? and Why is this (pointing to a house) a house? (Metaphysics, VII, 17, 1041a 6 to 1041b 32; In VII Metaphys., lect. 17, §§1648-80.)'1