Autor: Ormerod, Neil

Buch: Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Titel: Creation, Grace, and Redemption

Stichwort: Dialektik: Gnade - Natur; Thomas (Augustinus); divinum auxilium - natürliches Licht der Vernunft; reine Natur - gefallene N. (Wille); Verdienste - ewiges Leben; orthodoxe Tradition: theosis, Hesychasmus; gratia sanans, elevans; Pelagius

Kurzinhalt: Human nature is good in itself prior to original sin and can attain the good proportionate to it, but not the supernatural good of salvation, which requires God's grace. After the fall, human nature is weakened and can attain the good proportionate ...

Textausschnitt: THE GRACE/NATURE DISTINCTION

113b While Aquinas was not the first of the medieval theologians to introduce the grace/nature distinction, his is the most systematic exploitation of its potential to deal with the tensions present in the Augustinian legacy.1 In ST I-II q. 109, a. 1. Aquinas begins his account of grace by focusing on a very precise point of tension in the work of Augustine: Whether one can know any truth without grace. After noting objections to the position drawn from the writings of Augustine, and then noting Augustine's own retraction of those objections, Aquinas seeks his own response. He acknowledges that to know anything at all requires God's help (divinum auxilium), but such help should not be equated with a grace that brings salvation: (Fs) (notabene)

We must therefore say that, if a man is to know any truth whatsoever, he needs divine help in order that his intellect may be moved to its act by God. But he does not need a new light added to his natural light in order to know the truth in all things, but only in such things as transcend his natural knowledge.

113c Thus, there is a "natural light" of intellect proportionate to natural human knowledge, but there is also the possibility of a revealed knowledge that requires something added to this natural light, that is the light of faith. In this we see the beginnings of the grace/nature distinction. (Fs) (notabene)

113d Aquinas immediately then moves from the intellect to the will: Whether one can will or do any good without grace (ST I-II q. 109, a. 2). This lies at the heart of the grace/sin dialectic, at least in its extreme form. In this dialectic there is either sin or grace, and without grace nothing good can be achieved. Aquinas initially responds by distinguishing between nature in its pure state and nature in its fallen state. As in the previous response, "divine help" is needed for any motion of the will, as of the intellect, but the good proportional to nature is possible without grace to human nature prior to the fall. What of "fallen" nature? Here Aquinas departs from Augustine:

In the state of corrupt nature he falls short of what nature makes possible, so that he cannot by his own power fulfill the whole good that pertains to his nature. Human nature is not so entirely corrupted by sin, however, as to be deprived of natural good altogether. Consequently, even in the state of corrupt nature a man can do some particular good by the power of his own nature, such as build houses... But he cannot achieve the whole good natural to him, as if he lacked nothing. (Fs)

114a Aquinas is here asserting that even in the fallen state we are capable of some good, always with divine help, but not necessarily grace. He moves on to make a classical assertion about the necessity of grace:

Thus in the state of pure nature man needs a power added to his natural power by grace, for one reason, namely, in order to do and to will supernatural good. But in the state of corrupt nature he needs this for two reasons, in order to be healed, and in order to achieve the meritorious good of supernatural virtue. (Fs)

Kommentar (11.09.12): Die "Hilfe" Gottes als "Erstbeweger" bei jedem Akt des Verstehens und Wollens ist unterschieden von Gnade. Relation: "Hilf : Gnade = Schöpfung – Übernatürliches Leben.

114b By this stage Aquinas has effectively dismantled the grace/sin dialectic through the theoretical construct of human nature. Human nature is good in itself prior to original sin and can attain the good proportionate to it, but not the supernatural good of salvation, which requires God's grace. After the fall, human nature is weakened and can attain the good proportionate to it only in a spasmodic fashion. In this fallen state grace is necessary for two reasons: first, to heal our weakened orientation to the good, and, second, to elevate our nature to a higher end, to be able to attain God in the beatific vision. (Fs) (notabene)

114c The climax of this line of questioning then comes in ST I-II q. 109, a. 5: Whether one can merit eternal life without grace. Here the grace/nature distinction comes to the fore:

Now eternal life is an end that exceeds what is commensurate with human nature ... it follows that a man cannot, by his natural powers produce meritorious works commensurate with eternal life. A higher power is needed for this, namely, the power of grace. Hence a man cannot merit eternal life without grace, although he can perform works which lead to such good as is connatural to him. (Fs)

114d In this passage we can see Aquinas's ultimate rejection of Pelagian anthropology. Human nature is here conceived of ideologically, as oriented to certain ends, with its own operations and power to achieve proportionate ends, rather than an empirical conception of human nature, as found in Augustine. Human nature, according to Aquinas, is oriented to an end, the vision of God, which it simply cannot attain through the operations of its own nature. This end is supernatural, completely beyond the capabilities of any finite nature. (Fs)

115a Our attaining of this end can come about only through a special gift from God, something that makes us able to attain what we cannot attain through our own powers. This grace/nature distinction, while recognizing that grace is healing, focuses our attention on the elevating activity of grace. Grace is "supernatural."

Excursus on Grace and Divinization

While the Catholic tradition has adopted a metaphysical approach that speaks of grace in terms of its relation to the natural order-hence grace as supernatural-the Eastern Orthodox tradition has focused more on the implications of 2 Peter 1:4, that we become sharers of the divine nature through grace. For example, Gregory Nazianzus adopts the language of deification or theosis. This is a new creation that is "more godlike and exalted" than the first creation. This deification is realized by Christ in the incarnation and perfected in the economy of salvation by the Holy Spirit, "appropriated individually in baptism as well as in ascetic and philanthropic acts and finally consummated in the future life."2 Theosis is a reflection of God's light and brightness; it is proximity to, illumination by, and knowledge of God, demanding imitation of Christ and love of neighbor on our part. It is both God's gift and the reward for human effort. (Fs)

The issue of theosis finds a more theoretical explanation in the doctrine of the "uncreated energies of God." Cyril of Alexandria spoke of the Holy Spirit implanting a "divine form" in us through sanctification.3 While this does give expression to the notion of divinization, it is fraught with difficulties. What is the divine form that Cyril is talking about? In Aristotelian terms the form is what makes a thing what it is. The divine form is divinity itself, that is, God. How can this be implanted within us without both compromising the divine transcendence and making us something other than human?

A theoretical response to this was proposed by Gregory Palamas (1296-1359), a monk from Mount Athos. Some would place his contribution to the East as high as that of Aquinas in the West. The context of Palamas's contribution was a dispute concerning the monks' practice of Hesychastic prayer.4 During this prayer the monks claimed to behold the glory of God, the uncreated light of the divine essence that had appeared to the disciples during the transfiguration. Some rejected this claim, arguing that any light they saw must be a created light. Pala-mas responded by developing the doctrine of the uncreated divine energies, and so developed a distinction between the divine essence, which is unknowable (God-in-Godself), and the uncreated energies (God-for-us) that are God in relationship to the created order.5 This position is common among Eastern Orthodox theologians today. (Fs)

116a For Aquinas, this metaphysical analysis is not without psychological content. In discussing whether it is possible in the state of nature to love God above all things (ST I-II q. 109, a. 3) he says it is, but grace adds "an immediate willingness and joy to the natural love of God." Grace is "God's love poured into our hearts" (Rom 5:5), but not God loving us, but us loving God.6 While God loving us manifests the healing power of grace, it is in us loving God as God is in Godself that the elevating power of grace is realized. It is our love response to God that transcends the limits of our natural human power of love and reveals the supernatural nature of grace. (Fs)

116b The introduction of the grace/nature distinction allowed Aquinas to resolve the unresolved tensions present in the Augustinian theology of grace, which took as its starting point the grace/sin dialectic. Since then the grace/nature distinction has found a relatively permanent place in a Catholic understanding of grace and salvation.7 However, it is not without some difficulties. In particular it seems to posit two distinct ends for human existence, a natural end that is attainable through natural powers of human nature, and a supernatural end, which is attainable only through divine grace. How is this possible without dividing human beings in two, without introducing a deep division in the soul? Historically this problem found its focus in the question: Is there a natural desire to see God?